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1
The Rise and Fall of Medicare
We are coming to the end of Medicare as we know it. This end
will come about not because Medicare is not popular and not because
the reason for Medicare’s existence is past, but because Medicare’s
financing cannot sustain its expenditures. Spiraling per-capita benefit
costs and the prospect of an avalanche of new members in the program
will force Congress to find new revenues or to drastically cut benefits.
The natural questions are: How did we get here? And, why didn’t we
see the crisis coming? Yet the answers to these questions only give us
the source of our problems and not the solution, if there is one. In this
book, we follow Medicare through its relatively short life, pointing out
the reasons for the briefness of its healthy period and proposing a permanent solution to the crisis. We deal with all three aspects of the
Medicare program that have worked together to get us to the current
situation: a payment scheme that ensures the users of the system will
not care what it costs; a financing system that involves generation
transfers as its principal source of revenue; and the penchant of Congress to fund “worthy” causes with any funds that appear available.
The remainder of this chapter presents an overview of the factors that
have resulted in the potential insolvency of Medicare and our solution
to the Medicare crisis.

WHO PAYS AND THE ESCALATING PER-CAPITA COST
OF MEDICARE
As a point of departure, consider the difference between the fullpage grocery store advertisements that appear in every daily newspaper
and those touting your local hospital or health care provider. The grocery store ads, no matter in what city they appear, are dominated by
one thing: the price of the advertised goods. Health care firms also
advertise, and their ads inform us about why we should use their
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respective facilities, but price is never mentioned. Only the nonprice
components of care are the subject of hospital and medical clinic ads.
Why is price prominent in grocery advertising but never mentioned
in ads for hospitals or medical clinics? The reason is simple, and it is a
major reason for the escalating per-capita cost of Medicare: the majority of consumers of medical care are not concerned about its cost
because they aren’t paying for it (at least not directly). Because buyers
are not concerned about medical care costs, the sellers of medical care
aren’t either. Consumers are happy to demand state-of-the-art care,
and providers are happy to supply it.
Consider hospitals, for example. Well over 90% of all payments to
hospitals in the year 1990 were not paid by the recipients of hospital
services. For physicians services, over 80% of all payments were not
paid by patients. Even for dental services and prescription drugs, relative newcomers to the prepaid insurance market, more than 50% of
payments in 1990 were not made by the patients. If the patients aren’t
paying, who is? The payers are the federal government, through Medicare, and the patients, indirectly through various medical prepayment
plans (commonly known as medical insurance, although the insurance
companies simply administer group plans and are not at risk as they
would be if insurance was really involved).
Private insurance, or prepaid medical care, works this way. Suppose you are fully aware that your next year’s group premiums depend
solely on your group’s expenditures this year. Suppose further that you
are a member of a group of 1,000 and contemplate an additional
$1,000 worth of medical services. This extra $1,000 in expenditures
will raise your next year’s premium only one dollar, because the other
999 members will pay the rest ($1 each). Thus, you have every incentive to treat medical care as essentially free. Furthermore, you can’t
expect the providers of medical care to be concerned about the cost if
you are not. In this type of environment, no hospital will advertise
price, but rather what state-of-the-art services they can provide. After
all, you can and will pay anything, because you are not actually paying; your fellow workers are.
Imagine if the air-travel market operated the same way as the market for health care. You are in Florida and want to travel to California.
Your choices are 1) fly from, say, Orlando to Los Angeles on any major
carrier in coach for perhaps $500; 2) fly the same route and carrier first
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class for $2,000; 3) fly the space shuttle at a full cost of $50 million
(assuming convenience of schedule and flight safety were equal to
those of the airlines). Looking at actual travel statistics, most Americans choose the $500 coach ticket. Why? Because they are paying for
the ticket. The airlines know this and spend a lot of money telling prospective travelers what it will cost to fly on their airline. Now imagine
you had Travelcare insurance that was operated in the same manner as
most U.S. health insurance. Voila! Now all three modes of travel cost
you the same. You can opt for first class or the space shuttle for the
same price as coach. How many coach seats do you think travelers
would demand? How many coach seats would airlines supply? You
would be right if you said, “none.” What would airline advertisements
look like? Well, you can be sure they would not mention the price of
the ticket. You can also be sure that the NASA budget would be much
higher as more and more shuttle trips were flown.
To see the impact on the industry of who pays, consider the following facts. The real cost of a hospital room adjusted for the change in
consumer prices has risen over 450% during the last 30 years. In contrast, the adjusted costs of physician services and dentist services have
risen 170% and 130%, respectively, while that of pharmaceuticals has
fallen 20%. What is different about these latter three categories of
medical care? Why is there such a difference in real costs relative to
the hospital sector? Perhaps the answers are in who is paying. For
example, on average over the last 30 years, hospital patients paid less
than 13% of all hospital bills and real costs have risen at 5% per year.
Patients have paid on average less than 40% of physicians’ bills and
real costs have risen just under 2% per year. On the other hand,
patients have on average paid more than 75% of their dental bills and
the real cost of dental services has risen less than 1% per year; likewise, they have paid more than 80% of all their prescription bills, and
real costs have fallen at an annual rate of just less than 1% per year.
These are powerful facts that relate real increases in costs of medical
care to whether or not buyers care what it costs.1
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THE TRAGEDY OF MEDICARE FINANCING
When the Social Security Act was passed in 1935, the financing
was envisioned as being fully funded by those working, so that when
they retired there would be enough in the “Old-Age Reserve Account”
to pay for their retirement.2 Through a combination of failure to enact
the programmed tax increases, premature initiation of payments to
retirees, and expansion of benefits, the trustees of the Social Security
Trust Fund estimate that the fund will be bankrupt by the year 2029.
When Medicare was passed and the Medicare Trust Fund was established in 1965, there was never any pretense that the “trust funds” in
that fund would be adequate to pay for the health care expenditures of
the covered population. Not surprisingly, then, bankruptcy of the
Medicare Trust Fund is expected by the year 2007.
As bad as all this sounds, the real issue may be even worse. The
Social Security and Medicare trust funds—indeed, all government trust
funds—are not trust funds at all. A trust fund, as you and I use this
term, means resources put away to meet some future contingency.
However, that is not what the Social Security and Medicare trust funds
are. The assets of government trust funds are promises of the government to use future tax revenues to pay for the future expenditures that
are guaranteed by the trust funds. These promises are not the source of
any future revenues, and that is the problem.
As originally conceived, the Social Security Trust Fund (the name
was changed from the Old-Age Reserve Account in 1939) was to buy
in the market outstanding U.S. government bonds. The purchase of
these bonds would have indeed represented a real investment, because
these purchases would have reduced the future commitment of the government to pay interest on the purchased bonds, making these
resources available for the retired. What in fact has occurred is that the
tax revenues flowing into the trust funds have been treated as normal
tax revenues to be spent on general expenditures; new, special U.S.
government bonds have been issued and placed into the trust funds,
which increases the net indebtedness of the government but is never
entered in any official accounting of the outstanding federal debt.
To better see the relation between what a trust fund contains and
that fund’s ability to finance future expenditures, let us consider an
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education trust fund established for a newborn child. Consider two
types of assets in a college education trust fund for this child: bonds
issued by entities other than yourself and bonds issued by you. In the
former case, the trust fund has as its assets the ownership of income
that others are legally obligated to pay to the trust. As a result, if the
college education of your children depends only on the ability or the
financial status of the issuers of the bonds to repay when your child
enrolls in college, you have prepaid for your children’s education. On
the other hand, if the trust fund has as its assets only your promise to
pay for your children’s college education when they enroll in college,
there is no prepayment. Imagine that you place in the trust fund each
year 15.3% of your earnings (15.3% is equal to the sum of the 12.4%
Social Security tax and the 2.9% Medicare tax). Instead of investing
this money in stocks or bonds each year, you take the money back out,
spend it on a trip to Europe, and replace it with a promise to pay the
trust fund when your children enroll in college. Now the costs of your
children’s college education depend solely on your willingness to
reduce your living standard by an amount equal to the costs of college
education for your children. The education of your children depends
on your promise to mend your spendthrift ways by the time they reach
college age.3
The Social Security and Medicare trust funds both have earmarked
revenues from payroll taxes placed in them, and thus they have all the
appearances of the first form of a college education trust fund, one in
which real assets are put away to pay future expenditures. It is the next
step that is crucial to what has happened to these two trust funds. The
government takes the income going into the trust funds and replaces it
with its own promises to pay in the future. This is not a problem if the
government invests the trust fund revenues in real social overhead capital that enhances the real productive capacity of the nation, because
when the time comes to use the trust funds, the ability of the government to pay the cost has been enhanced because of the real investments
made. Unfortunately, even a casual look at the federal budget over the
past 20 years indicates that the revenues have all been spent on current
consumption rather than on investment.
In every sense, the Social Security and Medicare trust funds are
fiction. There are no resources put aside to meet the future expenditures that these trust funds were designed to insure. As a result, if the
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Medicare Trust Fund’s “value” were sufficient to pay for Medicare for
the entire millennium, the taxpayers of this nation would be no better
off: every dollar of Medicare expenditures for the millennium would
still have to come from taxpayers at the time of these expenditures.
There simply is nothing real in the Medicare Trust Fund.
In another sense, this fact does not matter. Only if the nation is
willing to tighten its belt will it have the real resources necessary to
provide for the retirement and health care of a growing elderly population. If we are not willing to do this, then we must begin to put something real away. If the government will not invest for the future, then
we must restructure the system so that private individuals can do so.

THE WORTHY-CAUSE EFFECT
In addition to the lack of real assets in the Medicare Trust Fund,
Medicare’s funding problems have been exacerbated by expansion of
its original scope. By 1972, Congress was already finding worthy
causes on which to spend the excess of Medicare tax revenues over
actual Medicare expenditures, making the all-but-fictitious trust fund
balance even smaller than it would have been. These causes were in
three areas: an expansion of those eligible to receive Medicare benefits,
an expansion of the benefits themselves, and other non-Medicare but
health care–related expenditures.
Legislation approved in 1972 extended Medicare coverage to disabled persons under age 65 who were eligible for benefits under Social
Security or Railroad Retirement and to certain other individuals under
age 65 suffering end-stage renal disease. Coverage was also extended
to any individual not eligible for Medicare as a result of not being eligible for Social Security or Railroad Retirement who was aged 65 or
older and enrolled in the voluntary Supplemental Medical Insurance
(SMI) program. In 1985, Medicare benefits were extended to state and
local government employees not covered by Social Security, and coverage was also extended to include spouses of workers who were not
currently covered but would be eligible. Finally, in 1986, Medicare
was made the secondary payer for individuals and their spouses when
their work-supplied health care insurance was exhausted.
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By 1967, Congress was already adding to the benefits of Medicare:
60 additional days of in-patient hospital care were added to the lifetime
limit. In 1972, payment for the services of interns and residents in
podiatry training was added to the benefit package. In 1980, unlimited
home health visits were allowed, as was the use of alcohol detoxification facilities. In 1985, Medicare added payment for liver transplant
services.4 The only break in this steady expansion of benefits occurred
with the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1998. The BBA, in an effort
to reduce the deficit in the flow of funds into the Medicare Trust Fund,
moved home-health-care coverage from the Hospital Insurance portion
of Medicare—the part of Medicare directly funded by the Medicare tax
and for which the Medicare Trust Fund applies—to the SMI portion of
Medicare. This move did nothing real except to take expenditures out
of one category and place them in another; total expenditures remained
the same. It saved the trust fund, but there is nothing in the trust fund,
so the future tax implications of the program remain unchanged.
Quite possibly the most controversial use of Medicare tax receipts
has been subsidies to teaching hospitals to aid in the training of physicians. This program represented a significant subsidy to those few hospitals that were in the program. These funds subsidized both the
training of physicians and the use of the hospitals by indigent patients.
Both of these uses might have been worthy of support, but if they were
so worthy, it seems that general revenue funds should have been made
available.

THE DEMOGRAPHICS FACTOR
In addition to financing and program expansion, demographics
plays an important role in the Medicare problem. Over the next 30
years in the United States, and in the rest of the developed world as
well, increased longevity combined with lower fertility will result in an
increased proportion of population that is above a constant retirement
age. In most of the developed world, the fertility rate is below the population-sustaining rate, a fact in startling contrast to the predictions of
the Club of Rome that population growth would be the bane of the 21st
century. It appears that the economics of procreation have moved us
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from a world of exploding population to one of perhaps declining population. The trend toward slower population growth, while not carried
as far as in the developed countries, has even hit the emerging countries: the developing countries of the Pacific Rim are also seeing
declining fertility. Figure 1.1 shows the expected change in regional
population between 1999 and 2030. Europe’s population will decline
5%; at the other extreme, the Middle East’s and Africa’s populations
are expected to grow by over 80%. In the United States, the population
is expected to grow by 27%. Given that the U.S. fertility rate is 2.07,
most of the growth will be due to immigration.
In 1965, 40% (77 million) of the U.S. population was 19 or
younger; 20 years earlier, 33% of the population had been 19 or
younger. This dramatic change in the age distribution of the U.S. population provided the potential for change in the nation. As this generation (referred to as the “baby boom”) has grown up, it has had a
profound impact on America’s culture and its economy. Products have
Figure 1.1 Change in Population 1999–2000 (%)
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been designed for the baby boomers and marketing campaigns have
been pitched toward them. More importantly, the biggest impact of
these same baby boomers is yet to be experienced, and not just here at
home, but worldwide.
Currently, members of the baby boom generation are experiencing
their peak earnings years, they dominate politics, and their voting
behavior shapes public policy. In a few years they will retire, and again
they will be part of a dramatic change in the age distribution of the
U.S. population. Once again, this generation will provide the potential
for change in the nation, but this time the change will occur as a result
of the agedness, rather than the youthfulness, of the population. What
changes can we anticipate and how widespread will these changes be?
The answer requires some background concerning where the United
States fits among the rest of the world’s population distributions.
North America and Europe together account for only 13.7% of the
world’s population, but they produce almost 60% of the world’s output.
Over the next 30 years, the combined population in North America and
Europe will drop to 10.6% of the total. Because of significant expected
immigration, the North American population share is expected to
decline only 7.8% while Europe’s population share is expected to fall
31%.
The combination of the post-war baby boom in the developed
world and declining fertility portend great changes in the age composition of the world’s population. For the developed world, the elderly
(defined as individuals 65 years of age or older) currently comprise
between 12% and 16% of the population (Figure 1.2). In Europe as a
whole, the elderly account for 15.4%; in France, 16%; in Germany,
16.1%; in England, 15.7%; and in Italy, 17.9%. In Japan, 16.5% of the
population is over 65, and in the United States, 12.6%.
Over the next 30 years, dramatic increases in the proportion of the
population that is elderly will force significant adjustments to government-sponsored pension programs and health care programs that redistribute from workers to retirees. By 2030, the elderly in Europe will
account for more than 25% of the total population: 29.6% in Germany,
25.8% in France, 23.5% in Britain, and a startling 29.3% in Italy. In
the United States, 20% of the population will be 65, and in Japan,
27.4%.
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Figure 1.2 Share of Region’s Population 65 and Above (%)

1999

2030

The proportion of elderly matters because the world’s output is
basically produced by the young. Most countries have social insurance
contracts that encourage the elderly to leave the labor force as a result
of labor policies that are still dominated by the Great Depression
notion that jobs are limited; by discouraging work by the elderly, we
save jobs for the young. These policies fail to view labor as a resource
(in fact, as the main engine of output). As the age composition of the
population changes, the share of the world’s workers that reside in
Europe and the United States will fall. Equally as important as who
produces the world’s output is who consumes the output. Currently,
the elderly in the developed world consume between 12 and 17% of
total production. By the year 2030, their consumption will rise to
between 25 and 32%! In Europe, the elderly will be consuming well
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over 30% of all production; in the United States and Canada, the elderly will consume 25%.
Virtually every country in the world has engaged in a system of
taxing workers to ensure the retirement benefits of the elderly. When
these systems were instituted, the population share of the elderly was
very small and the population was growing at fertility rates well above
population sustaining rates. Thus, the proportion of the population that
reached retirement age was very small relative to the number of workers, and, as a consequence, the burden on the young of providing for
the consumption of the elderly was small. A further consequence was
a small effect on any nation’s capital stock. Now, everything has
changed, and the whole system is about to topple, which will place
every country in a funding dilemma.
How the funding dilemma is solved has deep meaning for the
future, especially for the next 30 years. When we do long-term planning, we consider how governments will deal with this pending crisis.
Privatization of elderly entitlements, including Medicare, is a way to
capture the productive capacity of the current population bulge that
exists in all of the developed countries. Many of the countries of South
America have already privatized their social security systems; England
has partially privatized. The alternative to privatization will be a rapid
and significant increase in taxation that elected representatives will find
unpalatable. The required tax increase will bring the tax rate for funding current U.S. Social Security and Medicare entitlements to 22.12%.
If we wait until the problem arrives in earnest, the required tax rate will
be almost 29%.
What does the fact of declining fertility mean for the promises we
have made to provide for the health care of the elderly? The generation-transfer system of finance works so long as the number of young
is growing rapidly. A system that is based on population growth cannot continue to provide expanding benefits when that necessary growth
stops. The pending retirement of the baby boom generation magnifies
the inefficiencies inherent in the generation-transfer system of finance.
The current population of elderly stands at about 34 million and will
grow to approximately 39 million at the beginning of the baby boom
retirement. In the next 28 years, the elderly population will almost
double. When the last of the baby boomers retire in 2029, the elderly
population will stand at approximately 67 million. At that time there
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will be 2.2 workers per retiree, down from a current level of 3.9 workers per retiree.
In the United States, there are myriad reform proposals being
offered in the current Congress that promise to overcome the funding
crisis facing Social Security. A handful of these proposals include the
provision of establishing private retirement accounts. Medicare’s
funding crisis is equally severe, but prefunding the program has
received little attention. The provision of health care for the elderly
population can be made less sensitive to demographic changes if steps
are taken to move current Medicare to prefunded, no-first-dollar-coverage retirement health care and to reduce the incentives to retire early.
These demographics are hard to escape. We must either raise taxes significantly or reform the system, but only reform has any chance of
reducing the pain by providing the means of producing the output that
will be required for the consumption of both the working and the
retired populations.

A COHORT-BASED SOLUTION
Any complete solution to the problems of Medicare must address
both the flow cost of the system and its ability to provide for future
recipients. On a flow-cost basis, the Medicare system is already in deficit because the current benefits paid are in excess of current revenues.
Thus, we are now drawing down the trust fund, meaning that current
tax revenues (which could have been tax cuts) are funding current
Medicare expenditures because the trust fund contains only promises
to use tax revenues for Medicare. In the following chapters, we will
present an approach that is based on each generation prepaying its own
Medicare. While prepaying can ensure that the resources necessary to
provide benefits in the future are in place, it does not solve the flow
cost problem. For this, we design an alternative benefit package and
price this package. Our package, on a total out-of-pocket-cost-torecipient basis, is only marginally different from current Medicare;
however, the incentive structure is very different. The difference in
incentives has the potential of bringing the market to bear on Medicare
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expenditures, resulting in both the buyers and sellers of health care services caring what it costs.
In order to concentrate on the primary issue of providing health
care for the aged population, the original purpose of Medicare, we peel
away all the non-aged benefits of the current Medicare program. This
is not to say that these programs are without merit, but simply that their
inclusion confounds the analysis of dealing with the problem of the
cost and financing of health care for the aged. In effect, there are many
reasons for engaging in transfers from one group of society to another,
but we are restricting ourselves to the study of transfers that are related
to age and nothing else. In particular, transfers to the poor are not considered, because being poor is not age-related. In a sense, all poor
should be treated by the system in a similar manner, independent of
age.
Because we are discussing the provision of health care for the
aged, the question arises as to how this differs from other programs
designed to provide for the consumption expenditures of the aged, such
as Social Security or other retirement plans. Our answer is that on one
hand, there is no difference, and on the other hand, the difference is
overwhelming. The similarity lies in the fundamental fact that both
provide for the consumption expenditures of the elderly population.
The difference, however, is twofold. First, as a society we have
decided that we will not tolerate great differences in the level of health
care provided for the aged, regardless of ability to pay. As a result,
there is little incentive for the young to provide for their own retirement health care. Second, because of rapid changes in technology, we
have converted many aspects of what was once considered part of the
normal aging process to a medical condition, thus expanding expenditures on health care. As a result, the level of uncertainty in future
health care expenditures is far greater than for general living expenses.
The current structure of Medicare combines the worst of incentives
on the market side with a financing system that discourages saving for
the future. The result is a lower capital stock for the nation which,
when coupled with the upcoming bulge in the population of the aged as
a result of the retirement of the baby boomers, is going to bring Medicare to its knees.
We propose changing Medicare in two important ways. First and
foremost, the generational transfer method of financing must be aban-
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doned; it results in a reduced capital stock and reduces work incentives, both of which reduce national income. Second, we propose
introducing health insurance with no first-dollar coverage. Even
though in our solution the total out-of-pocket costs of serious illnesses
are the same as under current Medicare, the requirement that the first
dollars spent are the responsibility of the consumers will create incentives to care what health care costs. If consumers care, then competition will result in producers caring what health care costs.
We propose that each age cohort, defined as all individuals born
between January 1 and December 31 in any given year, insure itself
against retirement medical expenses. Each worker within an age
cohort will make contributions that are direct offsets to their current
Medicare tax. These contributions are placed into a Private Retirement
Insurance for Medical Expenditures (PRIME) account that, by the time
of the cohort’s retirement, will contain enough to pay for a lifetime of
retirement health care expenditures. Because of the considerable
uncertainty concerning retirement health care expenditures at the time
a cohort begins contributing, the level of contributions must be
adjusted as a cohort ages and more information concerning future medical needs is revealed. An additional benefit of cohort-based financing
is that it eliminates cohort size risk of the type we are now facing with
the pending retirement of the baby boom generation. If the population
age distribution experiences a bulge because of greater-than-normal
fertility or immigration, the contribution to retirement medical insurance of these cohorts will rise, maintaining the same per-capita value
as that for smaller cohorts.
All individuals would be required to participate in the program we
are proposing. The primary reason for mandatory participation is a
result of individuals’ incentives to underinsure themselves against
medical expenses that arise during retirement. As a society, we have
made the decision that individual access to health care will not depend
on ability to pay. Thus, individuals have incentives to save too little
during their working years to fund retirement health care; they expect
“society” to take care of them should they fall ill.
In the past, family units, through implicit intergenerational contracts, provided this insurance function. With today’s increased mobility and the changing dynamics of family units, a new means of
insurance is required. Cohort-based insurance in which, at the mini-
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mum, all working individuals in a cohort pay into the system, ensures
that a sufficient level of assets will be set aside as the cohort ages. By
forming cohort risk pools, mandatory participation also solves the
problem (i.e., adverse selection) that arises when individuals choose to
join the system only when they expect large medical expenses.
Insurance that comes into play only if an individual reaches the age
of 65 and has medical expenditures that exceed the policy’s annual
deductible requires smaller contributions than would a medical IRA.
Tying a mandatory life insurance program to the purchase of retirement
medical insurance simply increases the cost. In addition, we already
have a mandatory life insurance program contained in Social Security.
Thus, our proposed new Medicare, just as the current Medicare program, has no life insurance component and pays no death benefits to
survivors. In its simplest form, catastrophic retirement health insurance coverage is purchased during a worker’s years in the labor force,
the benefits of which are received only if the worker survives to retirement. The specific insurance we are proposing is comparable to
today’s $2,500 deductible policies, which pay all expenses above the
deductible.
Since our proposed insurance is universal, it must address the issue
of redistribution. With cohort-based insurance, redistribution occurs
within each age cohort rather than between cohorts. Within each age
cohort, workers subsidize nonworkers and high-wage earners subsidize
lower-wage earners. As an age cohort enters the labor force, they do
not know who will survive to retirement, who will be sickly, or who
will be high-income earners. At this time, they make a compact with
one another to pay the same percentage of their wages into a fund that
will purchase their retirement medical insurance, should they survive.
The level of retirement medical care that will be demanded by
today’s young workers is unknown, as is the composition and form of
that medical care. Both of these sources of uncertainty affect the timing of the purchase of retirement health insurance. Our approach does
not specify when retirement medical insurance will be purchased, but
the timing of the insurance purchase determines who bears the risks
associated with the medical care purchases that will be made by
today’s young workers when they are old. The real question is, will
future retirees pay for their own retirement medical purchases or will
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they rely on their children and grandchildren to pay for their medical
care?

CONCLUSION
When one considers the large difference in the potential unfunded
liability of the current system and our cohort-based alternative, one
wonders, where is the free lunch? After a thorough look at our proposal, however, it will be clear that there is no free lunch—but, there is
a considerably cheaper lunch that is of better quality than the one we
are currently committed to buying. The current generation-transfer
system of financing Medicare reduces the nation’s capital stock and
thereby reduces national income. By moving to prepaid financing, we
remove the disincentives to invest, and the nation will experience an
increase in its capital stock and income. It is this increase in the capital
stock and national income that provides the additional resources available to pay off most, but not all, of the current system’s unfunded liability. Moving to prepaid retirement health insurance is just good
business.
Even if it is good business to switch to cohort-based financing,
why is it so important to do it now? The answer lies in the incomegenerating power of the baby boom generation. While the pending
retirement of the baby boomers looms like a dark cloud over the
present Medicare system, these same baby boomers can become our
saviors if we can harness their earning power. To do this, we must act
quickly. The baby boomers begin to reach 65 in 2011 and, given past
history, they will begin their exit from the labor force even sooner (as
soon as age 50, which was in the year 1996). If we are to succeed in
making the transition to a fully funded Medicare system, we must
move all the baby boomers into the new system. Each year we delay
acting costs us $100 billion. We must face the fact that the promises
we have made to the elderly must be declared null and void unless the
system is drastically changed.
In our analysis, we show that using reasonable assumptions about
male and female earnings distributions and average rates of return on
investments in our nation’s capital stock, young cohorts can guarantee
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their retirement medical expenditures for a fraction of their current
Medicare taxes. Moreover, by acting now, we can transition from the
current system to a cohort-based system for far less than the unfunded
liability implicit in our existing Medicare system. In fact, the difference is staggering. Using current Health Care Financing Administration estimates, the existing Medicare system has an unfunded liability
of over $9 trillion (or 2.5 times our current national debt). Our system,
if adopted in the next two years, has a total unfunded liability of only
$700 billion (less than one-tenth the unfunded liability of the current
system).

OVERVIEW
In Chapter 2, we present a history of Medicare that details the
political issues and population demographics that led to its adoption.
Our cohort-based solution to the Medicare crisis has as its cornerstone
the potential increase in the nation’s income that will result by moving
from a Medicare financed through intergenerational transfers to a
Medicare prepaid by each generation. In Chapter 3, we present the
theory that underlies the source of this increase in national income. 5
Any proposal that uses savings to finance retirement health care expenditures must be based on estimates of both future earnings and health
care costs. In Chapter 4, we present a detailed discussion of our earnings forecasts. These forecasts deal with several issues, such as labor
force participation rates and life cycle earnings profiles, to name just
two. Chapter 5 provides the same level of detail for our estimates of
future retirement health care expenditures. Chapter 6 presents our proposal for a transition to a fully funded Medicare system. Finally,
Chapter 7 offers concluding comments.

Notes
1. The trend is for all areas of medical care to have increased third-party participation, so that buyers are being taken out of the “who-cares-what-it-costs” loop.
Patients currently pay less than 20% of doctor bills and less than 50% of dental
and prescription bills. As expected, the real inflation rates of these aspects of
medical care have shown a significant increase in the last decade.
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2. See A.W. Willcox (1937) for a complete discussion of the act and the public
finance aspects of the Old-Age Reserve Account, now referred to as the Social
Security Trust Fund.
3. We should note here that if the trust fund buys back some of your outstanding debt
rather than using it to support your current consumption, then the result is exactly
the same as buying bonds from others. The proceeds in the trust fund represent a
net addition to your asset position and are therefore available for use later. If, on
the other hand, you simply issue bonds to the trust fund and spend the proceeds on
current consumption, there is a deterioration in your net asset position and there
are no funds available for use later.
4. An excellent review of the history of Medicare provisions is contained in the
annual statistical supplement to the 1996 Social Security Bulletin (Social Security
Administration 1996).
5. Of necessity, Chapter 3 is abstract, although the heavy mathematics is relegated to
an appendix. If the reader is willing to accept the theoretical propositions that
intergenerational transfers reduce national income and that we can restore this lost
income by moving to a prepaid system, then nothing is lost by skipping Chapter 3
and moving immediately to Chapter 4.

2
A Brief History of Social Insurance
for the Aged in the United States
Insurance against the loss of income due to old age, unemployment, or illness has existed for thousands of years. In the past, old-age
insurance was implicitly centered on the family: assets were transferred between parents and children in exchange for care during old
age. Voluntary forms of insurance against the loss of income were also
historically prevalent in trade unions and fraternal organizations.
However, government-administered compulsory insurance is a relatively new institution. The first nationwide, compulsory old-age insurance program was established in Germany by Chancellor Bismark in
1889. By the time the U.S. Social Security Act was enacted in 1935,
nineteen European nations, following Germany’s lead, had instituted
compulsory, universal old-age insurance (Committee on Economic
Security 1935). Thirty years after Social Security was adopted, Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act was signed into law, establishing the
Medicare program. Though separated by three decades, the programs
share a common heritage that is explored below.
This chapter endeavors to accomplish three things. First, it presents the historical development of social insurance in the United
States as embodied in Social Security and Medicare. It is intentionally
terse but attempts to convey the pertinent facts. 1 Second, particular
attention will be paid to the economic arguments used to justify government-administered transfers to the aged, as well as to the eventual
reliance on pay-as-you-go financing. As the historical record suggests,
the rationales for Social Security and Medicare were and continue to
be couched in the language of market failure. Though not part of the
original Social Security Act, pay-as-you-go financing was quickly
adopted due to the unwillingness in Congress to maintain the tax
increases required to make the program actuarially sound, including
the increases that were scheduled in the original act. Third, the chapter
places today’s debate in its historical context by highlighting instances
where the historical debates foreshadowed the contemporary debates.
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The deliberations that preceded and followed the passage of Social
Security in the 1930s and the issues which marked the Medicare
debates of the 1960s are being repeated today, whether the debate is
over private versus public provision, prefunding versus pay-as-you-go
financing, means testing versus universal coverage, or redistribution
versus individual outcomes.

THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1935
The push for Social Security began in earnest during Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s first term in office, but prior to his election there were isolated calls for social insurance that targeted the needs of the elderly in
the United States. The early proponents of old-age insurance reasoned
that the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy left the
elderly without their historical role in the family and the marketplace.
A 1919 report of the Pennsylvania Commission on Old Age Pensions
stated,
The question of providing for the aged hardly existed before the
era of the factory system. The modern problem of old age is a
result of the tremendous industrialization of production since the
industrial revolution . . . The usefulness of an old man or woman
also rarely ceased in an agricultural society before actual senility
had taken place. (In Johnsen [1922], p. 243)

An early statement of the concepts of social insurance can be
found in Seager (1910). In the chapter on the provision for old age, he
stated,
The proper method of safeguarding old age is clearly through
some plan of insurance. Old age is a risk to which all are liable,
but which many never live to experience. Thus according to
American life tables, nearly two thirds of those who survive the
age of ten die before the age of seventy. Under these circumstances, for every wage earner to attempt to save enough by himself to provide for his old age is needlessly costly. The intelligent
course is for him to combine with other wage earners to accumulate a common fund out of which old-age annuities may be paid to
those who live long enough to need them. (Pp. 118–119)
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Seager goes on to suggest that the private annuities market was not
well developed at the time, citing limited evidence in the form of
union- and fraternal-order-based insurance, but he saw significant
promise in employer-based pensions. He concluded that adoption of
nationwide old-age insurance in the United States was contingent on
whether employer-based pensions became generally available and
transferable between jobs.
At about the same time, it was already being argued that market
provision of old age pensions had failed. For example, in 1913, Spencer Baldwin, the Secretary of the Massachusetts’ Commission on Old
Age Pensions, wrote, “It is evident that some comprehensive plan of
old age insurance or pensions must be adopted in this country, at some
time in the near future. The inadequacy of private enterprise, cooperative insurance, and corporation plans is generally admitted.” Though
more an advocate of state-sponsored programs, he suggested that compulsory insurance was justifiable on the grounds that it protects society
against old-age pauperism, and that it is the only plan “that offers an
adequate, comprehensive, workable, final solution of the problem”
(Baldwin 1913).
With the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s came
increased pressure for government action on the issues of social insurance in general and old-age pensions in particular. One group at that
time which gained nationwide attention for its old-age pension plan
was the Townsend Movement. The movement began in 1932 and was
based on a plan promoted by a 66-year-old unemployed physician,
Francis E. Townsend. The basic plan called for a universal $200
monthly pension for individuals 60 years of age and above. Funding
for the pensions would come from a 2% national sales tax. Within a
few years there were 7,000 Townsend clubs advocating the plan with a
reported membership of over 2.2 million (Kingson and Berkowitz
1993, pp. 32–33; Social Security Administration 1998).
Though the Social Security Act in its final form differed significantly from the Townsend plan, the proponents of national social insurance were gaining momentum in the early 1930s. In a June 8, 1934,
message to Congress, President Roosevelt invoked sentiments similar
to those of the early social insurance proponents.
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So, also, security was attained in the earlier days through the interdependence of members of families upon each other and of the
families within a small community upon each other. The complexities of great communities and of organized industry make
less real these simple means of security. Therefore, we are compelled to employ the active interest of the Nation as a whole
through government in order to encourage a greater security for
each individual who composes it. (Roosevelt 1934a)

By the end of the same month, Roosevelt had commissioned the
Committee on Economic Security (CES) to “study problems relating to
the economic security of individuals and shall report to the President
no later than December 1, 1934, its recommendations concerning proposals which in its judgment will promote greater economic security”
(Roosevelt 1934b). Besides old-age insurance, the Committee also
studied unemployment and health insurance.
By the beginning of 1935, the Committee’s recommendations were
introduced to Congress for debate, and within four months the House
had passed its version of the Social Security bill by a vote of 372 to 33.
The Senate version passed on June 19, 1935, with a vote of 77 to 6, and
on August 14, 1935, the Social Security Act was signed into law. The
act was
to provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several states to make
more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public
health, and the administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue;
and for other purposes. (U.S. Public Law 271, 1935)

Though only eight months passed between the introduction and
passage of the Social Security Act, it is important to note a Senate
amendment that did not make it into the final bill. The amendment,
sponsored by Senator Bennet Clark of Missouri, would have exempted
employers with government-approved pension plans from the payroll
tax. The House and Senate committees handling the bill voted against
the provision, but Clark succeeded in reintroducing it into the Senate
version that went to the conference committee. Opponents of the provision argued that private insurers would be in competition with the
government and might lure the younger workers away from the federal
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system, leaving it with the older workers who had not made any contributions. If this adverse selection occurred, the system would never
take in enough revenues to cover the expense. Thus, the opponents
argued that support for the system would dwindle as people opted into
private pension plans (Kingson and Berkowitz 1993, p. 37). The
amendment never made it out of the conference committee, however.
If workers had been given the opportunity to opt out of the system, the
opponents’ expectations may have been realized and a system of compulsory private pensions would now be in place.

THE PAYROLL TAX AND THE EVOLUTION
TO PAY-AS-YOU-GO FINANCING
From the outset, Roosevelt intended that Social Security would
eventually be self-supporting. During the start-up phase, a period projected to be 30 years, pensions for those who were close to retirement
age would be paid out of general revenues. But for younger workers,
he envisioned a “self-supporting system for those now young and for
future generations,” with self-supporting or self-sustaining having the
connotation “that funds for the payment of insurance benefits should
not come from the proceeds of general taxation” (Roosevelt 1935).
Title II of the Social Security Act set the retirement age at 65 and 1942
as the year of the first benefit payment. It also established a redistributive benefit structure, the death benefit, and the property rights assigned
to worker’s expected benefits.
The use of a payroll tax was attractive to Social Security’s early
proponents for a number of reasons. First, in the words of Franklin
Roosevelt,
They [taxes] are politics all the way through. We put these payroll
contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral,
and political right to collect their pensions and unemployment
benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever
scrap my social security program. (Schlesinger 1958, pp. 308–
309)

Or, as stated by Wilbur Cohen, who started his career as a research
assistant on the Social Security Act and would eventually ascend to the
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position of Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in the Johnson
administration, in his defense of using a payroll tax to finance an
expansion of Medicare: “This gives beneficiaries the psychological
feeling that they have helped to pay for their protection. It is the reason
why social security has been so popular and well accepted. People do
not want something that is called a hand-out or welfare” (Berkowitz
1995, p. 265). The use of the payroll tax also enhanced the expected
payments from the system. The American Federation of Labor argued
that if the program were to be financed with general revenues, they
would “irresistibly be pulled down to relief standards” (Derthick 1979,
p. 230). The payroll tax tied all wage earners to the system, and in
doing so, established the compulsory and universal nature of the program. Interestingly, in the current Social Security and Medicare
debate, the defenders of the status quo echo the early proponent’s sentiments that the popular support of the programs would erode if benefits were to be means-tested.
Title VIII of the Social Security Act of 1935 spelled out the provisions of the taxing arrangement. Tax revenues were to begin in 1937 at
a rate of 1% of covered wages, collected from both employers and
employees. The rate was to gradually increase to 3% collected from
the employer and employee (6% combined) by the end of 1948. With
the rate increases specified in the original act, a financial reserve was
expected to build up so that interest from the fund would help finance
benefit payments. As pointed out by Derthick (1979), however, beginning with the 1939 Social Security Act Amendments and continuing
until 1950, Congress postponed even the first incremental change in
the tax rate, to 1.5%, which was slated to begin in 1940. In an action
that compounded the effect of failing to enact the scheduled tax
increases, Congress opted to pay the first benefits in 1940 rather than
waiting until 1942, as was called for in the original act. Together, these
actions essentially transformed the system’s finances from one that
would have a reserve (which, if appropriately invested, would increase
the capital stock and provide for each generation’s retirement income)
to a pay-as-you-go system.
Several causes of the rapid transformation described in the historical accounts are important because of their relevance in today’s policy
discussions. Opponents of a large reserve fund—one estimated to
eventually provide for 40% of the system’s benefit payments through
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interest income—could be found across the political spectrum of the
day. In terms of immediate policy relevance, postponing benefit payments into the future while the reserve was building did not seem reasonable. The sooner contributions to the program could be tied to
relieving some of the pains of the Depression, the more relevant the
program would be. A large reserve account was also criticized by
some economists on the grounds that it would hinder the government’s
ability to respond to a recession (Berkowitz 1996, p. 157).
Others like Albert Linton, who had been one of four actuarial consultants to Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security, were concerned that Congress would be tempted to increase benefits as the
reserve account accumulated a growing balance. Linton also warned
that the costs would increase over time and that binding future generations to the program’s implied commitments would have to be reexamined. Specifically, he wrote,
We of this generation do not propose to pay out any such proportion of our earnings to provide current benefits under the Social
Security Act but we blithely assume that our children and grandchildren will be able to do so without serious disturbance to the
economic life of the country. This whole philosophy needs to be
reconsidered. (Derthick 1979, p. 235)

So while not in favor of a reserve account, which was expected to provide partial funding of future liabilities, Linton was aware that moving
in the direction of a pay-as-you-go system would necessitate high
future tax payments and thus require reconsideration of the whole system.
Linton’s opposition to the accumulation of a large reserve account
was repeated in Congress. The early actuarial projections put the size
of the reserve at $47 billion by 1980. Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican
member of the Senate Finance Committee, was on record as saying
that a large reserve account was “the most fantastic and the most indefensible objective imaginable. It is scarcely conceivable that rational
men should propose such an unmanageable accumulation of funds in
one place in a democracy” (Derthick 1979, p. 232).
On the other hand, Arthur Altmeyer, a member of both the technical board on the CES and the original Social Security Board, argued
that the reserve account was a necessary device to show the magnitude
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of future commitments (Derthick 1979, pp. 237–238). A.W. Willcox,
writing in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1937,2 favored the
accumulation of a large reserve account as well, on the grounds that the
future tax rates under purely pay-as-you-go financing would be
unbearable.
For while it would be very easy to levy payroll taxes which for a
generation would be just adequate to pay currently the benefits
fixed by Title II, the percentage would ultimately rise to a figure
considered to be out of the question. In other words, to ask the
covered working population of 1980 to pay taxes which would
equal the cost of supporting the seventy-odd million pensioners of
1980 on even the scale contemplated by Title II would be to ask at
least the politically impossible. (Willcox 1937, p. 447)

From the inception of the Social Security system, Congress
showed its unwillingness to maintain the higher tax rates that would be
necessary to build up the reserve account specified in the original act.
Seven times between 1939 and 1947, Congress delayed raising the tax
rate and taxable base. Ultimately, the first tax increase (to 1.5%, levied
on the employee and employer) occurred in 1950 rather than 1942, as
originally called for in the act. The effects of the congressional actions
are depicted in Figure 2.1. In 1940, the year of the first official benefit
payments, the Social Security Trust Fund balance was almost 33 times
Figure 2.1 Ratio of Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund to
Yearly Expenditures
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the system’s expenditures in that year; by 1950 the ratio had dropped to
13.4; and by 1965 the trust fund was approximately equal to one year’s
expenditures. In a matter of a few years, the concept of a large reserve
fund was abandoned, and pay-as-you-go financing became a hallmark
of the Social Security system.
As would be argued by Wilbur J. Cohen in 1961, who by then had
become the Under Secretary of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare,
The philosophy which the Congress has embodied in the present
law is that because compulsory social insurance is assured of continuing income (since new workers must come into the program),
it does not have to build up the kind of reserves that are necessary
in an institution that might have no new customers and might be
forced out of business. Private insurance is required to maintain
the type of reserves that will meet the threat of dissolution. Social
insurance is financially sound, on the other hand, as long as the
legislation on which it is based provides for a plan of financing
which yields income sufficient to meet all benefit costs as they fall
due. And the social security law does so provide. (Fiengold 1966,
p. 241)

Though Social Security’s origins can be linked to the acceptance of
social insurance in other industrialized nations, the specific economic
conditions in the United States during the 1930s helped provide the
necessary environment for large-scale government intervention. In the
words of Franklin Roosevelt,
Among an increasing host of fellow citizens, among the often
intangible forces of giant industry, man had discovered that his
individual strength and wits were no longer enough. This was true
not only of the worker at shop bench or ledger; it was true also of
the merchant or manufacturer who employed him. Where heretofore man had turned to neighbors for help and advice, they now
turn to Government. (Roosevelt 1938)

The proponents justified the program on the basis of a changing economy that left the elderly without their traditional roles. They argued
that without savings, the absence of a developed private annuities market, and the lack of productive employment, the elderly required intervention on their behalf.
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Many of the Social Security program’s central features, from a
dedicated financing source to compulsory participation to a redistributive benefit structure, were specified in the original act. At first, only
workers in commerce and industry were required to participate, but by
1955 virtually all workers in the United States were covered. Reserve
fund financing was quickly abandoned in favor of pay-as-you-go
financing, even though the future implications of pay-as-you-go
financing on tax rates were well understood from the outset. By the
time Medicare was being considered, Social Security was a well-established institution, providing the initial beneficiaries real rates of return
in excess of the market’s performance. The acceptance of Social Security, its adaptations between 1935 and 1965, and its popularity helped
set the stage for the eventual adoption and structure of the Medicare
program.

THE ORIGINS OF MEDICARE
Between President Roosevelt’s 1935 signing of the Social Security
Act and President Johnson’s signing of the bill establishing Medicare
on July 30, 1965, as Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, many proposals for some form of compulsory health insurance program received
congressional consideration. Over these three decades, the push for a
comprehensive, government-administered health insurance program
for all ages was replaced by a campaign for a health insurance program
which targeted the aged. We will pick up the story in the 1930s and
follow the public debates which led to the specific Medicare bill signed
by President Johnson in 1965. Our focus will be on the economic justification used by Medicare’s proponents. We point out that the financing problems that the Medicare program currently faces were foreseen
before it was enacted, and that many of the contemporary Medicare
reform proposals have historical predecessors.
The 1930s to the 1950s
In its final report, published in 1932 after five years of work, the
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CCMC) recommended that
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the costs of medical care should be paid for on a group basis through
insurance, taxation, or both. The Committee went on to recommend
compulsory health insurance for low-income groups, citing the practices in place in many European countries. The CCMCs work was
sponsored by eight leading private foundations, and its recommendations3 were influential in framing the health insurance debates for
years to come. Two years after the publication of the CCMC’s final
report, the Committee for Economic Security analyzed health insurance as part of its mandate. However, this Committee did not present a
specific health insurance proposal, offering instead a set of broad
guidelines. The Committee’s recommendations formed the basis for
the Social Security Act as initially introduced for congressional debate.
The language in Title VII of the Social Security Act gave the Social
Security Board authorization to study and make recommendations on a
broad array of social insurance issues; however, the original language
that specifically included health insurance was omitted. In his speech
marking the third anniversary of the act, President Roosevelt expressed
his continued hope that the act would be improved and extended, mentioning in particular protection against the losses associated with illness (Roosevelt 1938).
Most of the early legislative activities that followed focused on
compulsory national health insurance. From 1939 to 1947, Senator
Robert Wagner (D-N.Y.) sponsored or cosponsored a series of bills calling for national health insurance financed through a compulsory payroll
tax. The bills, known as the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bills in honor of
sponsors, Wagner, Senator James Murray (D-Mont.), and Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.), became the framework for a proposal
advanced by President Truman in 1949 (Marmor 1973, p. 11). Though
national health insurance was debated during the 1948 presidential
campaign, the proposals never gained popular appeal. The main opponent to these proposals was the American Medical Association (AMA).
The AMA’s efforts in the defeat of several members of Congress in
1950 who had been proponents of national health insurance was cited
as evidence of the rejection by the public of national health insurance
initiatives (Derthick 1979, p. 318; Fiengold 1966, p. 97).
At the same time that national health insurance was being debated
in Congress, employer-based health insurance was expanding rapidly.
Between 1939 and 1945, the percentage of the population covered by
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employer-based health insurance plans grew from 8% to 25% (Falk
1973, p. 13). Prior to the war, employer-provided health insurance was
rare, as was health insurance in general. However, the combination of
wage controls and wartime increases in the demand for labor resulted
in employers searching for other ways to raise workers’ compensation.
Paying workers in the form of health insurance was one way to raise
workers’ compensation without raising their wages. A special ruling in
1943 by the IRS declared that insurance purchases on behalf of
employees did not represent taxable income (Standard Federal Tax
Service 1943, Special Ruling 6587). Because of their special tax status, employer-based health insurance plans became a fixture in the
employment relationship. By 1965, 80% of the population was covered by some form of private health insurance (Council of Economic
Advisers 1966, p. 106). This expansion of private health insurance, as
much as the political opposition, was crucial to the demise of national
health insurance proposals.
The 1950s to 1965
In the early 1950s, proponents of national health care shifted their
focus to the uninsured, and in particular the aged. A forerunner of the
Medicare bill was first introduced in 1957 by Representative Aime J.
Forand (D-R.I.) during the Eisenhower administration.4 Forand was a
member of the Committee on Ways and Means, which had jurisdiction
of bills related to Social Security matters. The Forand bill would have
provided Social Security beneficiaries with coverage similar to today’s
Hospitalization Insurance (HI), with the addition of nursing-home and
surgeon-fee coverage, and would have been financed by an additional
payroll tax of 0.25%. The bill was never reported out of committee in
1958 and was reintroduced in 1959, but, after hearings, further action
was postponed until 1960 (Fiengold 1966, pp. 102–104).
By 1960, several competing bills addressing health care for the
aged were debated. Eventually, a bill sponsored by Robert Kerr (DOkla.), a member of the Senate Finance Committee, and Wilbur Mills
(D-Ark.), the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, was
passed in September 1960. The act was quite similar to an earlier proposal favored by the Eisenhower administration, providing states with
federal grants to defray part of the medical costs of the needy elderly.
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Mills was quite reticent to tie a medical care program to Social Security, and thus this bill was an attempt to address the health care needs of
the elderly without tapping into the Social Security system. His bill
did not go far enough in the eyes of those who wanted one like
Forand’s, with its general coverage and, more importantly, its “Social
Security financing.” With the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy, who
favored including health care in the Social Security program, the
progress toward Medicare’s passage began.
This progress, however, was slowed by Mills’s continued opposition in the House and Kerr’s in the Senate. Between 1961 and 1963,
three successors to the Forand bill were introduced. Because of Mills’s
opposition and his position as the Chairman of the House Committee
on Ways and Means, the bill’s proponents first introduced the bills in
the Senate. These bills would provide hospitalization, some nursing
home care, and laboratory and x-ray services. All would have relied on
financing through Social Security. Notable among the three was the
1962 Anderson-Javits bill (Senators Clinton Anderson [D-N.M.] and
Jacob Javits [R-N.Y.]). This bill had the special feature of offering
beneficiaries the choice between federal or private insurance. 5 The
Anderson-Javits bill was expected to receive Senate backing, but
because of its proposed financing it was not expected to even make it
out of a conference committee which would include members of the
House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance committees (Fiengold
1966, pp. 121–122). The latest of the three was the 1963 King-Anderson bill (Representative Cecil King [D-Calif.]) and Senator Clinton
Anderson [D-N.M.]), which dropped the private insurance option that
had been included in Anderson-Javits.
In 1963, Robert Kerr died, and a Medicare bill passed the next year
in the Senate. With Kerr’s death, Wilbur Mills became the primary
leading Democrat who stood in the way of passing a hospitalization
insurance bill that would rely on Social Security financing. The following excerpts from a speech he gave during an Arkansas-Missouri
Kiwanis luncheon meeting on September 28, 1964, detail his concerns
and his reasons for opposing the bills that had come his way. His comments came after a conference committee was unable to agree on the
health insurance provisions like those in the King-Anderson bill being
part of the Senate version of a Social Security bill. In his speech, Mills
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defended his stance on several key issues. The essence of Mills’s position is summarized here:
The central fact which must be faced on a proposal to provide a
form of service benefit—as contrasted to a cash benefit—is that it
is very difficult to accurately estimate the cost. These difficult-topredict future costs, when such a program is part of the social
security program, could well have highly dangerous ramifications
on the cash benefits portion of the social security system.

He went on to outline some of the future tax rate implications that
would result if the King-Anderson bill was passed. The ramifications
were brought out during questioning of the Chief Actuary of the Social
Security Administration, Robert Myers, in hearings before the House
Ways and Means Committee.
In practical terms, this meant that if the hospital insurance system
which would be created by the bill was to remain sound, the taxable wage base would have to be increased at least $150 each year.
Clearly, this would be a case of the tail wagging the dog. The
Congress would be left completely hamstrung, with only two
alternatives: (1) A total program which we know was actuarially
unsound, or (2) a commitment into the indefinite future to a steady
but wholly uncontrolled increase, due to the hospital part of the
program, in the amount of wages taxed for social security purposes. Clearly, we could not conscientiously be a party to such an
abrogation of congressional responsibility.

To add detail to his concerns, he indicated that average earnings in
covered employment grew at a 4% annual rate between 1955 and
1963, while average daily hospitalization costs grew at a 6.7% annual
rate over the same period, and that he had no reason to assume that the
growth in hospitalization cost would slow in the future. Besides
believing that such a system would be actuarially unsound, Mills was
also wary of the unfunded liability that would result from providing
hospitalization benefits immediately to individuals who had not paid
into the system. In the following excerpt, Mills articulates this concern
and introduces the notion of prepayment.
However, on the question of financing, a further very serious problem is the effect which the assumption of the liability for the hospital costs for all of the currently retired persons will have on the
social security program as a whole. I do not believe that it is gen-
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erally understood that this unfunded liability would amount to at
least $33 billion. It must be realized that the currently retired individuals under the social security program have not paid any taxes
as such for hospital insurance benefits. This is where the prepayment argument when applied to the King-Anderson proposal completely breaks down.

Finally, Mills restates his hesitation to tying the hospitalization
insurance provisions to Social Security and reiterates his interest in
pursuing a prepayment option.
I for one will continue to view this problem with an open mind
and will continue my efforts to work for the best interests of our
elderly citizens and to help them enjoy the latter years of their
lives without the nagging fears which so many of them now face
due to the possibility of disastrous medical bills. I would be hopeful that the basic prepayment concept might lead us in the direction of sound approaches to this matter. There are other principles
which we can embody to insure a sound medical program while at
the same time preserving our basic social security system.

As the preceding statements indicate, from the outset it was common knowledge within the Social Security Administration and among
members of Congress that Medicare was expected to face financing
difficulties. Mills’ grasp of the issues and assumptions involved in the
Social Security Administration’s actuarial projections was apparently
unsurpassed among representatives. According to Wilbur Cohen, Mills
“is probably the only man out of four hundred and thirty-five people in
Congress who completely understands the actuarial basis of Social
Security. He is completely conversant with the basis for making the
actuarial estimates and all of the factors that enter into it” (Zelizer
1996, p. 343). This thorough understanding likely led to his interest in
funding alternatives including prepayment. Nonetheless, by July of the
following year, a much broader program than the one serving as a point
of reference for these comments would become law. Mills eventually
relented and supported the more sweeping bill.
Before discussing the final legislative developments in the months
leading up to Medicare’s passage, it will prove useful to review the
rhetoric used to justify the need for universal health insurance for the
aged. A good source of that rhetoric is found in the Joint Economic
Committee’s March 17, 1965, comments on the 1965 Economic Report
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of the President. The committee suggests that the market had failed to
provide adequate insurance, that universal coverage was preferred to
means-tested coverage, and that the program should be financed
through the Social Security system. The comments only pertain to
hospitalization insurance, as the supplemental medical insurance was
added towards the end of the legislative process. In this first statement,
the committee suggested that the market had failed to provide affordable insurance.
This year the Congress faces another stage in one of the great
unfinished tasks of our society—assuring an adequate hospital
insurance program for the aged. Private insurance plans have
failed to provide adequate protection at premiums that most of the
aged can afford. The Committee concludes that Federal help is
essential to an effective program. (P. 24)

In the next set of statements, the committee argues for universal
rather than means-tested coverage and suggests that the aged were captive to the costs of medical care due to insufficient financial resources.
The question before our Nation is not whether our aged should
have adequate medical care—all are agreed that they should—but
in what manner that care should be financed. The facts on the
income and savings levels of the aged population, and on the medical costs to which they are subjects, indicate clearly that the aged
simply lack the means to pay for adequate medical care from their
retirement incomes and savings. Primary reliance should not be
placed on welfare programs which give public assistance based on
means tests. If applied by all states at the requisite level of medical care, such programs would be inordinately expensive—both
because of the medical costs involved and because of the high
costs of administering means tests.
Moreover, the committee believes that the aged of modern America should not be forced to exhaust all savings and be reduced to
a state of demonstrable poverty before they can qualify for help
toward meeting medical costs. Public assistance can play an
important role, but it must be to supplement a broad, national program for the aged which meets their health needs without detracting from their dignity and self-respect. After all, dignity, selfrespect, and a feeling of economic security are just as important
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to the health of our elder citizens as is care for their physical ills.
(P. 25)

The committee’s solution was insurance, but due to market failure,
federal intervention was necessary. Their language in the second quote
below seems to allude to prepaid insurance.
The solution to the health needs of the aged lies in insurance. If
private insurance could do the job there would be no need for a
federal program. But it is clear that adequate private insurance
plans for aged are beyond the means of most. (P. 25)
What the aged need is a plan which would permit them to acquire
insurance protection against the high medical costs of old age for
modest premiums paid during their long working lives, without
the need to pay heavy premiums after retirement. Such insurance
is now virtually unknown among private carriers. (P. 26)

Finally, bringing health insurance for the aged under the umbrella
of Social Security was the committee’s preferred course of action as
reflected in the following statement.
Health insurance for aged under the Social Security System would
seem to offer one effective and efficient response to the need.
This system has proved its capacity to administer, at low cost,
broadly based social insurance programs. It would provide uniform benefits for Americans, regardless of their location. And it
would free private insurance companies from some of their
present expense burdens and enable them to offer plans supplementing the basic coverage. (Joint Economic Committee, p. 26)

Several developments took place between 1964 and 1965 which
helped foster Medicare’s passage. Lyndon Johnson won in a landslide
election against Barry Goldwater in November of 1964 and his administration continued to place Medicare high on its agenda. The new
Congress included more Democrats than at any time since Franklin
Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection, and Mills indicated his willingness to
work with the Johnson administration on Medicare legislation (Fiengold 1966, p. 138). Hospitalization, skilled nursing home care for a
limited number of days, home health care, outpatient diagnostic services, and a dedicated financing source through Social Security were
the primary components of the 1965 version of the King-Anderson bill
being backed by the administration—a package similar to the Hospital-
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ization Insurance portion of Medicare as it now exists (Derthick 1979,
p. 331).
What is today known as Supplementary Medical Insurance, which
covers physician fees among other services, did not enter the legislative
mix until 1965 when John W. Byrnes (R-Wisc.), the ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, introduced an alternative bill.
Byrnes’ bill offered benefits patterned after those provided to federal
government employees by Aetna Life Insurance. The coverage specified in the Byrnes bill included the provisions in the administration’s
bill with the additional provisions of physician services and prescription drugs. The distinguishing feature of the bill was that the aged
could choose whether or not to participate. If they chose to participate,
their premiums, about one-third of the total cost, would be related to the
size of their Social Security benefits, with general revenues covering
the remaining two-thirds of the program’s costs (Derthick 1979, p. 331;
Fiengold 1966, p. 142; Marmor 1973, pp. 63–65). The contrast
between the Byrnes and King-Anderson bills were significant. The
Byrnes bill was voluntary rather than universal. Its financing came
from general revenues and premium payments, rather than from a dedicated payroll tax, and premium payments were income-adjusted rather
than uniform among individuals.
Instead of choosing between the administration’s and Byrnes’ bill,
in executive session Mills proposed a combination of the two. The
combined bill, renamed the Mills bill, was reported out of the committee on March 23, 1965, on a straight party vote. The bill included a
scaled-back version of the administration’s bill that would be financed
through Social Security taxes and voluntary supplementary insurance
covering 80 percent of physician fees and other services. The supplementary insurance had a $50 deductible and a $6 monthly premium,
half of which would be paid by the beneficiary and half paid through
general revenues (Fiengold 1966, p. 142). During the house debates on
the bill beginning on April 7, 1965, Republicans quoted from the
Mills’ 1964 speech (referenced above) to remind the Ways and Means
Chairman of his longstanding opposition to the reliance on Social
Security financing and to highlight their continued opposition to such a
financing arrangement.6 Byrnes argued that, “Under the payroll tax an
erroneous concept has been sold to the people that they have paid for
their benefits, that they have bought something as a matter of right,
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under such a concept there is no flexibility to make changes because
the people will tell you, ‘We have bought this, and you cannot make
any change except to liberalize it’” (Derthick 1979, p. 333). Before
voting on the Mills bill, the house voted on the Byrnes bill; it lost in a
191 to 236 vote. The vote on the Mills bill followed, and on April 8,
1965, it passed 313 to 115.
Hearings in the Senate began at the end of the same month, and by
July 9, 1965, the Senate version of the Medicare bill had gained
approval on a 68 to 21 vote. However, before the final version was
approved, two amendments were added, one temporarily, in the
Finance Committee. The first amendment provided for payments to
four categories of specialists under hospitalization insurance, and the
other amendment, sponsored by Senator Russell Long (D-La.), would
have moved Medicare towards means-tested, catastrophic insurance.
Long’s amendment would have required higher-income beneficiaries
to pay a larger proportion of their bills than those with lower incomes,
with those having incomes above $10,000 paying the full cost unless
they had higher than average expenditures (Fiengold 1966, p. 145). On
the first vote in the committee, both amendments were approved, but
on a re-vote on June 23, 1965, taken at the behest of the administration,
the Long amendment failed. On July 6, 1965, the full Senate approved
a slightly modified version on the bill that came out of the Finance
Committee. The House and Senate conference committee agreed to
include some of the Senate’s extensions but retained the House’s coverage of the four specialty categories under Supplementary Insurance.
The conference committee report was approved by over 70% of the
House and the Senate on July 27, and July 28, 1965, respectively
(Fiengold 1966, p. 147). On July 30, 1965, President Johnson signed
the bill into law.
1965 to 1997
Between 1965 and the present, many of the concerns Wilbur Mills
raised in his 1964 speech were realized. Benefits per capita rose and
the covered population expanded. As Mills had expected, Congress
was periodically placed in the predicament of debating tax hikes to
keep up with the system’s costs. Congress is again in the position of
considering major changes to Medicare as it deliberates on how to deal

38

A Brief History of Social Insurance for the Aged in the United States

with future commitments. In 1964, Mills projected that the unfunded
liability was in the neighborhood of $33 billion, but based on data
reported in the 1998 Trustees report (Board of Trustees 1998a), the
unfunded liability of the Hospitalization Insurance program out to
2075 is in excess of $4 trillion. The trustees suggest that an immediate
72% increase in the tax rate is required to bring the Hospitalization
Insurance Trust Fund into actuarial balance over the next 75 years.
The number of enrollees grew from 19 million in 1966 to over 38
million in 1997. In 1972, Medicare coverage was extended to eligible
disabled individuals under the age of 65, an expansion which
accounted for 5 million of the 38 million enrollees in 1997. While covering the disabled represents the major legislative change since 1965,
other provisions have worked to incrementally expand the program.
For example, in 1981 Medicare became the secondary payer for beneficiaries with end-stage renal disease; liver transplants were covered
beginning in 1985; and, in 1986, mandatory coverage was extended to
state and local government employees not covered under Social Security (Social Security Administration 1996).
Expenditures per beneficiaries were rising at the time. From 1967
to 1997, the average Part A expenses per enrollee, adjusted for price
level changes using the personal consumption expenditures implicit
price deflator, grew by a factor of 4.81 (or 5.37% on an annual basis),
and the per enrollee Part B expenses, adjusted for price level changes,
grew by a factor of 6.41 (or 6.39% on an annual basis). The combination of the growth in the number of enrollees and the growth in real per
capita Parts A and B expenditures produced Medicare expenditures in
1997 that were 1040% of those in 1967, implying that total Medicare
expenditures (adjusted for the price level) have grown at a real annual
rate of 8.12%. This growth rate in total Medicare expenditures compares with a 2.22% combined real growth rate in wages and the number of workers.
To keep pace with the growing expenditures per capita and the
growing number of enrollees, Congress chose to raise the payroll tax
rate numerous times. The portion of payroll taxes dedicated to Hospitalization Insurance (HI) started at 0.7% of taxable earnings (split
equally between employer and employee) and was raised to its current
level of 2.9% in 1986. Besides the tax rate hikes, the level of earnings
subject to the tax rose from $6,600 in 1966 to the current unlimited
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level in 1994. Therefore, future HI revenue increases can only come as
the result of a tax rate increase. However, because of Medicare’s twopart structure, Congress can shift part of the HI cost to Supplementary
Medical Insurance (SMI), as it did in moving part of the home health
care program to SMI as a provision of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act.
Originally, premium payments were intended to cover 50% of the SMI
expenditures. Over time, the percentage paid by beneficiaries declined
and the percentage paid by general revenues rose, so that premiums
now cover 25% and are slated to cover that amount into the future.
A brief look at the components of the change in per-capita expenditures is presented in the following graphs. Average real reimbursements per aged enrollee for selected years between 1967 and 1995 are
presented in Figure 2.2. Per-capita reimbursements under SMI are
growing more rapidly than HI reimbursements, but as of 1995 they
were equal to 57% of HI payments. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present the
components of the average. Figure 2.3 presents the average real reimbursements conditional on reimbursable services being greater than
zero. As this graph indicates, the HI reimbursements have become
much larger, while SMI reimbursements per person served have risen
much less dramatically.
Figure 2.2 Medicare Reimbursement per Aged Enrollee
(constant 1995 $)
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Figure 2.3 Medicare Reimbursement per Aged Enrollee Served
(constant 1995 $)

Figure 2.4 Percent of Aged Enrollees Who Received
Reimbursed Services
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Figure 2.4 presents the percentage of enrollees who received reimbursable services. Over Medicare’s first 30 years, the percentage of
enrollees who received HI reimbursable services has hovered just
above 20%. In contrast, SMI utilization has risen from 38% to 94%.
Taken together, these three figures indicate that the increased costs of a
hospital stay are producing the rise in HI reimbursements per beneficiary, while increased utilization in general is producing the rise in
average SMI reimbursements.7

CONCLUSION
As the preceding account illustrates, Medicare and Social Security
share a common heritage and structure. They both provide social
insurance benefiting the aged population and rely primarily on pay-asyou-go financing. The historical accounts also establish that most of
the contemporary Medicare reform proposals were at one time or
another debated prior to its passage. Means testing, the option to
choose private insurance providers, and vouchers all received serious
consideration. Mills’s reluctance to finance a service benefit with payroll taxes through the Social Security system is a well established part
of the historical record. His interest in prepayment most likely referred
to a trust fund type arrangement, but as Social Security’s history indicated, Congress typically chooses to postpone tax increases as long as
possible. Thus, meaningful prepayment through a common pool
invested solely in government bonds, which ultimately must be retired
with tax revenues at a later date, is unlikely. In addition, Medicare’s
history from its passage to the present have fulfilled Mills’s predictions. What is new in this contemporary round of Social Security and
Medicare reform proposals is the interest in private, individually based
savings and/or insurance accounts.

Notes
1. The historical account here relies on two excellent sources: Policy Making for
Social Security by Martha Derthick (1979) and Medicare: Policy and Politics by
Eugene Feingold (1966).
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2. The original article was unsigned; the attribution to Willcox is from Musgrave
(1959). Interestingly, the same article presented the Ways and Means Committee’s projections of the future population. The percentages of the population projected to be 65 or older in 1960 and 1990 were 9.3 and 12.6, respectively. The
projections were quite close to the actual percentages of 9.1 in 1960 and 12.3 in
1990. However, the actual number of individuals 65 and above were 17.2 million
in 1960 and 31.9 million in 1990, compared with the 1937 projections of only
13.6 million for 1960 and 19.1 million for 1990.
3. Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (1932), pp. 120–121. Most notable
among its other four recommendations was the proposal that medical services be
furnished by groups of physicians organized around hospitals. The eight foundations sponsoring the committee were the Carnegie Corporation, the Josiah Macy
Jr. Foundation, the Milbank Memorial Fund, the New York Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Julius Rosenwald Fund, the Russell Sage Foundation, and
the Twentieth Century Fund.
4. The integral role of the Social Security Board and later the Social Security
Administration in the preparation of the key health insurance related bills should
be noted. According to Derthick (1979, p. 320), Wilbur Cohen, then an economic
analyst, and I.S. Falk, director of research and statistics with Social Security, with
the backing of board member Arthus J. Altmeyer, drafted the Wagner-MurrayDingell bills (p. 317). The Forand bill was drafted again by Cohen (who had
moved to Ann Arbor, Michigan) and Falk (who had been replaced as the Social
Security Administration’s director of research and was then teaching at Yale) in
addition to Nelson Cruikshank, a Social Security director in the AFL-CIO, and
Robert Ball, who would become commissioner of Social Security in 1962.
5. On a related matter, during a May 8, 1964, telephone conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and his congressional liaison, Larry O’Brien, the two discussed a
proposal being talked about in the Ways and Means Committee that would have
allowed Social Security beneficiaries an irrevocable choice between the Medicare
insurance or cash. O’Brien mentions that originally the choice would have been
between the insurance, valued at $7.50 per month, or an increase in Social Security benefits in the same amount. As of the day of the conversation, the cash
option under consideration had been reduced to $5.00. (Lyndon B. Johnson
recordings of telephone conversations, tape WH6405.08, no. 3472.)
6. Derthick (1979) interprets Mills’s drastic change of position on the financing
issue as the result of his recognition that Medicare’s passage was inevitable and
that by taking the lead he would control any expansion. The expansion to include
Brynes’s bill could be justified in that it would define the limits of coverage (p.
332).
7. Reimbursement and utilization data are from Social Security Administration
(1997), Table 8B, and reflect only individuals in the fee-for-service sector.
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The Theory of Paying
for Retirement
One of the fundamental tenets of economics is that there is “no free
lunch,” meaning that when we make institutional changes, we can
expect there to be winners and losers, especially in the short run. This
fundamental tenet does not mean that changes cannot be made that
make everyone better off, but that such changes are not the general
rule. The no-free-lunch dictum has both theoretical and empirical content. In this chapter, we address the theoretical aspects of changing the
way that most of the world finances the consumption of their aged population. It is important that, at least in theory, the changes we propose
later in this book can improve the lot of both the generation that pays
and the generation that receives. Here we develop the pure theory of
providing for the retirement of the elderly. Because this is pure theory,
the rest of the book can be read without this chapter if the reader is
willing to accept the proposition we prove here: that at least some of
the real resources required for the transition from an intergenerational
transfer system to a prepaid system of providing for the elderly will be
forthcoming as a result of the greater income generated under the new
system. If you accept this proposition, you can move onto Chapter 4;
if not, read on.
The provision of retirement living expenses and health care in the
United States—and most of the rest of the developed world—is
financed through contemporaneous taxation of the working population.
This form of financing affects the incentives of the working population
to set aside resources for use during their retirement years. We summarize the literature on the economics of financing benefits for the
retired population. We begin with a discussion of the intergenerational
transfer inherent in a system that has current taxpayers (assumed to be
the currently employed population) financing the health care expenditures of the elderly population (assumed to be retired from the workforce). This form of retiree financing is referred to as “pay-as-you-go.”
We show that whatever form of financing is used to transfer resources
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from the working generation to the retired generation, the result is a
reduction in the nation’s capital stock. This lower capital stock implies
that the level of consumption available both for the working generation
and the retired generation is reduced. In the long run, then, when
retirement benefits are financed through a system that transfers
resources from the working generation to the retired generation, both
generations suffer a loss.
We summarize the theory of pay-as-you-go financing of retirement
benefits so as to lay the groundwork for a better understanding of the
benefits of intragenerational (rather than intergenerational) financing.
As a basis of comparison, we begin with a discussion of intergenerational financing that is based on individual choice in the provision of
retirement consumption. In order to demonstrate that the capital stock
reduction is not the result of a bad choice of a tax instrument, we discuss three forms of financing a transfer from the working generation to
the retired generation: lump-sum taxes, general income taxes, and payroll taxes. We show that any form of a generational transfer system
reduces the capital stock when compared with individual choice.
While some of the discussion will be technical, the majority of the
technical aspects of the problem are relegated to Appendix A.

FREE MARKET INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS
Medicare, for all practical purposes, is a pay-as-you-go financing
system that is based on a transfer payment from a younger working
population to an older retired population. Traditional economic analysis of transfers from one group to another does not consider different
generations and thus is not relevant to our problem. The recognition of
the special characteristics of intergenerational transfers led to the
development of what are referred to in economics as overlapping generations models.1 The generations of interest here are the working
generation and the retired generation. There is an extensive literature
that addresses the optimality of the generational transfers inherent in a
pay-as-you-go system when compared with a system in which each
generation provides for its own retirement expenditures.2 The basis of
these comparisons is the welfare generated by a system of transfers
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from the young to the old relative to the welfare generated by a system
in which each generation sets aside capital to pay its own retirement
expenditures. The conclusion of this literature is that intergenerational
transfers reduce welfare, but that once you are in such a system, it may
not pay to leave it because the adjustment costs may outweigh the benefits.
As a way of analyzing the effect of an intergenerational transfer
system on welfare, we begin by assuming a two-period, overlappinggenerations world where goods are produced by the working generation using capital and labor. The working, or young, generation then
ages and becomes the retired, or old, generation. The question we
address in this chapter is how the younger generation provides for consumption during its subsequent retirement years. By considering only
two periods, we collapse an individual’s entire working life into the
first period and the entirety of retirement into the second. While such a
simplification may seem a stretch, it captures the very limited question
that we are addressing here, namely, the effect of the form of the
financing of consumption by the retired population on the nation’s
means of production. We will further simplify the discussion by not
considering differences among individuals in either earning ability or
tastes. As a result, the model considered here cannot be used to analyze alternative ways of achieving intergenerational financing for
retirement consumption; it only deals with the benefits of the greater
means of production that results from a move away from the pay-asyou-go financing of such consumption.
Since we are not concerned at this time with differences in earning
capacity, but only with how a private system would impact the nation’s
capital stock, we assume that all working individuals have identical
preferences for consumption during their working life, denoted as cW,
and consumption during retirement, denoted as cR. We write the function that describes these preferences as
Eq. 3.1

U = U (cW , cR).

Assume that each individual supplies labor during a working
period of life. During this working period, individuals consume and
save for retirement; then the generation ages and retires. We assume
that only capital can be carried over from period to period. 3 Thus, in
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order to pay for their retirement consumption, individuals accumulate
capital in their working life and use that capital to purchase consumption during their retirement. The assumption that only capital moves
from generation to generation places emphasis on the fact that once the
retired population stops working, their only contribution to the output
of the nation, from which their retirement consumption must come, is
the capital they own. If they own no capital, they are completely
dependent on the largess of the working generation for their sustenance.
We assume each individual is virtually an island with an individual
production function that, given their labor and any capital purchased
from the retired generation, permits the production of output that can
either be consumed or be carried over into retirement as capital, to be
sold to the next young generation in return for consumption. Denote
this production function as
Eq. 3.2

y = f (k),

where y and k are, respectively, the output produced and the capital
stock purchased by the representative individual. The amount of capital an individual carries over into retirement is the sum of purchased
capital less depreciation plus any additional saving done during the
individual’s working life. We express this constraint on first-period
consumption and capital acquisition as
Eq. 3.3

y = cW + PWk + δk = f (k),

where PW is the working-period price of capital in terms of consumption units and δ is the rate at which capital depreciates. Each individual must forego consumption in the amount of δk in order to maintain
a level k of capital stock. Given that each working generation individual carries capital stock k into retirement, consumption during retirement is simply the product of the price of capital at retirement, PR and
an individual’s stock of capital, which can be written as
Eq. 3.4

cR = P R k .
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When the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium, the price of
capital will remain constant, which allows us to combine the constraints on consumption in an individual’s working and retirement
years. In this way, we write a single constraint that reveals all the
available choices between working and retirement consumption,
Eq. 3.5

cW = y – (cR + δk).

This constraint fully describes the opportunity for individuals to trade
consumption in their working life for consumption during their retirement years.
We assume that individuals choose the level of working and retirement consumption to maximize their lifetime utility (represented by
the general function given by Eq. 3.1 above). In Appendix A, we
derive the mathematical solution to this problem. Here, however, we
show the solution to the individual’s choice problem graphically (Figure 3.1). The concave line labeled FF in the figure is a representation
of the constraint (Eq. 3.5) on the ability of individuals to trade consumption in working years for consumption during retirement. The
constraint line FF passes through the origin because consumption during retirement is only zero if no capital is held, which implies that
income and therefore working life consumption is also zero. As the
capital stock increases, both working life consumption and retirement
consumption increase. Eventually, however, increased consumption in
retirement must be paid for by reduced working life consumption. In
fact, the negatively sloped section of FF is the only relevant part of the
constraint; the positively sloped section is included to remind us of the
critical role the capital stock plays in retirement consumption choice.
The convex curve labeled II in the figure represents the combinations of working life consumption and retirement consumption at
which, according to the preference function (Eq. 3.1), individuals are
indifferent. This curve is characterized by the property that the less
retirement consumption an individual has, the more an additional unit
is worth in terms of working-life consumption, a property economists
usually describe as diminishing marginal value of working-life consumption. The equilibrium combination of working-life and retirement consumption is shown in the figure as the point EF, which forms
the basis of comparison for our subsequent consideration of the effect
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Figure 3.1 Free Market Intertemporal Consumption

of intergenerational transfers. At this point, the II and FF curves are
tangent, indicating that the willingness of individuals to trade retirement consumption for working-life consumption, the slope of the II
curve, is equal to their ability to make such a trade, the slope of the FF
curve. This common slope is depicted in the figure by the line HH, the
slope of which must equal –P, since the cost of increasing retirement
consumption by one unit is the cost of acquiring an additional unit of
capital to sell during retirement.
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LUMP-SUM INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS
We now have a base case, individual provision of retirement consumption, to compare with a system that transfers consumption from
the working generation to the retired generation via some system of
taxation. Although we do our analysis for a constant-population world,
it applies equally well to a world where population is growing. Importantly, however, current fertility rates in the developed world are uniformly below population-sustaining levels. In our analysis, we
concentrate on the effect on the capital stock, which in this simple
model totally determines the potential for the population to trade
between consumption while working and during retirement. Specifically, we derive the effect on the capital stock of moving from a system
of self-financed retirement consumption to a system of generationaltransfer-financed retirement consumption in a constant-population
world.
As a first approximation to the answer to this question, consider a
simple per-capita lump-sum tax, T, imposed on the working generation
and distributed to the retired generation. In Figure 3.2, which adds the
constraint facing individuals when an intergenerational transfer is
imposed, we show the effect of this transfer. The curves labeled FF,
TT, and T´T´ represent, respectively, the constraint for our base case of
individual provision of retirement consumption, the constraint for the
intergenerational transfer world before any change in the price of capital occurs, and the constraint after the price of capital adjusts as a result
of the transfer.
Each point on the TT curve is derived from a point on the FF curve
by subtracting the amount of the transfer, T, from working life consumption and adding this same transfer to retirement consumption.
Thus, by construction, both the FF and TT frontiers are tangent to a
line of slope –1, shown in Figure 3.2 as the line SS. The point EF represents, as in Figure 3.1, the pretransfer, steady-state-equilibrium levels
of working life and retirement consumption. This point either lies to
the right of the tangent point of SS and FF or is at that tangent point.4
The straight line tangent to FF through the point EF , HH, is strictly to
the right of TT, and therefore to the right of T´T´. The generational
transfer equilibrium point ET, occurs at the point of tangency between
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Figure 3.2 Free Market Versus Intergenerational Transfers, the Case of
Lump-Sum Tax Financing

the indifference curve I´I´and frontier T´T´ and identifies the steadystate-equilibrium levels of working life and retirement consumption,
when intergenerational transfers are in effect. Because EF lies strictly
outside both frontiers TT and T´T´, it is associated with greater consumption for both workers and retirees. Therefore, the prepaid-retirement equilibrium point EF strictly dominates the intergenerationaltransfer-financed equilibrium point ET.
The striking result of this analysis is that even if we achieve a generational transfer with a lump-sum tax, which is supposedly nondistortionary, the result is a reduction in the per-capita capital stock and,
hence, reduced per-capita goods available for consumption to both the
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working and retired generations. Moreover, the reduced capital stock
results in a higher price for capital, which translates into a higher interest rate. This higher interest rate in the transfer world further distorts
individuals’ choices toward consumption in their working years.
It is worth noting that our analysis ignores the effect of any generational transfer system on fertility. If we assume that in addition to capital, individuals can acquire resources for their retirement years
through a contract with their children, then the existence of an extrafamilial transfer will reduce the retirement consumption motive to have
children. As a result, the introduction of a generational transfer may
reduce the fertility rate and therefore the steady-state population.
Because our model has constant returns to economy size, the steadystate per-capita capital stock is not affected by the fertility rate. However, Social Security and Medicare systems throughout the world rely
heavily on population growth to provide future retirement consumption. Thus, any fertility rate reduction resulting from the introduction
of a generational transfer system would reduce the population growth
rate and reduce the viability of these programs.5

INCOME-TAX-BASED INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS
Before we use the result that intergenerational-transfer-based social
security systems are inefficient (in that they result in lower capital and
income), we must show that our result is not due to the special tax we
analyzed. This is especially true because lump-sum taxes are not prevalent and most pay-as-you-go social security systems are financed with
some form of income tax. The great advantage of lump-sum taxation is
that there is no escape from it and nothing individuals do has any effect
on the amount of tax paid. However, as the above analysis shows, even
though lump-sum taxes cannot be escaped, they affect the equilibrium
capital stock and are welfare-reducing. One might expect that intergenerational transfers financed by taxes that have additional incentive
effects will reduce welfare further through their impact on the choice of
capital and labor. Here we extend the discussion of intergenerational
transfers to include financing by income-based taxation. 6 As we will
show below, however, an income-tax-financed intergenerational trans-

52

The Theory of Paying for Retirement

fer actually works better than one financed by a lump-sum tax, because
the income tax reduces the equilibrium price of capital, which in turn
alleviates some of the distortion resulting from the lump-sum transfer.
Nevertheless, even with the less distorting income-tax financing, intergenerational-transfer-financed retirement still results in consumption
levels for the working and retired generations that are lower than when
a generation’s retirement consumption is prepaid by that same generation during its own working years.
We illustrate the equilibrium in the income-tax-financed transfer
case in Figure 3.3; the trade-off frontiers FF and TT are the same as
those in Figure 3.1. Frontier ττ in Figure 3.3 represents the trade-off
frontier when income taxation is used to finance the transfer to the
Figure 3.3 Free Market Versus Intergenerational Transfers, the Case of
Income-Tax Financing
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retired generation. Frontier ττ is strictly to the left of TT because the
equilibrium price of capital stock is greater than when retirement consumption is prepaid. Because of the higher equilibrium price of capital, the capital stock with an income-tax-financed transfer is smaller
than with an individual prepaid system (see the discussion of the relative position of T´T´and TT for Figure 3.1).
The equilibrium under income-tax-financed intergenerational
transfer, Eτ, is a point on ττ at which the relevant indifference curve
I´´I´´ has a slope of –Pτ. To illustrate this, a straight line JJ is drawn tangent to the indifference curve at Eτ; hence, JJ also has a slope of –Pτ. It
is obvious that Eτ is dominated by EF. It is also obvious that the indifference curve is not tangent to ττ at Eτ. This outcome results from the
fact that the income tax changes the terms of trade between that consumption during working life and consumption during retirement. 7
We have established in this and the last section that no matter what
kind of financing is used, individuals are worse off in a world with
young-to-old intergenerational transfers than they would be if each
generation prepaid its own retirement consumption. Within the transfer world, however, the form of financing makes a difference because
different financing methods have different economic effects. Intuitively, income-tax financing will make intergenerational transfers even
less attractive than the lump-sum tax financing due to the identified
negative incentive effects of income taxes. However, this intuition in
favor of the lump-sum tax is no longer correct in an overlapping-generations economy.8
Although we will not present the proof of the generality of the
proposition that an income-tax-financed generation transfer is superior
to a lump-sum-financed transfer, the following simulation demonstrates this result for simple production and preference functions. For
purposes of this simulation, we assume the preference function is
homogeneous and has zero fundamental time preference, as indicated
by the equal weights on working life and retirement consumption,
Eq. 3.6

U(cW , cR) = (cW)1/2 (cR)1/2.

Although the underlying production function is homogeneous in capital and labor, the transformed production function as a function of the
capital/labor ratio is not homogeneous. For this simulation, we assume
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the following production function, which has diminishing returns and
the possibility of a negative marginal productivity of capital:
Eq. 3.7

f (k) = 81.65k1/2 –1.5k.

Finally, we assume a constant depreciation rate of capital, δ = 0.1.9
Using these assumed functions, we derive the steady-state values of
relevant economic variables in the prepaid, lump-sum-financed, and
income-tax-financed equilibria. Table 3.1 contains the steady-state
values and the level of utility using a transfer of 100 consumption units
for each of the two transfer situations.
Since in theory intergenerational transfers are always welfare
reducing, it is not surprising that in the simulation individuals are
worse off with either form of generational transfer than when retirement consumption is prepaid. The simulation also shows, as expected,
that the income-tax-financed transfer results in higher utility than the
lump-sum-tax-financed transfer, with the former having a higher capital stock, a lower capital price, and a higher utility. Income-tax financing does better than the lump-sum-tax financing exactly because it
alleviates the capital stock distortion.

Table 3.1 Simulated Effect of Lump-Sum and Income-Tax-Financed
Transfers (Fixed Labor Supply)

Variables

Prepaid
retirement

Lump-sum-tax- Income-taxfinanced
financed
transfer
transfer

Per-capita capital stock

625

454.0

477.2

Price of capital (units of consumption
per unit of capital)

1.40

1.75

1.64

Transfer/tax rate (%)

0/0

100/0

100/7

Working-period consumption

625

511.1

538.2

Retired-period consumption

875

893.0

882.8

739.5

675.8

689.3

Utility
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INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS WITH VARIABLE
LABOR SUPPLY
An important argument in the policy debate concerning the pay-asyou-go financing of current Social Security and Medicare programs is
the negative effect of the payroll tax on the supply of labor. In order to
account for the impact of any negative incentive effects of taxation on
labor supply on our results, we drop our assumption that workers supply the same level of labor no matter how that labor is taxed. We incorporate labor supply incentive effects by considering an extended model
that features variable labor supply. We add free time (leisure) during
an individual’s working life to the individual’s preference function
while retaining the assumption that individuals supply no labor during
retirement.10 Denote the level of leisure taken during an individual’s
working life as l and rewrite the individual’s preferences as
Eq. 3.8 U = U (cW , cR , l) .
To be consistent with our previous discussion, per-capita output must
depend on labor supplied, which we write as
k ⎞
Eq. 3.9 y = (1 − l) f ⎛
.
⎝ 1 − l⎠
Using this extended model, we show in Appendix A that, at equilibrium, the capital stock with variable labor supply for prepaid retirement, k, lump-sum-tax-financed retirement kTL̂ , and income-tax-financed retirement kτLˆ , has the property that kTLˆ < kτLˆ < k. Considering our results when we ignored the effect of taxes on labor supply, one
might expect that because an income-tax-financed transfer treats labor
and capital symmetrically, it would be superior to a tax on the income
attributable only to labor. Surprisingly, as we show in Appendix A, at
least one form of a payroll tax is superior to both the lump-sum tax and
the income tax as a method of financing an intergenerational transfer.
The logic of this result follows from two attributes of the model. First,
because payroll is less than total income, it follows that the tax rate
required to finance any given transfer to the retired generation must be
larger than if all income was taxed. Second, increases in the capital
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stock result in increases in total payroll. Therefore, if the equilibrium
price of capital remained the same with the income tax and the payroll
tax, the payroll-tax capital stock would have to exceed the income-tax
capital stock in order to raise the required revenue. Indeed, this is
exactly what happens in the following simulation.
In order to illustrate the effect of a payroll-tax-financed transfer,
we use the simulation equations above with the addition of leisure
consumed during working life. For purposes of consistency with the
simulation done in the fixed labor supply case, we retain the
assumption of a homogeneous utility function. Let U (cW , cR, l ) =
1.732 (cW)1/2 (cR)1/2 ( l )1/2 be the common utility function. Assume a
production function f(k) = 100k1/2 – 1.5k, and as in the last simulation,
let δ = 0.1 and T = 100.11 The results of the simulation are shown in
Table 3.2.
Inspection of these results confirms the two conclusions reached in
our prior simulation. First, no matter what financing method is
adopted, an intergenerational transfer from the young to the old
always reduces the capital stock and total utility. Interestingly, both the
income tax and the payroll tax are better than a lump-sum tax in that
they result in less distortion.12 However, all forms of transfer are inferior to a system of prepaid retirement benefits. The negative welfare
effects of generation-transfer-financed retirement benefits are due to
the higher capital price that is associated with such a transfer. All
intergenerational transfers distort the optimal capital stock and reduce
the availability of consumption for both working life and retirement. 13
Table 3.2 Simulated Effect of Lump-Sum and Income-Tax-Financed
Transfers (Variable Labor Supply)
Variables

Prepaid
Lump-sum Income tax
retirement tax financing financing

Payroll tax
financing

Capital stock

416.7

255.5

258.3

280.5

Price of capital

1.40

1.99

1.80

1.62

a

11

15

313.9

342.2

Income tax rate (%)

NA

NA

Working-period consumption

416.7

305.3

Retired-period consumption

583.3

607.3

564.3

554.4

Utility

493.0

419.3

433.9

449.2

a

NA = not applicable.
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DOES THE SIZE OF THE RETIRED GENERATION MATTER?
In view of the decline in fertility and the population bulge (the socalled baby boom), both of which are worldwide phenomena, the
impact of temporary population size changes on the well-being of the
elderly is of significance. In particular, how does the fact that the
entire developed world faces a pending significant increase in the population of retirees, while at the same time looking at a reduced workforce, affect the results we have derived above? To provide some
answer to this perplexing question, we use a simple version of the
model above. As a base case, we note that when all generations are the
same size and technology is constant, the equilibrium per-capita capital
stock will be that capital stock which maximizes the value of lifetime
consumption per capita for any given level of leisure.14
Begin by assuming that the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium with a constant population of size N0. Assume further that a generation size shock occurs, so that the new population is N1 = (1 + η)N0.
Without loss of generality, assume that η > 0.15 At the new larger population, the price of capital will rise because the supply is unchanged
and there are more demanders. If there were no further changes in
population, the per-capita capital stock would return to its original
equilibrium. During the adjustment to the new equilibrium steady
state, however, the price of capital is above its cost of production.
Thus, until we reach the original equilibrium, each successive retired
generation benefits from the larger population.
The baby boom generation is not the equilibrium population size
but is a temporary increase in generation size. If the equilibrium capital stock is chosen so that it maximizes the mean size of generation’s
consumption per capita, then a generation’s lifetime consumption will
depend on generation size relative to the mean. For a generation that is
larger than the mean, such as the baby boomers, the capital stock will
be too small, resulting in larger retirement consumption for the retired
smaller generation but smaller lifetime consumption for the baby boom
generation.16 Also, when the baby boomers retire and attempt to sell
off their capital to the smaller working generation, the price of capital
will fall.
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The only way that a society can prepare to pay for the retirement
consumption of a larger-than-normal generation is to add to the capital
stock. This larger capital stock would then be consumed during the
retirement years of the larger-than-normal population. As we have
shown above, a pay-as-you-go financing system takes away the incentive for a generation to add to its capital stock to pay for its retirement
expenses and thus will result in a reduced capital stock in the steady
state.17
If generational transfers are non-optimal in the sense that they are
welfare reducing, is there any role for intervention in intertemporal markets? The work in this area has addressed this question using the concept of insurance across generations.18 In effect, the unborn generation
buys insurance against the risk that they will be too large or too small.
There are two issues for an unborn generation: the price they must pay
for capital during their working period and the price they will receive for
capital during their retirement period. As we have shown above, a generation that is too large, in the sense that the inherited capital stock commands a market price in excess of the long-run price of capital, transfers
income to the retired generation. To compound the problem, the generation that is too large will also expect to face a price of capital during
their retirement period that is below their purchase price.
To consider the problem of social insurance, assume that population size is the result of a Markov process that is pure Martingale, which
implies that the expected size of the about-to-be-born generation is
equal to the size of the most recently born generation. In this case, if the
unborn generation is larger than the current generation, each unborn
will pay higher prices for capital and transfer resources to the current
generation. On the other hand, if the unborn generation is smaller than
the current generation, then each unborn will pay lower prices for capital and receive a subsidy from the current generation. Since the two
generations are affected in opposite directions by the size of the unborn
generation, there is room for a contract between the two generations
assuming risk aversion. Such a contract would involve the price of capital and reduce the flows between generations. Importantly, the direction of the flows would be dependent on generation size differentials, so
that fixed generational transfers would be non-optimal. Therefore, the
proven non-optimality of the current generational transfer system cannot be rescued by appealing to generational size insurance. Further,
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intergenerational insurance does not solve this problem, because the
diversification of risk usually involved in insurance cannot take place
across generations because of the small number of generations.

CONCLUSION
Our focus in this chapter has been on the pure theory of intergenerational transfers. The analysis allows for a comparison between prepaid retirement and retirement financed by intergenerational transfers.
The results we obtained are unequivocal in showing that intergenerational transfers are always welfare-reducing when analyzed by comparing the steady-state equilibria. More important to the work in our
subsequent chapters is the fact that intergenerational transfers, no matter how financed, lead to reductions in the nation’s capital stock. This
fact suggests that in moving from a Medicare or Social Security system
that is financed through an intergenerational transfer to a system that is
prepaid by each generation, there will be an increase in the nation’s
capital stock. This increase in the nation’s capital stock will result in
an increase in national income that will help provide the resources
required as the baby boom generation retires. Thus, the primary issue
in the debate concerning the privatization of the provision of retirement
benefits should be the effect of the institutional change on the nation’s
stock of capital and subsequent national income. The actual debate at
both the academic and political levels has concentrated on the fact that
private accounts could yield higher rates of return than current government-held funds. Unfortunately, the fundamental issue is not about
rate of return; it is about capital and income.
The next chapter describes in detail the forecasts required to provide an analysis of the existing U.S. Medicare program. We are suggesting changing the program from one based on intergenerational
transfers to a prepaid system. Any evaluation of our proposal requires
that we forecast into the future the existing system and our proposed
system. We accomplish these forecasts by a thorough analysis of data
on employment and life-cycle earnings for both males and females.
This work is of necessity detailed, and the reader may wish to accept
the validity of the underlying analysis and move immediately to Chap-
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ter 5. With that said, however, we encourage any reader who takes this
approach to return to Chapter 4 whenever there is a question concerning the basis of our forecasts.

Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

These models were first suggested in a seminal paper by Samuelson (1958).
See Myles (1995), Chapter 14, for an excellent summary of this literature.
This approach was first introduced by Diamond (1965, 1977).
The equilibrium is at the tangent point of SS only if the rate of interest is zero.
In a provocative paper, Philipson and Becker (1998) do a thorough analysis of the
substitution of capital and children as providers of retirement annuities.
In the United States, at least, intergenerational transfers are financed through a
payroll tax. However, as we demonstrate in Appendix A, when labor is completely inelastically supplied, in at least one form the payroll tax is equivalent to a
lump-sum tax.
The indifference curve has a slope of –Pτ at the equilibrium, while frontier ττ has
a slope of –Pτ / [1 + τ(δ – f´)] < Pτ; hence, ττ is steeper than JJ at equilibrium.
For an excellent discussion of optimal taxation, see Ordover and Phelps (1979)
and Park (1991).
This specification of the production function may look strange, but it is constructed to be comparable with a later simulation where labor supplied is an
endogenous variable.
Because we do not consider second-period labor supply, our analysis will not shed
light on the retirement decision. For demonstrating the non-optimality of intergenerational transfers, discussion of the retirement decision is not required,
although this decision is important for the financing of retirement consumption.
There is extensive literature on the retirement decision; see, for example, Crawford and Lilien (1981), Diamond and Mirrlees (1986), Feldstein (1974), and
Sheshinski (1978).
This utility function, except for the scalar constant, is the same as that used in the
previous simulation for any fixed level of leisure. The scalar constant was set to
make the utility values comparable to those contained in Table 3.1. Since utility is
strictly ordinal in nature, the actual values are unimportant. Note also that the values of all variables in Table 3.2, save those for utility, are unaffected by this scalar.
When the payroll tax is defined as in note 7, individuals ignore the effect of
changing the capital stock on the marginal product of capital. This simpler form
of the payroll tax for the variable labor case is the most distortionary of all methods of financing the transfer, because individuals ignore the effect of their capital
choice on the return to capital. See Flemming (1977) for a discussion of optimal
payroll taxes.
The welfare implications of transfers is more usually conducted using the
dynamic adjustment of the system. Under certain conditions, even though the
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15.
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comparison of steady-state solutions indicates a gain in welfare is possible, the
present value of the losses during the adjustment period will outweigh the subsequent gains. See Karni and Zilcha (1986) for a comparative statics approach to
the welfare implications of Social Security.
For the case where it is assumed that no leisure is taken in period t by a generation-t individual, this maximum lifetime consumption is the global maximum.
However, when leisure is taken, lifetime consumption is less than the global maximum.
The observation that generation size shock has significant effects on the welfare
of a generation that is too large was first investigated by Smith (1982).
These results depend on the existence of a consumption per capita maximizing
per-capita capital stock. Previous results have assumed that capital is always productive, so that a smaller generation inherits more capital and gets greater consumption. See Brandts and de Bartolome (1992) for an excellent discussion of
uncertain population size on social insurance results.
Feldstein (1996) estimated that the loss to the economy of reduced capital stock is
of the order of 1% of gross domestic product.
See Green (1988) and Brandts and de Bartolome (1992) for examples of this
work.
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4
Forecasting Earnings
The analysis of a system of providing retirement health care,
whether through a pay-as-you-go income transfer or through a prepaid
system, fundamentally involves seeing into the future. The effect of
the current system on future taxpayers requires that we understand the
fundamental relationship between the tax rate, earnings, and the size of
the working population on the one hand and the benefit structure and
the size of the retired population on the other. We must then place into
this relationship forecasts of each of the relevant factors: earnings, population by age, labor force participation, retirement population, and
future benefit cost. By the same token, the contribution required to
prefund a retirement health care system requires these same forecasts,
with the exception that after the transition, the age distribution of the
population does not play any role in contribution levels.
Given the critical importance of forecasting future levels of the
components of the retirement health care equation, any effort to understand the existing Medicare crisis and to suggest changes that will provide a permanent solution must be based on sound actuarial
foundations. With a sound actuarial foundation in place, institutional
changes (such as moving toward or to a system that is prepaid, the benefits of which are shown in Chapter 3) can be evaluated in terms of
their cost and feasibility. In this chapter, we begin the analysis by
developing forecasts of the earnings component of the retirement
health care equation. In this development, issues of life-cycle earnings
by education and sex must be considered. Further, since Medicare
benefits do not depend on work life history, we must account for everyone, whether or not they spent any time in the labor force.
Our approach is to forecast average annual earnings over the entire
population of males and females for each birth cohort. The forecasts
by birth cohort allow us to evaluate the future of the current system and
our proposed prepaid system of financing Medicare. In addition, during the transition from the existing pay-as-you-go Medicare system to
a prepaid system, the birth cohorts alive at the time of the transition
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will have to pay the cost of the transition. The forecasts of life-cycle
earnings for males and females will allow us to estimate the contribution rates that allow an individual already in the workforce to convert
to prepaid Medicare and to derive tax rates that will pay for the transition.
The data on which our forecasts of the life-cycle age earnings profiles for any birth cohort are based cover the period from 1964 to 1995
and are taken from the Current Population Survey. As we discuss at
length in this chapter, these data reveal a consistent upward trend in
female average annual earnings. This upward trend is especially
important because women have become a major factor in the nation’s
labor force. Over the period of our data, the labor force participation
of women has increased more than 47%, and their education level has
risen to equal that of the male population.
We produce estimates of life-cycle earnings and labor force participation (this chapter), estimates of future benefits under several plausible Medicare programs (Chapter 5), and the cost and benefits of a
transition from the current pay-as-you-go generation transfer system to
a system based on prefunding by birth cohort (Chapter 6). In the discussion, we present alternative proposals for reform of the health care
system that make the transition to a prepaid system less costly while
simultaneously increasing the efficiency of the health care system.

PAY-AS-YOU-GO VERSUS PREFUNDING MEDICARE
In the spring of each year, the Social Security and Medicare Trustees issue their reports on the status of the two programs. Their longrun actuarial projections rely on several key assumptions about population trends, real wage growth, and real benefit growth. Similarly, any
estimate of the cost of a prefunded Medicare program must be based
on best estimates of these same demographic, income, and benefit
components. The importance of each of these components on the
financing of Medicare can be seen by examining the following pay-asyou-go accounting identity:
Eq. 4.1

Tax Rate × Workers × Earnings = Beneficiaries × Benefits.
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The left-hand side of Eq. 4.1 identifies tax revenues as the product of
tax rates, the number of workers, and average earnings. The right-hand
side of Eq. 4.1 identifies the gross Medicare benefits as the product of
the number of beneficiaries and the average benefits paid. By rearranging this fundamental equation, we can derive the relation of the tax rate
required to finance a pay-as-you-go Medicare system to the ratios of
benefits to income and retirees to workers,
Beneficiaries ⎞ ⎛ Benefits ⎞
Total Benefits
.
=
⎜
⎟
⎝ Wor ker s ⎠ ⎝ Earnings ⎠ Taxable Income

Eq. 4.2 x Rate = ⎛

The required tax rate is simply the product of the beneficiaries/workers
ratio and the average benefits/average earnings ratio. If the tax rate is
held constant, then gross benefits can only grow at a rate that is equal
to the growth in the tax base.
The sensitivity of the required tax rate to the beneficiary/worker
ratio and the benefit/income ratio is well known and is the source of
concern for many policymakers. Under the current pay-as-you-go
Medicare financing system, the effects of the pending retirement of the
baby boomers on the beneficiaries/worker ratio and the expected rapid
growth of average benefits relative to average earnings will require
higher tax rates or a substantial reduction in benefits. When considering Medicare, it is important to consider that the size of the benefit
stream is not tied in any way to previous work history (unlike Social
Security). Thus, future Medicare benefits are unrelated to the future
labor force participation of the population and are therefore unrelated
to earnings. In contrast, Social Security benefits are at least partially
determined by future labor force participation. The fact that Medicare
benefits are divorced from earnings allows us to forecast future benefits, ignoring work history. Further, the fact that all labor earnings are
subject to the Medicare payroll tax allows us to project the growth in
tax receipts by simply analyzing the expected growth in annual earnings.1
In contrast to pay-as-you-go financing, consider the problem of
prefunding the future Medicare benefit stream for new labor force
entrants. For illustrative purposes, consider the prefunding of Medicare for each labor force member of a specific age cohort, defined as all
individuals born between January 1 and December 31 of a given year
(i.e., all those born in the same calendar year). Define the benefit that
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must be funded by a stream of contributions as consisting of a retirement medical insurance policy that will provide for their health insurance needs upon a specific age cohort reaching age 65. We can
simplify the problem by considering a representative worker in the
cohort. For this case we can assume that the number of beneficiaries
and the number of workers are both equal to 1, the one representative
individual. The required “tax rate” is the ratio of the present value of
expected retirement medical costs to the present value of expected
earned income, both adjusted for the probability of survival. 2 If this
required tax rate is applied to the mean cohort member’s income for
each remaining year, the proceeds will be adequate to fund the retirement medical benefits of the cohort.
Thus, the ratio of the expected present value of benefits to the
expected present value of income yields the appropriate tax rate to fund
all members of the cohort, which is what would be needed to replace
the current pay-as-you-go financing for Medicare with a system of prepaid Medicare. To calculate the required contribution rate, a cohort’s
earnings over its remaining work life (its work life-cycle earnings, so
to speak) and its expected retirement medical benefits must be estimated. In the final analysis, the cohort’s life-cycle earnings and its
expected retirement medical benefits are on equal footing in determining the contribution rate. We begin by decomposing cohort annual
earnings among three components: cohort labor force participation,
cohort annual hours worked, and cohort real hourly wages.

ESTIMATING FUTURE EARNINGS
Forecasting future earnings is fraught with uncertainties. To cover
these uncertainties and perhaps make them even more apparent, we
have developed several alternative aggregate earnings forecasts that
differ as a result of using alternative estimates of the growth rates of
historical wages, labor force participation, and hours worked. Note
that the method used to account for the rapid changes in the labor market for women has a significant effect on any estimate of the growth in
wages, labor force participation, and hours worked. For our estimates,
we use two decision rules to capture the convergence of the men’s and
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women’s annual earnings components. We present alternative forecasts to indicate how sensitive the aggregate forecasts are to differing
assumptions. These alternative forecasts will be evaluated before we
choose the projections on which the final forecasts are based.
Over the last 20 years, the cross-sectional evidence indicates that
the annual earnings life-cycle profile for women is trending toward the
life-cycle earnings profile for men, both for full-time, full-year workers
and for the working population as a whole. Further, among women,
the cohort-based life-cycle profiles tell a very different story than do
the cross-sectional profiles. The rise in female labor force participation, coupled with their increased human capital investment and greater
labor force continuity, makes the cross-sectional age/earnings profiles
underestimate the real earnings and labor force participation of women
during the latter years of their work life. This disparity between crosssectional age earnings profiles and cohort-based age earnings profiles
that characterizes the data for women is also true for certain subsets of
men, except that here we have the estimation error going the other way.
In particular, MaCurdy and Mroz (1995, pp. 34–35) suggested that for
men with lower education levels, the 1980 and 1990 cross-sections for
men with the same education levels would have overestimated future
earnings potential.
The data we use to calculate the growth rates in wages, labor force
participation, and hours worked are taken from the 1964 to 1996
March Demographic Supplements to the Current Population Survey
(CPS). The CPS is conducted by U.S. Census Bureau for the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. It is a monthly survey conducted at the household
level. Households are surveyed for four months, are not surveyed during the subsequent eight months, and are then surveyed for four more
months. Between 50,000 and 60,000 households are surveyed in a
given month. The March Supplement includes the variables of interest
for this chapter: average weeks worked, average hours worked per
week, annual wage and salary, self-employment and farm earnings,
and an indicator for participation in the labor market. The March Supplement questions pertain to labor market behavior during the previous
year, and thus the years for which we have data are 1963 to 1995. In
order to account for inflation, all earnings data are converted to 1995
dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditures implicit price
deflator.3 Using this CPS data, we develop a technique that allows us

68

Forecasting Earnings

to track the historical changes in labor force participation, hours
worked, and wages for different categories of workers. The historical
record of labor force participation, hours worked, and wages by worker
category allows us to treat each of the components of total earnings
separately and allows subsets of the labor force to experience differing
growth rates by earnings component.
In order to forecast the total tax base, and ultimately the cohort
profiles required for the contribution rate estimates, we must combine
our estimates of the number of individuals in a category with the proportion that participate in the labor market. The product of these two
yields the number of individuals in a specific category that are
expected to be employed. Combining the estimated number of
employed individuals in a specific category with the wage and hours
worked for that category completes our estimated tax base for that category. The total tax base is then the sum of all the categories. For purposes of our estimation procedure, we utilize 11 age groups and 5
education cells for each sex, yielding 116 separate age × education ×
sex categories.

ESTIMATING EARNINGS-COMPONENT GROWTH RATES
With the historical record for 116 categories of the population in
hand, the problem of forecasting the future for all categories requires
that we forecast the future path for each of the three components of
annual earnings. We base our forecasts of future performance of
wages, labor force participation, and hours worked using four different
methods of weighting the past record.4 Three of these growth rate estimates weight recent growth more heavily than growth in the early
years, and the last is simply the measure of growth obtained using only
the two endpoints of each series. By calculating the growth rates for
each age/education category, we allow the shape of the age earnings
profile to change over time. These age/earnings profiles allow us to
create projections for each cohort.
The validity of growth rate estimates that weight recent growth
more heavily have been investigated by Murphy and Welch (1992).
Their initial growth rate calculations for real hourly wages, annual
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hours, and annual earnings were updated in Murphy and Welch
(1996).5 We build on their work using three weighting schemes, the
first two of which weight the annual growth rates in each of the three
components of annual earnings, while the third applies the weights to
the levels of the components of annual earnings and then calculates the
resulting growth rate. The first growth rate calculation relies on
weights which are proportional to the time period measured from the
beginning of the period covered by the data. As an alternative to the
time-period proportional weights, the geometric weights also weight
recent annual growth rates more heavily, with the adjacent weights differing in an exponential fashion. For this geometric weighting scheme,
the discounting factor is chosen by the user. In order to assess the
effect of the choice of discount, we present in Figure 4.1 two discount
choices, 1.02 and 1.05, and compare to the outcome with proportional
weights and equal weights. Inspection of the estimates in Figure 4.1
reveals that growth rates calculated using geometric weights with a discount factor of 1.05 produces a series similar to that with proportional
weights.

Figure 4.1 Types of Weighting Used to Calculate Average Growth Rates
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In Table 4.1, we present the estimated growth rates for each of the
three components of annual earnings, calculated using time-period proportional weights, the two alternative geometric weights, and equal
weights for one of the education/age cells (college graduates between
the ages of 40 and 44). As shown in the table, even for prime-age men
with a college education, labor force participation and work hours have
declined. Real hourly wages for this age/education category have
grown between 0.657% and 0.841% for men and between 0.842% and
1.180% for women. The fact that women are gaining on men is evident in that for all components of annual earnings, the growth rates
among the women in this category have outpaced the growth rate for
the men. In a following section, we address how we deal with situations in which, for a given age/education category projected women’s
hours, participation, or wages exceed that for men.

IN-SAMPLE FORECASTS OF EARNINGS
In our discussion of the transition to a prepaid Medicare program,
we will rely on forecasts of future earnings over a long period. In order
to provide some indication of the accuracy of using past growth rates to
forecast future growth, we have split the period for which we have data
into two parts: an estimate base part, either 1963–1985 or 1963–1990,
and an in-sample forecast part, either 1986–1995 (the most recent 10year period allowed by our data) or 1991–1995 (the most recent 5-year
period allowed by our data). We use the estimate base part of our date
to estimate the future growth rates of the three components of annual
earnings. Then, using these estimated growth rates, we estimate
annual earnings for the 5 and 10 in-sample forecast periods.
The differences between the in-sample annual earnings forecasts
and actual annual earnings for all men and women, based on the various growth rates, are presented graphically in Figure 4.2a–d. The average annual earnings for men and women are calculated using total
male and female population, respectively, independent of labor force
participation; as a result, an increase (decrease) in labor force participation will increase (decrease) mean annual earnings. Therefore, the
labor force participation rate is an important factor in the determination

Table 4.1 Alternative Growth Rate Estimates for College Graduates Ages 40–44 (%)
Men
Weighting Scheme
Equal

Women

Participation

Hours

Hourly
wage

Participation

Hours

Hourly
wage

0.034

–0.074

0.768

1.222

0.374

1.180

Time proportional

–0.089

–0.047

0.657

1.212

0.607

0.864

Geometric 1.02 discount factor

–0.003

–0.066

0.753

1.208

0.443

1.087

Geometric 1.05 discount factor

–0.045

–0.059

0.811

1.151

0.517

0.979

Geometric, levels 1.02 discount factor

–0.093

–0.047

0.715

1.169

0.613

0.858

Geometric, levels 1.05 discount factor

–0.099

–0.049

0.841

1.101

0.615

0.842
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Figure 4.2a Actual and Predicted Earnings for Men 16–64 (1986–95)

Figure 4.2b Actual and Predicted Earnings for Women 16–64 (1986–95)
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Figure 4.2c Actual and Predicted Earnings for Men 16–64 (1991–95)

Figure 4.2d Actual and Predicted Earnings for Women 16–64 (1991–95)
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of the time path of mean annual earnings. In Figure 4.2, the two sets of
in-sample forecasts are overlaid on the path of the actual mean average
annual earnings; one set of overlays is for the most recent 10-year
period, using the 1963–1985 portion of our CPS data, and the second
set of overlays is for the most recent 5-year period, using the 1963–
1990 portion of our CPS data.
Each set of forecasts was constructed by first calculating the
growth rates for labor force participation, annual hours worked, and
real hourly wages based on the relevant portion of our CPS data for
each age/education/sex category. The growth rates calculated using
these methods were then applied to the 1985 and 1990 labor force participation, annual hours worked, or real hourly wage to produce the
forecast levels for each age × education × sex category. The forecast
levels were then weighted (using the weights discussed above) to form
the forecasts of total annual earnings. Finally, total annual earnings
were divided by the total male and female working-age population to
arrive at the male and female mean annual earnings.
While the data displayed in Figure 4.2 are designed to aid us in the
selection of the appropriate weighting scheme for forecasting future
annual earnings for both men and women, the results depicted are
clearly different for men and women in at least two ways. First, annual
earnings for men show much more cyclical variation. Second, after
rising during the first five years of our data, real mean annual earnings
for men levels off and remains approximately constant over the business cycle for the remainder of the data period. In contrast, real mean
annual earnings for women rises steadily during the entire period,
showing little cyclical impact and no leveling effect. These striking
differences are the result of three facts. One, over the period of our
data, the labor force participation rate for women has risen more than
47%, while labor force participation for men has declined 2.2% (a fact
that will prove significant in our later forecasts). Two, education levels
for women have been rising relative to those for men over the entire
data period. Three, women’s hourly wages have been rising relative to
men’s over the entire data period. The secular increases in female
labor force participation, hours worked, and real wages have overcome
the business-cycle effects, allowing the mean annual earnings for
women to rise throughout the period, though a slowdown in mean
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women’s annual earnings’ growth does occur during the recessionary
periods.
Examination of the graphs for the male working-age population in
Figure 4.2 reveals that the projected annual earnings, which rely on
growth rates calculated using geometric weights on annual levels,
appear to produce the superior forecasts over the 10-year period. In
fact, for the male working-age population, the forecast and actual end
of period values are almost identical. For the female working-age population, however, all of the forecast methods fail to catch the slowdown
in mean female annual earnings, although the geometric weights on
annual levels yield the smallest overestimate of the actual level of
female mean annual earnings. The reason for the disparity between the
forecast and actual mean female annual earnings is that the forecast
base is failing to capture the recent slowdown in mean female annual
earnings. This slowdown reversed itself in the last few years of our
data, but not enough to overtake the forecast. Based on our analysis of
the forecast errors (the details of which are presented in the third section of Appendix B), we have chosen the geometric weights applied to
annual levels of labor force participation, annual hours worked, and
real hourly wages to forecast annual earnings for our discussion of the
transition to prepaid Medicare in Chapter 6.

POPULATION AND EDUCATION PROJECTIONS
In order to estimate the cost of a transition to a prepaid Medicare
system, we must understand the future of the current Medicare revenue
stream. The future Medicare tax revenues are a combination of the
earnings of individuals and the number of individuals. For the earnings
part, we apply the forecast growth rates to the 1995 values for labor
force participation, annual hours worked, and real wage for each age/
sex/education category to predict future levels of individual earnings.
To forecast aggregate earnings, however, we must also estimate the
final component, the number of individuals in each category. The U.S.
Census Bureau publishes population projections for the 1995–2050
period; these projections are based on assumptions concerning fertility
and immigration. To account for the uncertainty concerning future fer-
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tility and immigration on the projections, the bureau publishes three
levels of projections: high, intermediate, and low. For our estimates,
we have relied on the Census Bureau’s intermediate population projections by age and have combined these projections into the age groups
for which we have calculated growth rates in labor force participation,
annual hours worked, and real wages. Since we also account for sex
and education, we must assign the total future population of males and
females in any age group to one of our five education categories.
In the assignment of the total population forecasts to each of our
age/education/sex categories, we must deal with several considerations. First, female educational attainment has been rising relative to
male educational attainment for the more recent birth cohorts. The
assumptions we make concerning the continuation of female educational attainment will affect the female earnings forecasts. Second,
education levels within a cohort rise as the cohort ages for two reasons:
mortality rates are lower for the more highly educated and individuals
continue to pursue education as they age. Individuals alive in 1995 are
distributed across all education levels, with this distribution changing
over the remaining life of each cohort, especially for the younger
cohorts as a result of the increase in continuing education. A final consideration concerns the yet-to-be-born cohorts and their education progression by age and sex.
We can use the extensive data concerning individual characteristics
contained in the CPS to deal with many of these issues. Based on the
annual CPS data, we have calculated the proportion of each of our age
groups that are in our five education cells—i.e., 0–11 years (did not
graduate from high school), 12 years (high school graduate), 13–15
years (some college), 16 years (college graduate), and 17 and more
years (some postgraduate work)—for each of the years for which we
have data (1968 to 1995). Using this data, we have identified the
weighted average progression in education achievement by age and sex
for the members of the baby boom generation.
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show, for men and women, respectively,
the weighted average distribution of educational attainment by age,
expressed as a percentage of all individuals of the specified age and sex
(derived from the CPS using the baby boom cohorts). Since, in 1995,
the oldest of the baby boom cohorts was 49 years of age, the age range
for each figure is from 16 to 44 years of age. Note also that in calculat-
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Figure 4.3 Percentage of Men in Each Education Cell

Figure 4.4 Percentage of Women in Each Education Cell
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ing the weighted averages, we have excluded the birth cohorts born
between 1946 and 1950. These birth cohorts, while part of the baby
boom, were the cohorts most affected by the Vietnam War, which
would be expected to result in greater-than-normal levels of education
for males as they attempted to avoid military service.
The first step in forming the weighted average percentage in each
education category is to find the percentage in each category when a
specific birth cohort—for example, the cohort of which all members
were born in 1950 (hereafter, the 1950 birth cohort)—is a given age,
say, 35 years old. Then, we find the percentage in each education category when the 1951 birth cohort was 35 years of age. We continue this
process until we have, for each age and birth cohort, the percentage in
each education category. Then, the observed percentage in each education category for a given age is weighted using the proportional weight
structure described above, where the observation for a birth cohort
receives a weight proportional to birth year minus 1950. In this manner, the more recent birth cohorts are given a greater weight. In fact,
the weight for the youngest birth cohort is 20 times that for the oldest
birth cohort. Because the sample size falls as the age being considered
rises, the variation between adjacent ages rises. To account for this
problem, we have applied a smoothing technique to the percentages in
each education category for all ages greater than 25.6
Each line in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 represents the percentage of the
population that attained a given education level for every age from 16
to 44. As expected, at 16 years of age, the entire sample (for both men
and women) had less than a high school education, indicated by the
value of 100% at age 16 for the “less-than-12-years education” line
and the value of 0% for all other levels of educational attainment. The
proportion of both the male and female populations with less than a
high school education falls throughout the aging process, but most rapidly as the population ages from 16 to 19 years of age. The “some college” line rises rapidly for both men and women beginning at age 17;
peaks at age 21; falls as those attending college graduate; and finally
begins to rise and continues to rise for the entire range of ages as the
population engages in continuing education. The “college graduate”
and “some postgraduate work” lines for both men and women rise rapidly at first and then continue to rise slowly for the remainder of the
ages considered. Not only is the basic structure of the educational
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attainment over the life cycle similar for males and females, but the
male and female age/education distributions themselves are quite similar. In fact, at age 32, the percentages of men and women having education levels above high school are essentially the same (44.8% and
46.1%, respectively). The percentages of men and women at age 32
with at least a college education are 24.3% and 23.6%, respectively.
The weighted average age/education progression reflected in the
graphs above will be used as the basis for forecasting future earnings
for all individuals born in 1951 and later. Since our age/education progressions do not extend past age 44, the education distribution at age
44 will be used for all ages 45 and above. For the 1950 and earlier
birth cohorts, the education distributions as they existed in 1995 will be
used as the basis for forecasting the education component of the earnings forecast for their remaining years in the labor force. The details of
the earnings forecast are presented in the next section.

EARNINGS FORECASTS FOR 1996–2050
Using our estimates of life-cycle education, labor force participation, hours worked, and real wages, we can forecast individual earnings
by sex over an individual’s entire work life cycle. Then, using our population forecasts, we can forecast the total of taxable earnings. However, before any forecasts are made, there is an additional problem that
must be solved: the decomposed structure we have adopted produces
situations in which the women’s earnings component in a given age/
education category exceeds that of men. While there is nothing in theory that suggests that such an outcome is not reasonable, the issues
involved merit some discussion.
The literature on male/female wage differentials attempts to
explain the greater male earnings on the basis of education and job tenure, the null hypothesis being that when these two factors become the
same, the male/female wage differential will vanish. If no male/female
wage differential is the long-run expected outcome, given education,
then forecasts based on components that result in a negative male/
female wage differential will be inconsistent with the expected long
run and should be discarded. To account for this potential problem
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with our long-run forecasts, we have adopted two alternative decision
rules for handling those cases in which our estimating technique results
in wages for females exceeding wages for males, all other factors staying the same.7
Our first decision rule caps female real wages (or hours worked, or
labor force participation) at the level forecast for men when the female
earnings (hours worked, labor force participation rate) component
would have surpassed that for males, if in a given age/education category male wages (hours worked, labor force participation rate) are
growing. The decision rule depends on whether or not the forecast of
male earnings (hours worked, labor force participation rate) is rising or
falling over time. The following example, based on real wages, illustrates the way Decision Rule 1 works. In the example, either of the
other two components (labor force participation or annual hours
worked) can be substituted for real wages.
Decision Rule 1, Example. Using geometric weighted levels to
forecast real wages, by the year 2041 the real wages of women
college graduates ages 45 to 49 are forecast to exceed the wages
of male college graduates aged 45 to 49. Because male wages are
growing in this category, we cap female wages at the forecast
male wage level for all years 2041 and beyond. For an education
level for which male wages are forecast to be declining, we cap
female wages at the wage achieved at the time when female wages
are forecast to exceed male wages and then set male wages equal
to female wages from that time forward. This decision rule also
establishes a lower bound for men’s earnings components and an
upper bound for women’s in cases in which men’s are falling and
women’s are projected to surpass men’s. An example of this case
is the wages for high school graduates ages 45 to 49. Male wages
in this education category are projected to fall at an annual rate of
0.77% while women’s are projected to rise modestly at a rate of
0.14%, so that by the year 2035, female forecast wages would
exceed the wages of males. With this decision rule, wages of
female high school graduates are capped at the forecast 2035
wage, and wages for male high school graduates are not allowed
to fall below the female cap.

Decision Rule 2 establishes the projected values for males in labor
force participation rate, hours worked, and real wages as the dominant
trend and fixes the female maximum level for any category as a fixed
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percentage of the value for males. With this rule, if projected real
wages, hours worked, or labor force participation for females reach a
given percentage of that for males, then the female values are set equal
to a percentage of the comparable male forecast value. This decision
rule caps each of the components of female earnings in each age/education category at 95% of the male earnings component in the same
age/education category, while no lower limit is placed on any projected
earnings component in an age/education category. 8 By the construction of these two decision rules, if Decision Rule 1 applies to any category, Decision Rule 2 must also apply. Because Decision Rule 2
results in a lower level of the comparable female component than Decision Rule 1, any projections made under the second decision rule will,
by construction, be less than or equal to those made under the first
decision rule; they will be equal when neither decision rule comes into
play; and strictly less when a decision rule applies. The following
example based on real wages will clarify the working of Decision Rule
2. As in the case of Decision Rule 1, either of the other two components can be substituted for real wages.
Decision Rule 2, Example Based on Real Wages. Using geometric weighted levels to forecast real wages, by the year 2035 the
real wages of women college graduates ages 45 to 49 are forecast
to exceed 95% of the wages of male college graduates aged 45 to
49. Thus, this decision rule caps female wages at 95% of the forecast male wage level for all years 2035 and beyond.

The 1995 age profiles for labor force participation, hours worked,
and real hourly wages in each of the five education cells form the starting points to which the estimated growth rates for each component can
be applied. However, due to the size of the CPS sample, the relation
between age and any one of the components as observed in 1995 cannot be expected to be represented by a smooth curve, even if such a
smooth curve represented the population as a whole. We used a
smoothing technique based on regression analysis to make the curves
smooth around each age while still allowing for considerable variation
in the relation between age and any component over the entire range of
ages considered.9 In Table 4.2, we summarize the aggregate projected
growth rates for annual earnings, labor force participation, hours
worked, and real wages over the 1996–2030 period for men and
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Table 4.2 Annual Change in Earnings Components, 1996 to 2030a (%)
Annual
earnings

Participation

Hours

Wage

Proportional, D.R. 1

–0.070

–0.097

0.005

0.346

Sex/growth rate
Male
D.R. 2

–0.222

–0.207

–0.008

0.327

Geometric, D.R. 1

–0.009

–0.103

0.047

0.418

D.R. 2

–0.171

–0.215

0.037

0.391

Female

a

Proportional, D.R. 1

1.226

0.230

0.495

0.563

D.R. 2

0.749

–0.018

0.354

0.488

Geometric, D.R. 1

1.227

0.230

0.495

0.547

D.R. 2

0.740

–0.025

0.386

0.455

Education distribution fixed at the 1996 levels.

women, holding the age and education distributions of each earnings
component constant at 1996 levels. The table contains results for the
four possible combinations of the two growth rates considered and the
two decision rules. The two growth rates considered are those calculated using proportional weights applied to the growth rate of each of
the earnings components and geometric weights (with a discount factor
of 1.05) applied to the levels of each of the three earnings components.
As seen in the table, the difference between the projections based
on the alternative growth rates is small, holding the decision rule constant, especially for women. When Decision Rule 1 is in effect, men’s
annual earnings are projected to fall at an annual rate of 0.070% when
proportional weighting is used and to fall 0.009% (essentially no
change) when geometric weighting is used. When Decision Rule 2 is
used, the projected rates are –0.222% and –0.171% for proportional
and geometric weighting, respectively. For women, the differences on
projected annual earnings growth, holding the decision rule constant,
are even smaller.
The two decision rules produce noticeably different results. The
Decision Rule 2 values reveal what will happen if the historical trends
for men continue without the minimums imposed in Decision Rule 1.
Using Decision Rule 2, annual earnings for males will fall by 0.22%
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per year, while using Decision Rule 1 annual earnings will fall by only
0.07% per year, one-third as fast. Surprisingly, we forecast a decline in
male annual earnings using either decision rule. The forecast decline
in male annual earnings is due to the current downward trend in male
labor force participation that is continued using either of our forecast
growth rates. Since Decision Rule 2 imposes the declines in male
labor force participation on the female labor market forecasts, the
annual earnings growth rate for females drops from approximately
1.2% under Decision Rule 1 to approximately 0.7% under Decision
Rule 2, no matter which growth rate estimate is used.
Because the baby boomers are highly educated and are currently in
their peak earnings years, fixing the age and education distribution of
each earnings component at 1996 levels has the effect of heavily
weighting high-skilled age and education categories. Even with a projection that heavily weights some of the higher skilled categories, we
project that hourly wages will only grow between 0.327% and 0.418%
for men and between 0.455% and 0.563% for women (Table 4.2).
These rates are less than one-half of the 0.9% growth rate assumed by
Medicare’s trustees for their intermediate estimates in 1998 (Board of
Trustees 1998a,b). The trustees’ low and high cost estimates are based
on a 1.4% and a 0.4% real wage growth, respectively. Thus, any earning projections we make using the decomposition presented here will
be below those produced by the Social Security actuaries.
To account for any bias resulting from fixing the age and education
distribution, we apply the education progression results we derived
above to the Census Bureau’s intermediate population estimates. We
show these alternative estimates of future growth rates in Table 4.3.
When the forecast age and education distributions are used, the growth
rates decline across the board. The 2030 distribution is weighted by
smaller proportions in the highly skilled categories. With the projected
age and education distribution, all of the estimates of participation and
hours growth are negative for men. As in Table 4.2, the use of Decision
Rule 2 rather than Decision Rule 1 affects annual earnings for men and
women, primarily through the participation effect.
Relative to the Medicare and Social Security trustees’ wage growth
assumption, our projections of wage growth rates are quite conservative. Additionally, the decision rules they employ to handle the convergence of men’s and women’s series will produce different projections
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Table 4.3 Annual Change in Earnings Components, 1996 to 2030a (%)
Annual
earnings

Participation

Hours

Wage

Proportional, D.R. 1

–0.082

–0.165

–0.056

0.272

Sex/growth rate
Male
D.R. 2

–0.252

–0.291

–0.070

0.254

Geometric, D.R. 1

–0.023

–0.168

–0.012

0.334

D.R. 2

–0.206

–0.300

–0.024

0.308

Female

a

Proportional, D.R. 1

1.210

0.228

0.445

0.599

D.R. 2

0.732

–0.036

0.331

0.531

Geometric, D.R. 1

1.222

0.225

0.471

0.588

D.R. 2

0.729

–0.044

0.363

0.503

Uses forecast population and education distributions.

than the projections based on the two decision rules described above.
To illustrate these differences, we show in Figure 4.5 three sets of labor
force participation forecasts for men and women ages 45 to 49. The
first set is drawn from the Office of the Actuary’s 1992 economic projections (Social Security Administration 1992, Table 4, pp. 65–70).
The other two sets are based on our forecasts using Decision Rule 1
and Decision Rule 2 with growth rates calculated with geometric
weights. The two vertical lines represent the starting year (1991) for
the Social Security Administration (SSA) forecasts and the starting
year for our forecast (1996). The SSA’s forecasts indicate that the historical trends are allowed to continue for the first few years and are
then held essentially constant over the remaining periods. In contrast,
with Decision Rule 1, the projected participation rates for men and
women continue to converge out to 2050. Relative to the SSA’s projections, Decision Rule 1 produces a more pessimistic projection of male
labor force participation but a more optimistic projection of female
labor force participation. As expected, the use of our Decision Rule 2
produces the most conservative projections because of its forcing the
decline in male labor force participation on the female labor force.
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Figure 4.5 Out-of-Sample Estimates of Labor Force Participation,
Ages 45–49

Figure 4.6 presents our four forecast total earnings series when all
of the earnings components are aggregated across the age, sex, and
education cells. It also presents the SSA’s projection of taxable income
under the hospital insurance tax and covered income. 10 The tax rate
times the taxable income produces the projected revenues to the system. Our two projections using Decision Rule 1 most closely follow
the SSA’s taxable earnings series.
The two series based on Decision Rule 2 produce substantially
lower estimates in the years beyond 2020. Beyond 2020, the women’s
earnings components, within the age/education cells, begin to
approach and overtake men’s; thus, imposing the second decision rule
will dampen or reverse the gains made in some cells. Of the two series
that rely on Decision Rule 1, the one using geometric weighting provides a reasonable alternative to the SSA projection. This growth rate
also produces the best in-sample forecast over the 10-year period. In
the remainder of this chapter, the forecasts based on Decision Rule 1
and on geometric weights use a calculated discount factor of 1.05.
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Figure 4.6 Comparison of Total Earnings Forecasts (1996 $)

Projected cross-sectional age/earnings profiles for the years 1996,
2000, 2010, and 2020 are depicted in Figure 4.7. The profiles reflecting the average earnings by age are for all individuals, including nonworkers and part-time workers. The discontinuities apparent in the
projected profiles result from our use of separate growth rates by age
and education cells. Again we utilize locally weighted regressions (in
which each point is predicted using 30% of the adjacent data) to produce a smoothed series. The smoothed series are represented by the
connected line in the profiles for men and women. As the successive
cross sections indicate, the female profile continues to approach the
men’s. This trend is an extension of the historical convergence. Due to
the more rapid growth experienced at younger ages for men and
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women, the cross-sectional profiles are projected to exhibit a steeper
slope in the future for individuals up to 44 years of age.
In Figure 4.8 we present, for four birth cohorts, examples of projected annual age/earning profiles based on our forecasts of annual
earnings. The first graph is a projection of the expected average earnings for the 1945 birth cohort; the next three graphs show the lifetime
earnings for individuals born at 10-year intervals (1955, 1965, and
1975). The progression of these profiles illustrates the continuing convergence of female average annual earnings to male average annual
earnings. This convergence is especially apparent for the younger ages
in the life cycle.

THE FINAL GROWTH RATE AND DECISION RULE CHOICE
The forecast cohort age/earnings profiles of the type presented in
Figure 4.8 form the primary element in the denominator of the contribution rate required to finance a prepaid Medicare system. For each
cohort, we have an estimate of the path that average earnings for men
and women will follow over their remaining lives. In Appendix B, we
present a table detailing the smoothed annual earnings series for two
future cross sections and for two birth cohorts.11 Those projections are
based on geometrically weighted growth rates calculated for each earnings component within age × education cells. After evaluating several
candidates which weighted recent experience more heavily than the
changes occurring early in each series, we chose to use geometric
weights applied to the levels of each of the three components of annual
earnings, on the basis of the accuracy of its in-sample forecasts relative
to the others considered. When the chosen growth rate and Decision
Rule 1 are used in tandem, they produce a forecast aggregate earnings
series quite similar to the one forecast by the Social Security Administration.
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Figure 4.7a 1996 Cross Section

Figure 4.7b 2000 Cross Section
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Figure 4.7c 2010 Cross Section

Figure 4.7d 2020 Cross Section
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Figure 4.8a 1945 Birth Cohort

Figure 4.8b 1955 Birth Cohort
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Figure 4.8c 1965 Birth Cohort

Figure 4.8d 1975 Birth Cohort
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CONCLUSION
In order to forecast the contribution rate that will be required to
prefund the retirement health care expenditures of the population, we
must estimate the life-cycle earnings of both the male and female populations. Importantly, since Medicare benefits do not depend on work
life history, we must account for everyone, whether or not they spent
any time in the labor force. Thus, we have created a method for forecasting the average annual earnings over the entire population of males
and females for each birth cohort. During any transition from the
existing pay-as-you-go Medicare system to a prepaid system, the birth
cohorts alive at the time of the transition must take part in the transition. In order to estimate what contribution rate will allow an individual already in the work force to convert to prepaid Medicare, we must
have estimates of that birth cohort’s future earnings.
We also provided the basis for forecasting the longitudinal age/
earnings profiles for any birth cohort. We based these forecasts on data
from the Current Population Survey, which contains extensive information on labor force participation, hours worked, and real wages.
The average annual earnings for males or females in a particular birth
cohort is composed of the product of average hours worked, average
wages, and labor force participation divided by the total size of the
cohort. Using the information contained in the CPS for the period
from 1964 to 1995, we calculated growth rates for each of the three
components of average annual earnings. It is important to separately
estimate each of the components of average annual income, because
labor force participation and hours worked are the result of decisions
made by individuals. In the process of constructing our growth rate
estimates, the upward trend in female average annual earnings
becomes very apparent. This upward trend occurs in all three components of annual earnings. For women, over the period of our data,
labor force participation has increased more than 47%. This increase
in labor market participation, coupled with increased annual hours
worked and hourly wages, accounts for the convergence of male and
female annual earnings so obvious in the data.
The application of the estimated growth rates to the three components of annual earnings allows us to forecast annual earnings for the
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entire period of the transition from the current system of pay-as-you-go
Medicare to prepaid Medicare. Before finalizing our estimates, we had
to recognize the fact that labor market differences between males and
females are rapidly disappearing. Any forecast that failed to account
for the convergence of male and female labor market behavior and outcomes would be far from the mark in the later years of the forecast. We
experimented with two decision rules to account for the rapid convergence of female labor market outcomes to the outcomes of males. In
the final analysis, we chose to assume that once the differences in education and continuous job tenure equalized, the earnings components
of males and females would be equal. Thus, we capped each component of annual earnings at the level for males. This does not imply that
female average annual earnings are not allowed to exceed those of
males—they would if females were more educated, for example—but
only that, other things being equal, equal behavior is predicted.
The contribution rate required to prepay Medicare is determined
by the ratio of the present value of expected benefits to the present
value of annual earnings. In this chapter, we constructed the methodology for forecasting the annual earnings part of the contribution rate
equation. What remains is forecasting future retirement health care
expenditures; this final forecast is the subject of the next chapter.

Notes
1. Only the Hospitalization Insurance (HI) portion of Medicare has a dedicated payroll tax. In 1994, the maximum earnings subject to taxation was raised from
$135,000 to its current unlimited level.
2. The mathematical details of this computation are presented in the first section of
Appendix B.
3. Annual earnings were defined as the sum of wage and salary income and selfemployment income. Earnings above a given threshold in each survey year are
“top-coded” to prevent identification of individuals using other characteristics
such as age, sex, and location variables. Top-coded wages and salaries were
inflated by a factor of 1.5 and top-coded self-employment income by a factor of 2
to estimate average earnings above the top-coded value. Individuals younger than
16 and older than 75 were excluded.
4. Weighted averages of each annual earnings component for each age × sex × education cell were calculated using the person weight in the March data.
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5. The exact form of these weighting schemes is presented in the second section of
Appendix B. For a more detailed discussion, see Murphy and Welch (1992), pp.
65–69.
6. For ages 25 to 49, the empirical proportions in education cells 0–11 years, 13–15
years, 16 years, and 17 and above years are smoothed using locally weighted
regression. In the regressions, the high school graduate category is treated as an
omitted category and is set equal to [1– (p0–11 + p13–15 + p16 + p17+}], where pn is
the proportion in age category n. See StataCorp. (1999), Reference H-O, pp. 152–
156, for the details of this smoothing technique.
7. The details of these decision rules are presented in the fourth section of Appendix
B.
8. Several caveats are worth mentioning. Projected real hourly wages are not
allowed to drop below 80% of the 1995 minimum wage, projected participation
must be greater than or equal to zero and less than or equal to 1, and the minimum
and maximum projected annual hours are zero and 3,120, respectively, for any age
× education cell.
9. Each of the 15 age × earnings component profiles was smoothed using locally
weighted regressions based on 30% of the surrounding data points.
10. The series in the graph reflect the SSA’s intermediate projections (Social Security
Administration 1992, Table A15, pp. 110–111) which are re-based to 1996 dollars
using the GDP deflator presented in Table A10, p. 98 of that volume.
11. Because the cross-sectional series presented in Table 4.5 are smoothed within
cross sections and the birth cohort series are smoothed within the birth cohorts,
the corresponding values do not match exactly. For example, individuals born in
1965 will be 45 years old in 2010. In the cross section, 45-year-old men are projected to earn $43,090, but in the cohort profile they have a projected value of
$43,032. In the contribution rate calculations and total tax base calculations, we
use the actual forecast values rather than the smoothed.

5
Estimating the Future Cost of
Retirement Health Care Benefits
Up to this point, our analysis has concentrated on aspects of intergenerational finance that are relevant for both Social Security and
Medicare. However, Medicare differs in one critical way from Social
Security: it is an open-ended in-kind transfer. Medicare is open-ended
because the benefits are specified by what is subsidized, not by the
quantity of the subsidized item consumed. As a result, benefits paid
vary as preferences for health care change and as the technology of
delivery changes. This open-ended characteristic of Medicare means
that forecasting future benefits involves more than predicting the future
cost of various medical procedures; it extends to forecasting medical
technology and changing preferences for health care. This open-endedness also makes cost containment more difficult because, to contain
costs, one must control technological advancements that increase the
class of things that are health-related on the one hand and consumer
preferences for health care on the other.
The current Medicare system is beset with two problems: first, the
issue of financing the coming retirement health care expenditures of
the baby boom generation, and second, the rapidly rising benefits per
Medicare recipient. Since the retirement of the first of the baby
boomers is some 15 years away, most recent initiatives to reform Medicare have concentrated on ways to reduce per capita expenditure
growth among current beneficiaries. Historically, the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) has attempted to slow per-capita
spending by controlling reimbursement rates. More recently, however,
the emphasis has been on moving Medicare away from its original feefor-service basis to a greater reliance on managed care. As has been
occurring in the private sector, managed care enrollment of Medicare
beneficiaries has expanded in recent years. From 1992 to 1996, the
percentage of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans
grew from 6.4% to 12.7%. Additionally, with the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, beneficiaries are able to choose among an expanded set of
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insurance instruments including, in a limited way, Medical Savings
Accounts (MSAs).
In this chapter, we develop estimates of the cost of an alternative to
current Medicare that is designed to make users of the system more
aware of its cost and, as a result, make health care providers compete
on a price basis for Medicare dollars. Moving to a retirement health
care system that makes users and providers care about cost has advantages beyond the possibility that total health care expenditures may be
reduced. The current Medicare system, and much of the nonretirement
health care, is based on users never facing the full cost of their decisions. As a result, they make marginal decisions using prices that are
significantly below the social cost of production. In effect, we have
(through the tax treatment of health insurance and through legislation
and regulation) insured a “tragedy-of-the-commons” outcome, in
which consumers treat health care as a common property resource and
overconsume medical care. Unlike the usual tragedy-of-the-commons
outcome, where resources are depleted, in this case we reallocate
resources from other parts of the economy into the health care sector.

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE COST OF
RETIREMENT HEALTH CARE
Because of the dynamically changing age distribution of the retired
population, estimating the current value of the future retirement health
care costs under both current Medicare and alternative retirement
health care plans requires an estimate of benefits by age for the retirement population. A natural candidate for a starting point in estimating
retirement life-cycle health care expenditures is the average reimbursement by age for the current Medicare population. Since this data forms
the basis of much of the subsequent forecasts in this chapter, we
present a detailed discussion of the data-set properties.
The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
There are several sources for Medicare’s reimbursements by age.
First, in setting its reimbursement rates for Health Maintenance Orga-
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nizations (HMOs), HCFA annually publishes the United States percapita costs (USPCC), along with demographic cost factors that allow
HMOs to determine the average reimbursement they will receive per
client of a given age and sex. Second, HCFA produces summarized
reimbursement data in the form of an Annual Person Summary (APS)
file, which contains reimbursements by age and information on average
reimbursements by level of reimbursement. In previous work, we used
the summarized APS data to impute the expenditure distribution by
age, and from these age-expenditure distributions estimated the premiums necessary to purchase no-first-dollar-coverage insurance (Rettenmaier and Saving 1997, Appendix). However, obtaining an accurate
representation of the effects of changing the deductible requires knowing actual expenditures at the individual level. Individual level data is
available from HCFA in their Cost and Use file, which we rely on in
this section to describe the age progression in average expenditures.
The Cost and Use file is based on Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS) data supplemented with claims information from
HCFA’s administrative files. The MCBS survey provides, at the individual level, a thorough accounting of health status, demographic characteristics, health insurance coverage, and health care use and
expenditures on both covered and noncovered services, the primary
noncovered health-related service being long-term care. An individual
participant in the MCBS can be surveyed for up to four years, providing a longitudinal profile of expenditures. 1 HCFA supplements the
reported benefits received in the MCBS with actual claims information
from its administrative files, thereby improving the accuracy of the
reported benefits in the survey data and overcoming the problem of
systematic underreporting of benefits by those surveyed.
The Age Distribution of Medicare Expenditures
Because of data availability, we limit our analysis of the age distribution of Medicare expenditures to the 1995 Cost and Use file. The
1995 Cost and Use file includes information on a total of 12,096 individuals, of which 9,999 are 65 years of age or above (recall that Medicare also covers individuals who are younger than 65 years of age but
qualify for reasons such as disability or end-care renal disease). The
sample was designed to represent the entire Medicare population, and

98

Estimating the Future Cost of Retirement Health Care Benefits

when person weights are applied, the 9,999 represent the 34 million
aged beneficiaries. 2 With these data it is possible to identify total
expenditures separately by type of event and by sources of payments.
For example, there are nine event or service categories: dental, longterm care facility, home health, hospice, inpatient hospital, institutional, medical provider, outpatient, and prescribed medicine. The
source of payments include Medicare, Medicaid, Medicare and private
HMOs, Veterans Administration, private employer-based insurance,
private individual insurance, out-of-pocket, and other source. Table
5.1 summarizes the distribution of total expenditures across type of
service and source of payment.
As indicated in Table 5.1, inpatient hospital expenditures and medical provider services account for the majority of the elderly’s medical
related expenditures. Note that almost 29% of the total expenditures
are in categories (dental, prescription drugs, and long-term care) which
are not covered by the current Medicare package. Table 5.1 also identifies the amount and the percentage of total expenditures in six payment source categories. Medicare pays for 52.7% of the elderly’s
medical-related expenditures when dental, prescription drugs, and
long-term care are included in the total. Medicare beneficiaries pay for
almost 20% of the total out of their own pockets. Dental, prescription
drugs, and long-term care are excluded from the expenditure distributions we analyze below because they are not covered by the Medicare
package. Excluding them reduces the average 1995 total expenditures
29% from $8,151 to $5,789.
We estimate the average expenditure in 1998 by inflating the 1995
expenditure distribution by the growth rate in average per-capita benefits and annualizing expenditures for individuals who were in the sample for fewer than 12 months, which results in average expenditures of
$7,086 in 1998 dollars. The median expenditure in 1998 dollars is
only $1,437 while the mean is $7,086, indicating that, as expected, the
distribution is skewed toward high expenditures. Figure 5.1 presents
the cumulative proportion of the Medicare population’s total expenditures accounted for by individual annual reimbursements of increasing
levels. Only 6.8% of the total expenditures are incurred by beneficiaries who spend less than $2,500, 22.5% are incurred by beneficiaries
spending less than $10,000, and 87% of total expenditures are incurred
by beneficiaries who spend less than $90,000. Thus, a full 13% of the
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Table 5.1 Total Expenditures of the Medicare Beneficiaries 65 and above

Distribution by expenditure category

Average annual
amount per
beneficiary (1995 $)

% of Total

2,449

30.05

Expenditures
Inpatient hospital
Outpatient

650

7.98

1,911

23.44

Dental

183

2.24

Prescription drugs

539

6.61

Medical provider

Hospice
Home health
Long-term care
Institutional
Total expenditures

40

0.49

457

5.61

1,641

20.13

281

3.45

8,151

100.00

Payment source
Medicare

4,296

52.70

Medicaid

925

11.35

Private insurancea

714

8.76

HMOsb

285

3.49

Out-of-pocket

1,618

19.85

Other sourcec

313

3.84

8,151

100.00

Total expenditures

SOURCE: 1995 Cost and Use File.
a The private employer-based insurance, private individual insurance, and private other
insurance variables were summed to form the “Private insurance” category.
b Private and Medicare HMO payments are included in the “HMOs” category.
c The “Other source” category includes the other, Veteran’s Administration, and uncollected liability variables.
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Figure 5.1 Cumulative Density in Payments, Medicare Beneficiaries
65 and Above

total expenditures are incurred on individuals whose reimbursements
exceeded $90,000. Figure 5.2 presents the cumulative proportion of
all beneficiaries who received benefits based on increasing annual individual expenditure levels. The figure reveals that 61.4% of the beneficiaries have annual expenditures of less than $2,500, 82.6% have
annual expenditures that fall below $10,000, and 99% have expenditures of less than $90,000. Thus, the 1% of Medicare beneficiaries
whose reimbursements exceeded $90,000 accounted for a full 13% of
all Medicare expenditures.
That a small percentage of beneficiaries account for a bulk of the
total expenditures is common in insurance markets. Individuals buy
insurance to avoid large risks such as those reflected in these distributions. The relation between the proportion of total expenditures and
the proportion of total enrollees is identified by the Lorenz curve in
Figure 5.3. The Lorenz curve is based on the total expenditures of all
enrollees 65 years of age and above. It shows that 80% of the individuals account for 19.2% of total expenditures, or conversely, 20% of the
individuals account for 80.8% of the expenditures. By way of compar-
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Figue 5.2 Cumulative Density in Beneficiaries, Medicare Beneficiaries
65 and Above

Figure 5.3 Percentage of Payments by Percentage of Beneficiaries
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ison with the working age population, 10% of working age individuals
account for 80% of the group’s health care expenditures (Eichner,
McClellan, and Wise 1996, p. 10). Thus, the concentration of expenditures among a few beneficiaries is less severe among the aged than
among younger individuals. One would expect that the degree to
which total expenditures are concentrated among a small percentage of
the beneficiaries would decline with age. Among young beneficiaries,
medical care is typically purchased in conjunction with some no-firstdollar-coverage event or accident, but as individuals age and persistent
conditions begin to dominate health care expenditures, the “inequality”
in expenditures will decline.
The decline in expenditure inequality that is associated with age is
further borne out in the evidence presented in Table 5.2, where the percentages of total expenditures at various points in the beneficiary distribution are presented for progressively older age groups. The values in
the table’s first row reflect points along the curve in Figure 5.3. The
Gini coefficient is also presented, and it indicates that over 75% of the
area below the line reflecting perfect equality lies between the line and
the Lorenz curve. The remainder of the table shows how the shape of
the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient changes with age. On the
whole, the Lorenz curves of successively older age groups lie above
each other. The single exception is at the 50th percentile between age
Table 5.2 Total Expendituresa at the 50th, 80th, and 90th Percentile in
the Expenditure Distribution

Age range

a

50th percentile
(% of total
expend.)

80th percentile
(% of total
expend.)

90th percentile
(% of total
expend.)

Gini
coefficient

All 65+

3.7

19.2

37.3

0.752

65–69

3.5

16.8

32.1

0.782

70–74

3.6

17.0

33.5

0.781

75–79

4.1

20.0

38.1

0.750

80–84

4.7

23.6

44.1

0.719

85+

4.4

27.6

49.2

0.701

Total expenditures are the sum of expenditures in the following categories: home
health, hospice, inpatient hospital, institutional, medical provider, and outpatient hospital.
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groups 80–84 and 85+. Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient
also declines with age, falling over 8 percentage points between age
groups 65–69 and 85+.

FORECASTING REAL MEDICARE EXPENDITURES
UNDER CURRENT MEDICARE
The first step in generating the expenditure estimates is multiplying the Medicare benefits by age net of Part B premium payments
times the Census Bureau’s forecasts of population by age. The next
step is applying one of three real growth rates in per-capita expenditures. We present three forecasts of total real Medicare expenditures
for beneficiaries 65 and above in Figure 5.4. The forecasts are based
on assumptions concerning the future growth in the real costs of providing the services covered under current Medicare. Over the past

Figure 5.4 Total Real Medicare Expenditures
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decade, the real costs of Medicare benefits per recipient have grown at
an annual rate of approximately 6%, although this growth rate has
slowed recently due to changes in the structure of Medicare. Most
forecasts of future Medicare benefits (per recipient) in real terms are
growing at rates considerably below this 6% figure. The expected
reductions in growth are due to several factors, including the introduction of competition in health care plans and the fact that the 6% growth
in real per recipient benefits would imply that the share of Medicare in
real Gross Domestic Product would reach unreasonable levels.
The lower series presented in Figure 5.4 is based on a constant 1%
growth rate in per-capita expenditures. The series that ultimately produces the highest expenditures is based on a constant 2% growth rate.
The remaining series is based on the growth rate assumptions used in
the 1998 Trustees reports (Board of Trustees 1998a,b). From 1998 to
2002, the trustees use a growth rate of 1%, from 2003 to 2010 they
project a growth of 3.5%, and then from 2011 to 2022 the trustees
assume that the growth gradually declines to 0.9% and remains at that
rate for all years beyond 2022.

ESTIMATING THE COST OF NO-FIRST-DOLLARCOVERAGE RETIREMENT HEALTH INSURANCE
We believe that any real solution to the Medicare crisis must deal
with both the level of per capita medical expenditure growth and the
issue of financing Medicare for the future. A transition to prefunded
medical care insurance provides the opportunity to introduce an alternative form of insurance for those cohorts who move to the prefunded
system. In this chapter, the estimated cost of no-first-dollar-coverage
insurance for future aged beneficiaries is presented along with the cost
of standard Medicare reimbursements. The advantages of no-first-dollar-coverage health insurance are twofold. By avoiding the tragedy-ofthe commons effect, no-first-dollar-coverage health insurance reduces
expenditures relative to health insurance with first-dollar coverage or
health insurance with low coinsurance rates. Also, by forcing consumers to recognize the real cost of care, higher deductibles may affect the
rate of expenditure growth through provider competition.
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A benchmark for the relative effects of coinsurance rates and some
level of no-first-dollar coverage (a deductible, so to speak) on the level
of medical expenditures can be estimated from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment (HIE). The HIE was conducted to control for
the selection bias which had hampered earlier attempts to quantify the
effects of differing health insurance policies on beneficiaries’ expenditure patterns. Keeler et al. (1988, pp. 104–105) estimated that, relative
to free care, a policy with 100% coinsurance up to a $500 maximum
dollar expenditure in 1983 (in effect, no coverage for the first $500 of
covered expenditures) would reduce total expenditures by 27.17%.
Even imposing a 25% coinsurance rate and a modest $50 maximum
dollar expenditure produced a 12.76% expenditure reduction relative to
free care.
The results of the RAND study suggest that the cost of providing
retirement health care can be substantially reduced by making beneficiaries’ behavior when buying health care the same as when buying
any other product. However, the use of the RAND study to estimate
the impact on retirement health care expenditures can be questioned on
two grounds. First, it was conducted more than 15 years ago. Second,
the population in the experiment was not the elderly. In response to the
age of the study, we can adjust the deductibles used in the RAND study
for price level changes using several alternative price indices. The fact
that the RAND study was conducted using the general population
rather than a population 65 years of age or older is of more concern.
However, we can use work done on the effects of Medigap policies on
the health expenditures of the Medicare population to corroborate the
general population results of the RAND experiment.
There are 10 standard types of Medigap plans, referred to as Plans
A through J, which cover to varying degrees the gaps produced by
Medicare’s two-part structure. For example, Plan C covers the Part A
and Part B deductibles and coinsurance amounts. The average price of
such a policy was $1,100 in 1997 (American Medical Association
1998, p. 14). Individuals with Medigap insurance face the same
prices—essentially zero—as those with free care in the RAND experiment. Christensen and Shinogle (1997) found evidence that beneficiaries with Medigap plans used 28% more services than those with no
supplement. They also find that Medicare beneficiaries with employerbased supplements used 17% more services.3 Medicare beneficiaries
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with no Medigap or employer-based supplements face the deductibles
imposed in Medicare Parts A and B and the 20% Medicare Part B coinsurance rate, as well as the Medicare Part A coinsurance rate that
comes into effect during hospital stays in excess of 60 days. Since the
RAND experiment results are amazingly consistent with the Medigap
study, we will use the results of the RAND study in our subsequent
estimates of the cost of no-first-dollar-coverage health insurance alternatives to current Medicare.
In order to estimate the cost of our proposed no-first-dollar-coverage health insurance, we must account for the changes in the age distribution of expenditures and for the expected reduction in expenditures
resulting from the introduction of no-first-dollar-coverage in each age
category. The descriptive statistics presented above show that medical
expenditures for the Medicare population are concentrated among a
small portion of the population and that this concentration declines
with age. The effects of the introduction of no-first-dollar-coverage
insurance on these expenditures must take into account the change in
the distribution of expenditures across the service categories by age.
For example, home health expenditures rise from about 3% of the total
expenditures of those 65 to 66 years old to over 15% of the total of the
beneficiaries 85 years of age or above. To adjust our cost estimates for
no-first-dollar-coverage health insurance, we use the simulation model
output from the RAND experiment presented in Appendix G of Keeler
et al. (1988). In effect, we first place current Medicare in its appropriate place in the RAND simulation model and then compare a $2,500
deductible health care plan’s predicted expenditures to those of Medicare. The difference between the simulated Medicare results and the
results for our alternative plan as a percentage of simulated Medicare is
our estimate of the expected percentage reduction for each category of
expenditures.
The first step in applying the RAND experiment results to the
Medicare population is to place Medicare into the context of the
RAND simulation model’s output. The output is organized by plan
type and total expenditures, divided into the following categories: hospital expenditures, acute care, well care, and chronic care. There are
28 plan types considered in the RAND experiment, each of which has a
maximum out-of-pocket dollar expenditure (MDE) and a coinsurance
rate. The MDEs identify the maximum total payment exposure for
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each beneficiary. The three coinsurance rates considered are 25%,
50%, and 100%, and they reflect the percentage of the expenditures up
to the MDE for which beneficiaries were responsible. The nine MDEs
are $50, $100, $200, $500, $1,000, $1,500, $2,000, $3,000, and all.
The remaining category is the free plan with no coinsurance and no
deductible.
Because of Medicare’s two-part structure, the comparison between
current Medicare and the plans considered in the RAND experiment
requires careful consideration. Without the additional purchase of
Medigap insurance, basic Medicare Hospitalization (Part A) has a $736
deductible and coinsurance that comes into effect after 60 days in the
hospital, and basic Medicare Supplemental Medical Insurance (Part B)
has a $100 deductible and then a 20% coinsurance rate. In placing current Medicare within the parameters of the RAND experiment, we
must determine what kind of budget constraint beneficiaries respond to
in making their expenditure decisions. Christensen and Shinogle
(1997) suggested that, for the individuals represented in the 1994
National Health Interview Survey, 85% of Medicare enrollees had
some form of supplemental coverage, either in the form of private
insurance or Medicaid coverage. They found that individuals with
Medigap insurance used 28% more services than those with no supplement and that those with employer-based supplemental insurance used
17% more services. Using the 1996 Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey, Eppig and Chulis (1997) reported that 87% of Medicare’s feefor-service sector and 81% overall had some form of supplemental
insurance. The overall percentage drops because HMO enrollees purchase less supplemental coverage due to the HMO’s expanded benefits
packages, which reduces the incentive to supplement.
The more comprehensive the supplemental coverage of the Medicare population, the closer the total package moves to free care. In the
estimates that follow, we treat the expenditures of individuals with supplemental coverage as if they arose from first-dollar coverage. 4 Individuals without supplementary coverage face the deductibles and
coinsurance under Medicare Parts A and B. As a proxy for basic Medicare, we choose the simulation results from the RAND study for a policy with a 25% coinsurance rate and a $1,000 maximum dollar
expenditure in 1983 dollars. The 25% coinsurance rate is 5 percentage
points higher than the 20% rate for Medicare Part B, and the maximum

108

Estimating the Future Cost of Retirement Health Care Benefits

dollar expenditure is three times the 1983 average out-of-pocket
expenditures for Medicare beneficiaries.
Identifying the effects of a $2,500-deductible policy is less complicated than Medicare because the RAND simulation model contains
policies similar in structure to our proposed alternative to Medicare.
Between 1983 (the year in which the simulation model expenditures
are denominated) and 1998, per capita Medicare expenditures grew by
a factor of 2.94. In relation to the simulation model output, the current
dollar $2,500-deductible policy would be described by 100% coinsurance with a MDE of $851 in 1983 dollars. While the RAND experiment did not contain this exact policy, it did contain policies that
bounded this policy. Specifically, the RAND experiment contained a
policy with 100% coinsurance and a $500 MDE and a policy with
100% coinsurance and a $1,000 MDE. Their simulations also distinguished among hospital, acute, well, and chronic care expenditures.
We interpolate the effects of the $851 deductible on hospital and on all
other expenditures grouped together, using the results for the $500 and
$1,000 MDE, 100% coinsurance policies. The simulated 100% coinsurance/$851 MDE policy produces hospitalization expenditures equal
to 78.92% of a free care policy and other expenditures equal to 51.61%
of a free care policy. Weighting these two percentage estimates by
total expenditures in each category implies that the simulated 100%
coinsurance/$851 MDE policy will produce total expenditures that are
64.61% of a free care policy.
Our basis for forecasting the cost of providing our proposed 100%
coinsurance/$2,500 MDE policy will be the percentage reduction in
Medicare expenditures predicted by the RAND study. Supplemented
Medicare is represented in the RAND simulation by free care, and
basic Medicare is conservatively represented by the 25% coinsurance
and $1,000 MDE. Our 100% coinsurance/$851 MDE policy results in
hospital expenditures equal to 97.21% of the basic Medicare proxy
policy (the 25% coinsurance/$1,000 MDE policy) and 78.92% of the
supplemented Medicare proxy policy, with remaining expenditures
equal to 73.43% of the basic Medicare proxy policy and 51.61% of the
supplemented Medicare proxy policy. Once again, weighting these
two percentage estimates by total expenditures in each category
implies that the simulated 100% coinsurance/$851 MDE policy will
produce total expenditures that are 85.61% of the basic Medicare
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proxy policy and 64.61% of the supplemented Medicare proxy policy.
These results are presented in the last column of Table 5.3.
Table 5.4 presents total expenditures, Medicare reimbursements,
and the premiums that would be necessary to pay for policies that
incurred the expenditure levels forecast using the approach presented
above. We base our estimates on the estimated 1998 Medicare expenditures and apply the percentages in Table 5.4. The average premiums
for our Medicare alternative are equal to the adjusted expenditures in
each category, using the percentages presented in Table 5.3, less the
$2,500 deductible averaged over all beneficiaries for each age group in
the Medicare population. Thus, the premium is calculated by adjusting
individual Medicare expenditures using the percentages presented in
Table 5.3. The hospitalization effect is used to adjust total inpatient
hospital expenditures, and the “other” effect is used to adjust all
remaining expenditures.
Table 5.4 shows our estimates of the cost of the proposed 100%
coinsurance/$2,500 deductible policy by age group and for the entire
Medicare population. As a point of comparison, current Medicare benefits are also presented. As indicated in the table, average 1995 Medicare reimbursements were $5,475 in 1998 dollars, or 80% of total
health care expenditures by the Medicare population. The estimated
cost of our proposed policy based on our extrapolation between the two
bracketing policies used in the RAND study is equal to 61% of the current health care expenditures by the Medicare population and to 76%
of current Medicare reimbursements.

CHOICE AND ADVERSE SELECTION
Our proposed Medicare alternative is a retirement health insurance
package that is comparable to today’s high-deductible policies. The
important feature of these policies is that they have no first-dollar-coverage so that users of the health care system care what it costs at the
first dollar level. As shown in the RAND study, insurance of this kind
significantly reduces expenditures on health care. In addition, because
the retirement health care we analyze is provided through a genuine
insurance contract where the insurance provider is at risk, that provider
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Table 5.3 Relative Medical Expenditures under Four Policies from the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment Simulation Resultsa
Expenditure
category

Base
Supplemental Medicare

Hospital

78.92

Proxy

Other

51.51

(Free care)

Total

64.61

Hospital

97.21

Basic Medicare proxy
(25%, $1,000)
a

(100%/$851) Expenditures
as % of base coinsurance
rate, MDE

Other

73.43

Total

85.61

See Keeler et al. (1988), Table G.2, pp. 104–105, for expenditures by type of episode
and type of coverage.

Table 5.4 Total Expenditures, Medicare Reimbursements, and Estimated
$2,500 Deductible Policy Premiums by Age ($)a
Total expendituresb

Medicare benefitsc

$2,500 ded. policy
premium

All 65+

6,836

5,475

4,170

65–66

4,460

3,464

2,714

67–68

4,964

3,769

2,914

69–70

5,429

4,163

3,102

71–72

6,619

5,297

4,018

73–74

7,147

5,691

4,387

75–79

7,063

5,742

4,296

80–84

8,398

6,852

5,243

85+

9,596

7,871

6,022

Age group

SOURCE: 1995 Cost and Use File.
Inflated to 1988 dollars.
b Total expenditures are the sum of expenditures in the following categories from the
1995 Cost and Use File: home health, hospice, inpatient hospital, institutional, medical provider, and outpatient hospital.
c Medicare benefits are the sum of Part A and Part B reimbursements for fee-for-service
patients and are equal to Medicare payments to HMOs for the HMO patients.
a
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will also be cost-conscious. A further component contributing to
expenditure reduction of our proposed alternative to current Medicare
is the impact on the price of health care services due to competition for
the very large first-dollar pool.5 For example, by the year 2030, the
retired population will number almost 70 million, which implies that
the first-dollar-coverage market will total $175 billion in 1998 dollars.
At the mean, prefunding of retirement health care ensures that
retirees have the resources necessary to provide for their health care
during their retirement years. However, how do we insure that, at the
time of retirement, retirees with health care risks that are greater than
the average are able to find insurance providers willing to take them?
Put differently, if each cohort member chooses among a set of alternative health care packages, how do we ensure that all levels of risk are
served?
One approach to ensuring that all individuals are served upon
retirement is to require that they choose their insurer at age 22, when
neither they nor their insurance providers know what their medical care
needs will be at ages 65 and beyond. Such early commitment will
result in individuals being dispersed across insurers randomly, implying that the average premium will cover the expected expenditures
each insurer may face. However, there is a considerable question concerning the cost of such early commitment since the provision of the
services will not begin for more than 43 years.
Alternatively, and more realistically, we should expect that individuals choose their insurer at age 65, when both they and their insurance
provider know more about their medical care risks. In this case, however, the familiar problems of adverse selection on the part of patients
and screening on the part of insurers surface. Thus, our proposed solution to the Medicare crisis must deal with both problems. Ultimately,
the solution to both problems requires that premiums be risk adjusted
in a manner that is not currently allowed. However, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 calls on the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to “implement a risk adjustment methodology that accounts for variations in per capita costs based on health
status and other demographic factors for payment [to Medicare+Choice organizations] starting no later than January 1, 2000”
(Health Care Financing Administration 1999, p. i). In addition, the act
allows for more private sector options in the Medicare market, such as
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preferred provider organizations (PPOs), provider-sponsored organizations (PSOs), and even private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, in addition
to health maintenance organizations (HMOs).
In 1985, HCFA established a limited risk-adjustment methodology
for reimbursing HMOs in which reimbursements vary by an enrollee’s
age, sex, Medicaid eligibility, disability status, and the county in which
the HMO is located. Initially, an HMO is reimbursed at 95% of the
risk-adjusted county average cost among fee-for-service patients which
is further adjusted by risk factors associated with a particular enrollee’s
age, sex, Medicaid eligibility and disability status. However, since the
reimbursement is not fully risk-adjusted for a beneficiary’s health status, HMOs have historically screened patients to lower their risk exposure. In addition, because the annual re-estimation of the county
factors does not include HMO patients, the HMOs’ potential cost
reductions do not result in lower county factors or in lower growth
rates.
The current risk-adjustment mechanism, known as the Principal
In-Patient Diagnostic Cost Group (PIP-DCG), takes into account an
enrollee’s age, sex, Medicaid eligibility, location, and inpatient diagnoses. This mechanism, now under review by HCFA, is considered a
first step in developing a more robust risk-adjustment mechanism that
will incorporate full additional health parameters in addition to inpatient diagnoses. However, in the final analysis, any risk adjustment
methodology must include the experience of all participating private
providers.
As an alternative to simply posting the reimbursement rates that
HCFA is willing to pay, the demand side of the equation, it is possible
to elicit supplier responses through a competitive bidding process that
is totally lacking in the current formulation. However, a form of competitive bidding was outlined in the final report of the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare. While the Commission’s
final proposal did not garner the needed super-majority of votes among
the commission members for a formal recommendation to Congress,
some of its provisions will likely be incorporated in upcoming legislation. One key provision in the proposal, now known as the BreauxThomas proposal (the Commission’s chairmen), is a premium support
system. Under the proposal, supply-side responses would be elicited
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through bidding for Medicare beneficiaries through annual negotiations with a new Medicare Board.
As the BBA and the Breaux-Thomas proposal illustrate, incremental changes are occurring in the way medical insurance is provided to
Medicare patients. With prefunding, at retirement, beneficiaries will
have an account designed to fund the present value of average remaining lifetime reimbursements. How each group of new retirees is dispersed across insurers is contingent, in part, on the length of the
contract period. With long-term contracting, particularly lifetime contracts, risk adjusting would have an added dimension. Besides evaluating a beneficiary’s health risks, insurers would also have to consider
longevity risks. Healthier individuals reduce short-run risks for the
insurer, but because they live longer, insurers face more years of coverage. Longevity risk and health risk work in opposite directions, reducing the incentives for providers to screen applicants since insurers
bidding for clients must consider the distribution of the present value
of remaining lifetime expenditures, not just the next year’s expenditures.
We can see the effect of considering remaining lifetime rather than
single-year expenditures by reviewing the relation between age and
expenditures. In Figure 5.5 we illustrate the path of average annual
reimbursements by age of death for Medicare beneficiaries born in
1909. The data are from the Continuous Medicare History Sample
(CMHS). The CMHS contains individual-level longitudinal data from
the time any individual enters the sample, at age 65, until death. This
data begins in 1974 and the last available year is 1997. Thus, it is possible to track the annual reimbursements of individuals born in 1909
from the time they turn 65 until the age of 88 or their deaths. Up to 24
annual observations are available for each sample member in this birth
cohort. Using the data underlying the figure, we can see the after-thefact average costs of a long-term contracting insurer by age of death,
where actual reimbursements were converted to 1997 dollars using the
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) implicit price deflator. 6
Given that per-capita Medicare reimbursements have risen more rapidly than the general price level, these reimbursement profiles for
higher death ages include some real reimbursement growth in addition
to pure age effects.
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Figure 5.5 Average Annual Medicare Reimbursements for Individuals
Born in 1909

As the series in the figure illustrate, regardless of the age of death,
the high cost of dying is the dominant factor in reimbursements. For
survivors at any age, average reimbursements are greatest for those
who are closest to death, indicating that there is something more than
just the year or two immediately preceding death to reimbursement
levels. From the figure it is easy to see why, with annual contracting,
insurers prefer the healthier individuals—defined as those with longer
life expectancies. But with lifetime contracts, it is the present value
that matters. In Figure 5.6, we present the present value of lifetime
reimbursements by age of death using 3%, 5%, and 7% discount rates,
where we have excluded individuals who are still alive at the end of the
sample period. Interestingly, those who die young have lower remaining lifetime reimbursements. With this information alone it appears
that with lifetime contracting, insurers would have a preference for
individuals expected to die young, the polar opposite of the incentives
of one-year contracting insurers.
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Figure 5.6 Present Value of Reimbursements for Individuals Born in 1909

The above discussion is based on average profiles. However, the
problem for insurers at the beginning of a contract is to determine the
expected present value of each individual, not the overall average. This
is what risk adjustment is all about. We can use the same data that
underlies Figures 5.5 and 5.6 to estimate the extent that past reimbursements predict the present value of remaining lifetime reimbursements.
Since the CMHS does not include preretirement expenditure data, we
address this question by examining the relation between the first five
years of retirement reimbursements (65 to 69 years of age) and the
present value of future expenditures for the subset of individuals who
survive to at least the age of 70. Again we use the 1909 birth cohort as
our point of reference. In interpreting the results, we must bear in
mind that the oldest surviving individual in the 1909 sample is 88 years
of age and that some 30% of the sample was still alive in 1997. Thus,
we underestimate the present value of lifetime reimbursements for all
survivors. Since those in the lower quartiles of reimbursements from
65 to 69 years of age are more likely to survive, we underestimate their
present values relative to those in the fourth quartile.
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The row headings in Table 5.5 identifiy the quartiles in the distribution based on total reimbursements between the ages of 65 and 69. 7
The four data columns identify the quartiles based on the present value
of lifetime reimbursements at age 70 to death or the age of 88 (the end
of our sample). Approximately 30% of the individuals who survive to
age 69 survive beyond 88 years of age. Each cell in the table identifies
the movement between quartiles in the two distributions. For example,
38.89% of the individuals ranked in the first quartile based on Medicare reimbursement between age 65 and 69 are again ranked in the first
quartile based on expenditures up to the age of death or to the age of
88, if still alive. At the other end of the distribution, 35.13% of the
beneficiaries in the top quartile during the first five years are again in
the top quartile based on the present value of remaining expenditures.
If reimbursement in the first five years had no predictive power, then
we would expect approximately 25% in each of the table’s cells. As
seen in the table, location in the middle two quartiles during the first
five years does not appear to predict future reimbursements, but location in the tails of the distribution does. However, this result must be
viewed in light of the fact that the present values of survivors is underestimated.
Table 5.6 identifies the present value of reimbursements for survivors and decedents from the age of 70 on, by quartile during the first
five years. It also presents the percent of beneficiaries in each quartile
who survive beyond 88 years of age and the average age of death
among decedents. As indicated in the table, the present value of
remaining reimbursements rises with location in the initial distribution,
Table 5.5 Mobility between Medicare Reimbursement Quartiles for
Beneficiaries Born in 1909 (%)
Quartile based on the present value at age 70 of
remaining lifetime reimbursements
Quartile based on reimbursements
between 65 and 69 years of age

First

Second

Third

Fourth

First

38.89

26.14

20.36

14.61

Second

24.70

27.18

25.88

22.24

Third

19.45

25.07

27.45

28.02

Fourth

16.97

21.59

26.32

35.13
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Table 5.6 Present Value of Remaining Lifetime Reimbursements at Age
70 by the Quartile Based on Reimbursements during the First
Five Years of Medicare Coverage
Quartile based on
reimbursements between
65 and 69 years of age

Present value of
reimbursements ($)
Survivors

Average age
Survivors of decedents
Decedents
(%)
(years)

First

18,224

24,860

34.38

79.93

Second

26,791

32,411

33.86

80.24

Third

33,749

38,627

30.72

79.66

Fourth

45,944

42,734

19.29

77.92

Average

29,231

35,137

29.56

79.36

and in general, decedents spend more than survivors. The only exception are the survivors in the top quartile who, on average, had higher
reimbursements than the decedents in the top quartile. The last two
columns in the table indicated that reimbursements are negatively
related to survival.
Though prepaid long-term contracts combine health care risk and
longevity risk, the descriptive statistics indicate that past reimbursements provide some information about the present value of future
expenditures, although the omission of the remainder of survivors
reimbursements will reduce the information content of past reimbursements. The evidence presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 suggests that
long-term contracts by themselves will not completely overcome
incentives for provider screening. One approach that will overcome
this problem is to treat the contributions to private accounts in two
parts. First, each individual has a private account to pay for the present
value of retirement health insurance if the individual is healthy. Second, the remainder of the contribution is used to purchase insurance to
pay for the difference, if any, in the age-65 risk-adjusted premiums and
the healthy premiums.
Cochrane (1995) showed that long-term contracts can solve both
the renewability problem and the adverse selection problem that are
common in one-year contracts. For his analysis, Cochrane utilized a
long-term contract with fixed periodic payments (similar to a house
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mortgage). Whenever a change in health status occurs, one side of the
contract makes a payment to the other side equal to the change in
expected costs. For example, if an individual suffers a decline in health
status—implying that the expected costs of care will exceed the contracted fixed payment—the insurer must make a payment to the individual equal to the expected deficit should the individual elect to
switch insurers. Conversely, if an individual experiences a positive
health shock, and decides to switch insurers, he or she must pay their
current insurer an amount equal to the expected surplus. With severance payments of this type, individuals have the ability to move among
insurers.
With prefunding, individuals enter the retirement health care market with sufficient funds to purchase lifetime coverage. Rather than a
fixed annual payment, all individuals in a cohort sign up for health
insurance and place their entire account in the hands of the health
insurer. Any time an individual desires to change health care providers, his or her current provider would be willing to pay them the
present value of all expected future benefits. Any other provider offering the same level of quality will take such an individual for a onceand-for-all premium equal to the present value of all future expected
benefits.
Should an individual elect to upgrade health care providers, their
original provider gives them a severance payment equal to the present
value of all future expected benefits at their level of care. The new
higher quality provider will charge the present value of expected benefits, which will exceed the severance payment received from a lower
quality provider, and therefore have to be supplemented. By the same
token, an individual desiring to reduce quality will receive a severance
payment greater than the cost of lower quality care, the only requirement being that a specified minimum quality of care must be purchased. Thus, how sick one is has no bearing on the availability of
choice. With long-term contracts, a market based on age and health
status would develop in which uniform market prices prevailed. These
market prices would determine the enrollment cost of a new health care
provider and the severance payment to be made by an existing health
care provider.
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CONCLUSION
Forecasting either the tax rate that will be required to fund current
Medicare as the current baby boom generation enters retirement or the
contribution rate that would be required to fully prefund retirement
health care requires that we know both sides of the fundamental equations of generational transfer finance and prefunding. In Chapter 4, we
developed the earnings side of these equations and in this chapter we
have laid the foundation for the benefit side of the equations. This
chapter also introduces an alternative to traditional Medicare in the
form of a no-first-dollar-coverage health insurance policy. Thus, Chapter 5 discusses the benefit side of both of the fundamental problems
facing current Medicare.
We base our estimates of the future costs of current Medicare and
of our alternative on data from the Health Care Financing Agency’s
1995 Cost and Use file and on a 1983 experiment of the effect of alternate health insurance parameters on the level of health care expenditures. The future costs of current Medicare are based on the age
distribution of benefits and the demographic factors inherent in the
coming retirement of the baby boom generation. The impact of moving to our proposed alternative to Medicare—the introduction of a
100% coinsurance/$2,500 deductible policy—was estimated from data
contained in the RAND experiment. By deflating our proposed $2,500
deductible by the growth in Medicare expenditures of 2.94, the appropriate deductible for comparison with the RAND study is $851 in 1983
dollars. The RAND study deductibles were $500 and $1000, so that
interpolation results in the $851 deductible policy reduced health care
expenditures by almost 35%. In the next chapter we use the benefit
vectors presented in Table 5.4 and the cohort age earnings profiles from
Chapter 4 to estimate the contribution rates new labor force entrants
would face if they were to prefund their retirement medical care.

Notes
1. See the introduction of Health Care Financing Administration (1998) for a
description of the survey and of the matching of survey and administrative data.

120

Estimating the Future Cost of Retirement Health Care Benefits

2. Individual responses are weighted throughout this chapter using the full sample
weight as suggested in the data documentation (Health Care Financing Administration 1998, pp. 6–8).
3. It might be argued that the choice of Medigap is made on the basis of health status
so that those choosing more Medigap coverage do so because they are in poorer
health. To test this hypothesis, we have regressed Medigap coverage on health
status and found no effect.
4. Included in this category are individuals who had Medicaid, private supplemental
insurance, or HMO coverage.
5. The RAND study offers no information on the competition effect because the
scale of the experiment was too small to induce competition for its first-dollar
pool.
6. The choice of deflator deserves further comment. In Lubitz, Beebe, and Baker
(1995), annual reimbursements for decedents in 1989 and 1990 were re-based to
1990 dollars using the growth rate in per-capita Medicare payments as the deflator. They then compared average expenditure profiles by age of death. Both quality and quantity changes affect the size of the annual growth rates they use to
deflate reimbursements, which leads to overstated reimbursements in early years.
7. Quartiles are chosen rather than quintiles or deciles because more than 20% of the
beneficiaries had zero Medicare reimbursements between the ages of 65 and 69.

6
The Transition to
Fully Funded Medicare
The fundamental issues that are being discussed in the ongoing
debate over prepaying Social Security have a direct bearing on prepaying Medicare. As we pointed out in Chapter 3, the capital stock and
individual welfare in the steady state are higher in a prepaid system of
retirement pensions than they are when transfers to the elderly are
financed by taxing the young. If we could move in an instant to the
prepaid steady state from the transfer-financed steady state, everyone
would be better off. But the instantaneous transition is not possible,
and the transition between two steady states is the sticking point. The
transition path taken determines who bears the cost and whether the
transition can actually improve welfare for all generations.
In the recent wave of Social Security reform proposals, much has
been made of the difference between the rate of return on capital and
the rate of return that is offered by Social Security. Assuming that the
tax rate is fixed, Social Security can offer a rate of return equal to the
growth rate in the economy. A prepaid system can offer a rate of return
equal to the marginal product of capital. If the return on capital
exceeds the growth rate of the economy, then some have argued that
private accounts would make workers better off. Unfortunately, the
accrued benefits of current retirees have to be financed. So, if current
workers divert their tax payments into private accounts, the government must raise additional taxes or borrow to pay for the accrued benefits of current retirees. Borrowing by itself would result in no net
increase in the capital stock, and raising additional taxes is never popular, but apart from a benefit reduction, borrowing or taxation appear to
be the only options.
The approach taken by most reformers is to require workers to
establish private saving accounts for their retirement expenses and at
the same time pay taxes sufficient to support current and soon-to-be
retirees. The new mandatory savings would reflect additions to the
capital stock. Feldstein and Samwick (1997), and subsequently Feld-
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stein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (1999), have suggested that all current workers establish mandatory Personal Retirement Accounts
(PRAs) and continue paying payroll taxes at the current rate. Initially,
the contribution rate to the private accounts as a percentage of wage
earnings is low, in the range of 2%. As funds accumulate in the private
accounts, two things happen. As the system matures, the annuities that
can be purchased at retirement offset an increasing proportion of the
scheduled Social Security benefits, thus reducing the financing requirements of the current system.
The aggregate PRAs also represent additions to the capital stock
and, as such, they generate capital taxes that can be used to further
lower future payroll tax rates. Over time, the contribution rates to the
private accounts can rise to a level that would allow the average worker
to prepay his or her retirement pension. During the early years of the
transition, the combination of the contributions to PRAs and the modified payroll taxes would exceed the scheduled payroll taxes. In later
years the modified payroll taxes would be eliminated, leaving a contribution rate of about 4.25%, a rate that is much lower than the pay-asyou-go tax rate (which is estimated to rise to 19% by 2070). Current
workers bear a greater burden than they would under the pay-as-yougo system, but future workers would be much better off under a prepaid system than under the current system. So, such a transition is not
necessarily Pareto-improving. The gradual reduction in the payroll tax
will reduce the deadweight loss due to the reduced labor supply under
the current tax rate. Feldstein and Samwick (1997) estimated the efficiency gains from such tax rate reduction to be about 2% of the tax
base.
Laurence Kotlikoff and Jeffrey Sachs (1996) offered another transition path. Focusing exclusively on the retirement portion of Social
Security, they suggested eliminating the payroll tax and replacing it
with mandatory contributions to private accounts. The transition cost
associated with the accrued benefits is financed by a new federal business cash flow tax. Since both retirees and workers engage in consumption expenditures, the tax burden for the transition is shared by
both workers and retirees. In addition, the business cash flow tax is
less distortionary than the payroll tax, and therefore the switch in the
tax by itself produces an efficiency gain. Over time, the tax rate associ-
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ated with the new cash flow tax would decline as the liabilities of the
phased-out system are eliminated.
When enacted, Medicare provided benefits to a population of retirees who had not paid into the system. Even today’s new retirees have
only paid into the system for 33 years, two years fewer than the number of years in the formula used to calculate Social Security benefits.
A transition to prepaid Medicare today would have been equivalent to
requiring the working population of 1965 to prepay their own retirement health care while at the same time paying for the health care used
by the then-retired population. As the statements by Wilbur Mills
quoted in Chapter 2 revealed, he for one was interested in a prepayment option and recognized that a promise of benefits to retirees represented an unfunded liability equal to $33 billion; but, rather than
prefunding for Medicare, pay-as-you-go financing was adopted. This
chapter explores several paths for the transition from pay-as-you-go
Medicare financing to prefunding and evaluates the consequences.
Prepaying Medicare has its own set of unique issues. First, unlike
Social Security, Medicare benefits are not tied in any way to lifetime
earnings. Further, Medicare is an in-kind benefit: the benefits one
receives from the system are conditional on use. As a result, benefit
growth is affected by changing preferences and changing technology.
Given that the current Medicare system has been in place for 33 years,
it is too late for the current retired population and the soon-to-beretired population to be placed in a fully funded system. Thus, any
proposal to change the fundamental nature of financing retirement
health care benefits must contain a mechanism for dealing with the
years required to move from the existing system to the new system. In
what follows, we present a proposal that keeps intact the benefit structure for the currently retired population and the soon-to-be-retired population.
Because the population boom represented by the baby boom generation represents a significant source of current federal revenue and
also because they will create a surge in the retired population, we
define soon-to-be-retired to exclude the baby boomers. In effect, during the transition, younger members of society will be paying twice, in
the sense that they will be prepaying for their own retirement health
care benefits and paying for the retirement health care benefits of those
currently and soon to be retired. However, because of the efficiencies
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to be gained from prepaid retirement health care, at least the younger
of those being double-taxed (so to speak) may be better off on net,
because the increased capital stock allows them to enjoy increased consumption during their latter working years by enough to offset the
decrease in consumption during their early working years. As a result,
their extra payments into the system have a significantly lower present
value than remaining with the status quo.
In the next section we develop the contribution rates necessary to
prefund both the current Medicare system and our no-first-dollar-coverage alternative to current Medicare. Using the earnings forecasts
generated in Chapter 4 and the benefit series presented in Chapter 5,
we calculate the required contribution rate under several rate-of-return
and growth-rate assumptions.

THE COST OF PREPAYING RETIREMENT
HEALTH INSURANCE
Medicare was originally intended to provide health insurance for
the elderly. While coverage was expanded to include qualifying disabled workers in 1972 and end-stage renal disease patients in 1973,
Medicare fundamentally remains an elderly health insurance program. The aged Medicare population is 33.8 million, or 87% of the
38.8 million total Medicare beneficiaries.1 Elderly individuals qualify
for the Medicare program if they are eligible for Social Security benefits. This minimal eligibility requirement has resulted in nearly universal coverage among the aged population. All eligible enrollees draw
identical Medicare benefits whenever they fall ill and experience
expenditures above the deductibles. Because benefits are institutionally unrelated to the magnitude of past tax payments, the benefits
received net of contributions vary across groups due to work history
and longevity. Two extremes in net benefits are illustrated by a single
worker who dies just before reaching retirement and by a qualifying
nonworking spouse. The single worker receives nothing from the program after a lifetime of contributions, while the nonworking spouse
receives benefits during retirement despite having invested nothing into
the system.
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McClellan and Skinner (1997) decomposed the redistribution
inherent in the Medicare program into its between-generation and
within-generation components. Within a generation, the direction of
redistribution is not clear. While lower-income individuals pay less in
lifetime taxes because of lower life expectancies, they also receive
lower benefits than their higher-income counterparts. McClellan and
Skinner found that the bulk of the redistribution in the Medicare system is between-generations, but of the total transfers that occur within
generations, they found that Medicare redistributes from low- to highincome groups. Moreover, they suggested that the direction of the
redistribution will persist for the next 20 years.
With prefunding, individual rates of return will continue to vary by
usage, but any redistribution occurs within-generation. The projected
experience of the average individual is used in this section to determine
the contribution rates for prepaid retirement insurance. The contribution rates are equal to the ratio of the present value of expected benefits
to expected lifetime earnings (see Appendix B, Equation B.1). At
retirement, all survivors in a generation (a specific age cohort) will
have equal funds in their PRIME accounts. Thus, for lower-income
workers to have the same amounts in their retirement accounts as highincome workers, they would have to contribute at a higher rate
throughout their lives.
An alternative to differential contribution rates is to establish a tax
rate based on the projected experience of the average member of a
cohort. In making the contribution rate cohort-specific, we assume that
redistribution takes place between income groups as the cohort ages.
One way to do this is to have all workers in a given cohort make mandatory contributions to their PRIME accounts up to a specified dollar
maximum, which is equal to the dollar value of the taxes for the average individual. Contributions up to the maximum offset taxes dollar
for dollar. The excess tax revenues from the higher-income workers
within a cohort are then used to subsidize the contributions of the
lower-income workers. The current subsidy to nonworking spouses
can be eliminated by requiring single-earner couples to prepay both of
their PRIME accounts. In this way, each individual will own a PRIME
account, so that changes in marital status or spousal death will have no
detrimental effects on the availability of retirement years health care.
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The contribution rates for average new labor force entrants are presented in Table 6.1. In addition to the earnings estimates from Chapter
4 and the benefit estimates from Chapter 5, the remaining components
of the contribution rate calculation are cohort-specific mortality rates,
growth rates in per capita Medicare costs, and rates of return earned on
the PRIME account assets. The earnings estimates used here and in the
simulations that follow are based on one of the projections outlined in
Chapter 4. The specific estimates are based on the combination of the
geometrically weighted growth rates and the first decision rule for
dealing with cases where women’s projected wages exceed men’s.
Finally, mortality rates are drawn from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s
1995, 2005, and 2050 middle series, and cohort-specific mortality is
imputed from the cross-sectional mortality tables.
To identify a range of possible contribution rates, we use three
growth rates in real per capita Medicare reimbursements and three real
Table 6.1 Required Annual Contributions Beginning at Age 22 as a
Percentage of Life-Cycle Earnings
Medicare
replacement

$2500
Deductible policy

1%

4.09

3.45

2%

7.13

6.01

5.34

4.51

1%

2.05

1.74

2%

3.52

2.98

HCFA

2.67

2.27

1%

0.66

0.57

2%

1.12

0.95

HCFA

0.87

0.74

Rate of return/growth ratea
Rate of return = 3.5%

b

HCFA

Rate of return = 5.4%

Rate of return = 8.5%

a

In per-capita medical expenditures.
b The HCFA growth rate in per-capita medical expenditures is based on the approximated growth rates assumed in the 1998 Trustees reports. For years 1998 to 2002, the
growth rate is 1%; from 2003 to 2010, it is 3.5%; and for the years 2011 to 2022, it
declines at a constant rate to 0.9%, and remains at 0.9% in all subsequent years.

The Economics of Medicare Reform

127

rates of return. The real per capita reimbursement growth rates are 1%,
2%, and the rates that mimic those used by the Trustees in the 1998
Trustees reports (Board of Trustees 1998a,b). The three real rates of
return are 3.5%, 5.4%, and 8.5%. The lowest rate of return is approximately the real return on inflation-indexed government bonds. The
highest rate, 8.5%, is the pre-tax rate of return on nonfinancial corporate capital in the United States between 1959 and 1996 (Poterba
1999). The intermediate rate is equal to the realized real rate of return
after federal, state, and local corporate taxes are paid.
As indicated in the table, replacing current Medicare net of Part B
premium payments requires contribution rates that range from 0.66%
to 7.13% of lifetime earnings. The $2,500 deductible policy can be
prefunded with contribution rates between 0.57% and 6.01% of lifetime earnings. Current Medicare is funded on a pay-as-you-go basis
by a 2.9% payroll tax dedicated to Hospitalization Insurance expenditures and general revenue funds for expenditures incurred under the
Supplementary Medical Insurance program. Expressing total Medicare expenditures incurred by retirees, net of their premium payments,
as a percentage of taxable payroll implies that a tax rate that would pay
for current total Medicare benefits would be 4.17%. Significantly, all
of the contribution rates using the 5.4% and 8.5% rates of return fall
below the 4.17% current Medicare implied tax rate, and all of the contribution rates at the 8.5% growth rate fall well below the current Hospitalization Insurance 2.9% payroll tax.
We introduce the 4.17% current Medicare implied tax rate as an
accounting benchmark because it allows us to identify the degree to
which projected expenditures are underfunded at current tax rates.
Figure 6.1 illustrates projected Medicare expenditures and revenues in
1998 dollars. The expenditure projection uses the same per capita
growth rates as the 1998 Trustees Report. Total Part A (Hospitalization
Insurance) and Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) expenditures are expressed net of premium payments, which we assume will
remain at the 1998 share, approximately 25% of average Part B costs.
We project future Medicare revenue by holding constant both the 2.9%
payroll tax and the 1.27% payroll tax equivalent of the general revenue
contribution to Part B. Projected Medicare revenue is then calculated
as 4.17% of projected aggregate labor earnings.
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Figure 6.1 Projected Medicare Revenues and Expenditures

The population projections underlying both the revenue and expenditure estimates are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census middle series.
The difference between projected expenditures and revenues identifies
the degree to which current Medicare is underfunded at current full tax
rates. Using a 2.8% government borrowing rate, the present value of
the difference between projected expenditures and revenues out to
2080 is $9.3 trillion. This gap between expenditures and revenues represents a problem that must be addressed by any reform. If benefits are
not cut and pay-as-you-go financing remains, the gap must be filled by
higher taxes equal in present value to $9.3 trillion.
With prepayment, the expenditures in Figure 6.1 represent future
annual draws from PRIME accounts. The question is, how do we
make the transition from current pay-as-you-go financed Medicare to a
system of PRIME accounts? During a transition to prepaid Medicare,
workers must fund their PRIME accounts and pay for the expenditures
of current Medicare recipients. We will defer the issue of who bears
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the burden of such a transition until the end of this chapter and analyze
a transition scenario in which all baby boomers achieve fully paid-up
PRIME accounts by the time of their retirement. Thus, anyone born in
1945 or earlier, before the baby boomers, remains in the current Medicare program and their expenditures are paid by contemporaneous tax
payments. All those born in 1946 and later are placed in the new
PRIME account system.
Table 6.2 presents the results of a simulated transition in which
individuals receive the 5.4% after-tax marginal productivity of capital
as the return on their PRIME accounts. For purposes of comparison
with current Medicare and with payroll tax implications of future payas-you-go Medicare costs, revenues and expenditures are presented as
a percentage of taxable payroll. For now, we ignore the effects of a
larger capital stock on the marginal productivity of capital and on the
wage rate. Those considerations will be taken up in the discussion of
the subsequent simulation. Projected Medicare expenditures, net of
premium payments, as a percentage of taxable payroll are presented in
the first column of the table. This column shows the tax rates required
to fund Medicare on a pay-as-you-basis in the future. Over the next 20
years, if we retain the current pay-as-you-go financing of Medicare, the
tax rate will rise to 7.81% and by 2070 will be 14.33% of payroll. The
second column presents the prepaid accounts contribution to projected
Medicare expenditures as a percentage of taxable payroll, and thus
highlights the extent that the total tax burden is relieved by prepaid
accounts. Because the oldest of the baby boomers will reach the age of
65 in 2011, the benefits paid from PRIME accounts are zero until then.
The share of total benefits paid from PRIME accounts steadily rises,
and by 2045, as the last of the individuals in the old system dies, all
retirement medical care is prepaid.2
The third column shows the Medicare taxes that must be paid from
contemporaneous tax payments (this column equals the difference
between the first and second columns). Column four presents total
PRIME account contributions as a percentage of taxable payroll.
Recall from Table 6.1 that new entrants must set aside 2.67% of their
lifetime earnings to prepay their Medicare coverage. However, during
the transition, the aggregate PRIME accounts contributions are higher
than 2.67% because the contributions to PRIME accounts sufficient to

a
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Table 6.2 Medicare Simulation Resultsa (% of taxable payroll)
PRIME
Aggregate
contributions +
PRIME
PRIME
Benefits
benefits paid Corporate tax contributions Transition
account
paid by tax
by taxes
contribution
+ net taxes
tax
revenues contributions

Year

Status quo
Medicare tax rate

Benefits
paid from
prepaid
accounts

2000

4.17

0.00

4.17

5.43

9.61

0.35

9.26

5.09

2010

5.38

0.00

5.38

4.70

10.08

1.77

8.31

4.14

2020

7.81

3.69

4.12

3.45

7.56

3.31

4.26

0.09

2030

10.44

8.54

1.90

2.82

4.72

4.31

2.67

0.00

2040

11.71

11.30

0.41

2.69

3.10

4.61

2.67

0.00

2050

12.07

12.07

0.00

2.67

2.67

4.66

2.67

0.00

2060

13.16

13.16

0.00

2.67

2.67

4.79

2.67

0.00

2070

14.33

14.33

0.00

2.67

2.67

4.73

2.67

0.00

Assumptions: constant 5.4% after-tax marginal productivity of capital; $43.80 monthly premium in
1998; HCFA Medicare growth rates; and 4.17% implied Medicare tax rate.
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prepay their retirement health insurance of cohorts between age 22 and
age 54 in 2000 exceed 2.67%. With PRIME account contributions
earning a realized 5.4% marginal productivity of capital, individuals up
to 35 years of age can prepay their Medicare at less than the current
Medicare 4.17% implied tax rate. However, transition tax revenues are
required to supplement the contributions of individuals 36 to 54 years
of age whose required contribution rate is higher than 4.17%. In 2000,
aggregate PRIME account contributions equal 5.43%. Aggregate
PRIME account contributions gradually decline to the long-run 2.67%
level in future years as an increasing share of the labor force is under
the prepaid system for their entire work-life.
The sum of aggregate PRIME account contributions and the benefits that must be paid by tax revenues is shown in column five.
Between now and 2020, this amount exceeds the pay-as-you-go tax
rate from the first column, but in every year that follows, the cost of
prefunding is less than the status quo tax rate. However, the true cost
of prefunding is actually less than is indicated by comparing the fifth
and first columns. Recall that, in this simulation, individuals are
assumed to earn the after-corporate-tax marginal productivity of capital on their PRIME accounts. Since any additions to the capital stock
earn the precorporate tax rate of return, the difference between the
before and after tax rate of return represents additional corporate tax
revenues on the incremental capital. The incremental corporate taxes
increase federal, state, and local tax revenues.
Because the prepaid accounts replace anticipated Medicare payments, aggregate PRIME accounts net of draws represent incremental
capital. If the additional federal corporate taxes are used to facilitate
the transition to prepaid Medicare, the length of the transition period
can be shortened. The sixth column presents the contribution of these
additional corporate taxes to the transition cost, where we assume that
67% of total corporate taxes that arise from earning on the incremental
capital stock is available to assist in the transition to prepaid Medicare,
allowing state and local governments to keep their share of the additional tax revenue. Subtracting the additional corporate taxes from column five yields net taxes and PRIME account contributions.
Comparing the values in column five to those in column one reveals
that, by 2015, total transition costs are less than the costs of maintaining pay-as-you-go financing. The final column in the table is obtained
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by subtracting the implied tax from total transition costs. It shows the
costs of the transition that are over and above the current implied tax
rate.
The previous simulation used corporate taxes arising from earnings on the incremental capital as a funding source. Implicitly, most of
the corporate taxes were used to help fund private accounts. A more
transparent way to capture the full earnings from the additional capital
stock is to assume that all taxes are deferred on PRIME accounts. The
results of a simulation in which we allow PRIME accounts to earn the
before-tax marginal productivity of capital but drop the assumption of
a constant marginal productivity of capital are presented in Table 6.3.
We assume that PRIME accounts begin earning the full 8.5% marginal
productivity of capital, but as the capital stock rises, the marginal product of capital is allowed to fall. Also, since the increased capital stock
increases the capital-labor ratio, wages rise. This wage rate effect is
also included in this simulation.
To establish a baseline capital stock, we follow Feldstein and Samwick (1997) in assuming Cobb-Douglas production technology and a
25% capital share. We also follow their assumption that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is equal to a constant 37% of the capital stock. GDP
is forecast using our projections of aggregate earnings combined with
the Social Security Administration’s (Yang and Goss 1992) estimate
that taxable payroll will represent between 44% and 46% of GDP in
the future.
Using this baseline estimate of the capital stock, we identify the
effects of the incremental capital stock resulting from the net accumulated PRIME accounts on the time path of the rate of return on capital
and the wage rate. With these estimates in hand, the contribution rates
and aggregate taxable earnings are recalculated. The first column in
Table 6.3 is identical to the first column in Table 6.2. It is presented for
comparison to the second column, which identifies the Medicare costs
as a percentage of the higher tax base resulting from the higher earnings associated with a larger capital stock. By 2020, Medicare as a
percentage of the taxable payroll falls from 7.81% to 7.51%. This
decline is the result of a 4% increase in aggregate wages. By 2050,
wages will be 5.76% higher, and as a result, Medicare as a percentage
of payroll falls from 12.07% to 11.41%.

Table 6.3 Medicare Simulation Resultsa (% of taxable payroll)

a

Year

Status quo
Medicare tax rate

Forecast
Medicare costs

Benefits paid
from prepaid
accounts

Aggregate
Benefits paid by PRIME account
tax revenues
contributions

2000

4.17

4.17

0.00

4.17

3.13

3.13

7.30

2010

5.38

5.27

0.00

5.27

2.57

3.68

7.85

2020

7.81

7.51

3.55

3.96

1.75

1.54

5.71

2030

10.44

9.91

8.11

1.80

1.35

0.00

3.16

2040

11.71

11.07

10.68

0.39

1.27

0.00

1.66

2050

12.07

11.41

11.41

0.00

1.26

0.00

1.26

2060

13.16

12.45

12.45

0.00

1.26

0.00

1.26

2070

14.33

13.65

13.65

0.00

1.26

0.00

1.26

Transition Medicare tax +
tax
transition tax

Assumptions: 8.5% marginal productivity of capital; $43.80 monthly premium in 1998; HCFA Medicare growth rates; 4.17% implied
tax rate; and individuals born in 1946 and later are in the new system.
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The next two columns in Table 6.3 are the same as those in Table
6.2 with the same titles, but they use the higher taxable wage base as
the denominator. The aggregate PRIME account contributions are
lower than in the previous table, given the higher starting marginal productivity of capital retained by the accounts. However, the ultimate
contribution rate of 1.26% is higher than 0.87% rate presented in Table
6.1, which was based on a constant 8.5% marginal productivity of capital. The decline in the marginal productivity of capital outweighs the
increased wages to produce the higher contribution rate. Next we
present the transition tax, which again measures the total of the Medicare benefits that must be paid by tax receipts and PRIME account contributions less the implied 4.17% tax rate. The final column in Table
6.3 identifies the total costs of the transition, the sum of the PRIME
account contributions and transition taxes, as a percentage of payroll.
Figure 6.2 depicts series from Table 6.3. As seen from the graph,
the future costs of financing retirement medical care are significantly
Figure 6.2 Benefit Payments and Prepaid Account Contributions
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reduced at the expense of higher current costs. The most telling comparison is between the forecast Medicare series and the benefit payments plus PRIME account contribution series. This comparison
shows that, by 2016, total transition costs fall below pay-as-you-go
costs and continuing falling thereafter. Thus, for the next 16 years, the
transition to prepaid Medicare can be accomplished beginning with an
initial transition tax of 3.13%. The solid line in Figure 6.2 depicting
the transition tax shows that by 2026 total transition costs will fall
below the current implied tax rate of 4.17%. However, this transition
tax overstates the relative burden of moving to a prepaid system, in that
it reflects the tax burden over and above a static tax rate of 4.17%
rather than the pay-as-you-go tax rate that would be required if status
quo Medicare financing is retained. Relative to the pay-as-you-go tax
rate, the additional burden of the transition tax falls continuously and
reaches zero within 16 years.
The percentage increase in the capital stock due to the transition to
prepaid Medicare is presented in Table 6.4. Ultimately, prepaying
Medicare will increase the capital stock 25% over projected baseline
estimates. The associated reductions in the marginal productivity of
Table 6.4 Effects of the Larger Capital Stock on the Rate of
Return and on the Wage Rate (%)
Year

Increase in the
capital stock

New rate of return
on capital

Increase in the
wage rate

2000

1.39

8.41

0.35

2005

4.31

8.24

1.06

2010

8.17

8.01

1.98

2015

12.62

7.78

3.02

2020

16.94

7.56

3.99

2025

20.61

7.39

4.80

2030

23.16

7.27

5.35

2035

24.54

7.21

5.64

2040

25.09

7.19

5.76

2045

25.24

7.18

5.79

2050

25.09

7.19

5.76
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capital and increases in wage rates are also presented. In the long run,
the marginal product of capital falls from 8.5% to 7.2% and wage rates
rise 5.8% relative to the baseline.

PREPAYING NO-FIRST-DOLLAR-COVERAGE INSURANCE
In the previous simulations, the benefit package was identical to
current Medicare net of premium payments, and future expenditures
were projected by allowing per capita expenditures to grow at the rates
used in the 1998 Trustees report. Replacing the current two-part benefit package with a single, higher-deductible policy lowers the transition
cost, brings about demand-side reductions in the level of expenditures,
and may induce significant supply-side responses lowering the cost of
medical care provision.
In a final simulation, we investigate prepaying higher deductible
policies for the baby-boom and subsequent generations using cost estimates from Chapter 5, assuming an initial marginal product of capital
of 8.5%, and assuming that per capita health care expenditures rise at
the rates assumed in the previous simulations. Thus, we make a conservative assumption that switching to higher deductible insurance
does not lower the growth rate in expenditures. Taking into account
the capital stock effects on wages and the marginal product of capital,
the contribution rate for new entrants is 1.02% of lifetime earnings.
This leaves 3.15% of the implied tax to fund the contributions of older
baby boomers and the expenditures of current beneficiaries. As a
result, the initial transition tax falls from 3.13% to 2.58% of payroll.
Again, by 2016, the total costs of prepaying PRIME accounts and paying for the expenditures of patients who remain in the old system fall
below the tax rate required to maintain the status quo pay-as-you-go
Medicare financing system.
Should the baby boomers prepay higher deductible retirement
insurance, their benefits will be lower than those of the preceding retirees who remain in the current system, producing a “notch generation”
who retire with a lesser level of retirement insurance coverage. However, policy changes within the current system, such as increases in the
retirement age or higher Part B premiums, will also result in lower life-
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time benefits for future retirees. Thus, the relevant comparison is
between the higher deductible policy and what the benefit package
must become by 2010, the year preceding the retirement of the oldest
baby boomers. It may well be the case that lifetime benefits will be
reduced in some way to reduce the pay-as-you-go tax burden. We have
estimated that the higher deductible policies are 16% less expensive
than Medicare, taking into account Part B premiums. Any reforms
between now and 2011 that reduce per-capita Medicare payments by
16% will eliminate any concerns of a notch generation.

GENERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The previous section raised the issue of how a transition to prepaid
Medicare affects different generations. Importantly, how the burden of
the transition affects various generations determines its immediate
attractiveness. With a transition structured in the way we have discussed, all workers pay an equal transition tax rate in each year. In the
second simulation, the transition costs exceed pay-as-you-go taxes for
16 years. As a result, the burden is greatest on the birth cohorts whose
labor earnings for the next 16 years represent large shares of their lifetime earnings. Indeed, we find that the leading edge of the baby boom
has the greatest reduction in the sum of remaining lifetime after-tax
labor income plus Medicare benefits. Relative to a continuation of
pay-as-you-go financing, those born in 1946 experience a 2.4% reduction in lifetime after-tax income and Medicare benefits, but all those
born in 1962 and later experience higher lifetime after-tax income and
benefits.
These generational burdens should be interpreted in light of the
fact that baby boomers have been paying below the steady-state tax
rate in the current pay-as-you-go regime because they have been supporting a small retired population. By being members of a large generation, their tax rates have been lower than would be necessary to
support equal benefits in a constant population growth world. A transition to private accounts simply recognizes the implicit debt resulting
from these tax under-payments. Further, our use of taxable payroll as
an accounting metric leads to some problems that can be overcome
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with the use of a tax that distributes the transition burden across generations more equally. The transitions we have outlined place the burden
squarely on the shoulders of workers. By financing the transition with
a business cash flow tax, for example, would increase generational
equity and be less distortionary than a payroll tax (Kotlikoff and Sachs
1996).

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have outlined several possible transition scenarios. By the 16th year in the simulation in which the full pretax marginal product is credited to individual accounts, workers pay less in
taxes and contributions to their PRIME accounts than the tax rate that
would be required if the current pay-as-you-go Medicare financing
system is retained. Furthermore, in all future years, workers pay lower
taxes than would be needed to finance Medicare on a pay-as-you-go
basis. Parts A and B of Medicare are replaced with fully funded real
investment. Such investment will increase the nation’s capital stock
and provide the resources necessary to fund the retirement medical
care of the baby boomers, while at the same time protecting the rights
of older generations to retirement medical care.
The problem of the retirement population surge that will occur as
the baby boomers leave the labor force is compounded by the fact that
real per capita Medicare expenditures have been rising faster than the
growth rate of the system’s current financing base. The country’s ability to cope with the unfunded Medicare liability depends on our willingness to harness these out-of-control health care expenditures. The
approach we have suggested is the conversion of the current Parts A
and B of Medicare into health insurance consisting of a high deductible
and then 100% coverage. This type of health coverage makes consumers care what health care costs and will play a major role in restoring
competition to the industry, but (as discussed above) the attractiveness
of our transition path does not rest on the assumption of this less
expensive insurance.
The transition we have investigated is designed such that all individuals born in 1946 and later are switched to prepaid insurance. We
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consider the second simulation, which takes into account the effects of
a larger capital stock on the marginal productivity of capital and wage
rates, to be a reasonable projection of the consequences of prefunding
Medicare. In that simulation, workers up to 43 years of age can prepay
at rates that are less than the implied Medicare tax of 4.17%. Their
excess contributions can go towards funding the older cohorts—those
born before 1946—who remain in the to-be-amended Medicare system. The younger cohorts’ contributions will also be used to subsidizing the prefunding of the baby boomers retirement health care. We
estimate that the transition will save the country money when compared with the maintaining the status quo. A transitional tax is instituted to cover the transition cost. Once the last of individuals born
before 1946 has left the system, all future generations are self-funded.
At this point, we will have achieved a retirement health care system
that will be free of uncertainty due to future generation size.
The estimates we have presented above assume a particular form
for the transition to a private system of providing for the health care
expenditures of the elderly. Our approach is only one of several financing methods, all of which can accomplish the end goal of moving us
from generation-transfer-based Medicare to prepaid Medicare. Fundamentally, however, the financing issues we address in our transition
must be faced whether or not any change is made in the form of Medicare financing. The elderly are going to consume real resources, and as
the elderly population grows, younger generations are going to have to
give up consumption in favor of the elderly no matter how Medicare is
financed. The only real question is how these younger generations will
be induced to give up the resources necessary to provide the elderly
with the health care they demand.
There are only two ways for the elderly—especially those not
working—to get resources from younger generations: governmentenforced reductions in the younger generations’ consumption through
taxation, and voluntary reductions in consumption by the younger generations achieved through the sale of assets to the younger generations.
In the projections of the transition, we assume that any shortfall in revenues are financed by a transitional tax. The transition costs exceed the
cost of maintaining the current system for 16 years, but in every year
thereafter they are less.
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Importantly, the additional borrowing or taxation will be required
whether or not we move the financing of Medicare from a pay-as-yougo generational transfer to a prepaid system. The elderly will still consume health care, and we are still committed to pay for it. The only
way to pay for the health care of the increased population of elderly is
to take resources from the working population. If we leave the current
generation-transfer-based Medicare in place, tax rates will double over
the next 25 years. On the other hand, if we embark on a transition to a
prepaid system, financing the gap in revenues and expenditures with a
combination of contributions to private accounts and transition taxes,
the total resource commitment will be reduced. No matter what we do,
if we honor the commitments we have made to the elderly population,
some sacrifice must be made by younger generations. We can reduce
the pain, but we cannot make it go away.
The current generation-transfer system of financing Medicare is
inefficient. It results in a reduction in the nation’s capital stock and in
national income. The great benefit of making the transition to a prepaid system now is that the earnings of the baby boom generation can,
at least for the next decade, be used to help finance the transition.
Without prefunding, the baby boomers’ retirement medical care consumption will have to be financed wholly through contemporaneous
taxation. Given a commitment of meeting the demand of providing
health care for the elderly, the fact that some of these resource demands
can be satisfied by increased production resulting from a move to prepaid financing of elderly health care expenditures is a strong argument
for proceeding at all possible haste to a such a system. In addition, we
can enhance the efficiency of the health care delivery system and
reduce the cost of the transition by introducing no-first-dollar-coverage
health insurance.

Notes
1. We have chosen to analyze Medicare as a retirement health insurance program.
We consider disability insurance to be a general welfare issue and for this reason
omit it from the remaining analysis.
2. The U.S. Census Bureau data has population counts from ages 0 to 100. The
youngest birth cohort remaining in the old (tax-supported) system was born in
1945, so the last population count for members of this cohort is in 2045, when
they are 100 years of age.

7
Conclusions and Other Issues in
the Medicare Reform Debate
The Medicare reform issues presented in the previous chapters
have dealt with the three aspects of the Medicare program that have
worked together to get us to the current situation: a payment scheme
that ensures the users of the system will not care what it costs; a financing system that involves generation transfers as its principal source of
revenue; and the penchant of Congress to fund “worthy” causes with
any funds that appear available. By moving from generation-transfer
financing to prepaid Medicare, we remove the inefficiencies induced
by the adverse effects of the previous system on the incentive to invest
in the nation’s capital stock. Changing the form of insurance to catastrophic coverage with no first-dollar coverage makes consumers of
health care evaluate what it costs. When consumers care what health
care costs, suppliers will have to compete for consumer dollars and this
competition will reduce the cost of care. The best thing about our solution is that it removes an inefficient institution and replaces it with an
efficient institution, producing an increase in national earnings.

THE ISSUE IS THE STOCK OF CAPITAL, NOT THE RATE
OF RETURN
Much of the discussion of the transition cost to a prefunded Medicare system in Chapter 6 was based on rates of return on private
accounts that exceed the rate of return on government bonds. Casual
observation of this fact may lead one to conclude that our proposal is
based on this higher rate of return, and that if the existing Medicare
Trust Fund were invested in higher-yielding securities, no change in
the system would be necessary. Such a conclusion misses the point.
Indeed, rate of return is not the issue for two reasons. First, the current
Medicare Trust Fund contains no assets and never has. Granted, it does
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have accounting entries that are entered as assets, but the fact of the
matter is that these are accounting entries only. The Medicare Trust
Fund—and the Social Security Trust Fund, for that matter—is pure fiction; there are no assets in either fund. One can see the vacuous nature
of the contents of the trust funds by answering the following question:
How would the future tax payments by any citizen be affected if the
trust fund were twice its current size, or if it did not exist at all? The
answer is that future tax payments by the working population are independent of the level of assets in the trust funds!
In both the Medicare and Social Security trust funds, the revenues
in any year enter the fund and are then treated by the federal government as general revenues and spent. True, the Treasury gives the
Medicare Trust Fund a government security that has a stated yield, but
because the tax proceeds are spent on general expenditures and not
invested, the trust fund does not contain title to any real assets. All
future expenditures that are scheduled to come from the trust fund
must actually come out of the general federal government budget. It is
as if you establish a trust fund for your children’s education and then
use your entire contribution to that trust fund for an annual trip to Paris,
while placing an IOU in the trust fund. No matter what interest rate
you place on the IOUs, your children’s education depends entirely on
your willingness to constrain your own consumption when your children start college. Thus, the rate of return on the Medicare Trust Fund
is irrelevant because there are no assets in the fund. When current revenues into the Medicare Trust Fund fail to cover current Medicare
expenditures, the total amount of the shortfall must come from taxpayers, which is exactly what would happen if there were no trust fund!
The benefits of prefunding Medicare come from the removal of the
inefficiency inherent in generational transfers. The fact that working
generations expect that their retirement Medicare will be provided by
future generations creates incentives for increased present consumption and early retirement. Both of these effects result in a level of
investment that is below the level of investment if each generation is
expected to provide for its own retirement health care. Thus, part of
our reform plan for Medicare takes advantage of the increase in the
nation’s capital stock that will occur when we move to prepaid financing of retirement health care.
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TRANSITION ISSUES
Any transition to market institutions, whether instantaneous or
gradual, must answer the question of how to deal with the debts of the
old regime. In our case the debts are the health care benefits promised
to the currently retired and soon-to-be retired population. 1 To put this
problem in perspective, in the United States for example, the present
value of the unfunded liabilities of the two retirement programs, Social
Security and Medicare, are more than $12 trillion, a sum that is
approximately four times the acknowledged federal debt. This retirement system debt is the result of a larger-than-normal working generation paying taxes at a rate only sufficient to fund the retirement of a
small retired generation. This same tax rate, when applied to the coming small working generation, will be insufficient to fund the retirement of a large retired generation.
A key element in reforms of elderly entitlement programs around
the world is the potential for the rate of return on private investment to
be much higher than the rate of return implicit in pay-as-you-go generation transfer systems of funding retirement benefits. Even if a significant disparity exists between these rates of return, however, this does
not mean that every generation would be better off with a transition
from an existing public pay-as-you-go retirement benefits system to a
prefunded system. The key to understanding the generational distribution of the cost and benefits of a transition from pay-as-you-go financing to prefunded financing of Medicare is the “transition cost” that
must be incurred to deal with the huge implicit debts in the form of
accrued Medicare benefits.2
One way to deal with the implicit debts of an inherited elderly entitlement system is to recognize the debt by making it explicit, while at
the same time making current and future working generations pay for
servicing the newly recognized debt. It has been shown in several contexts that, when the additional taxes raised to service the additional
debt are taken into account and when the debt management taxes are
scheduled in such a way that the total debt (explicit and implicit)
schedule remains unchanged after prefunding, the true rate of return
that each generation can get from a prefunded system would be the
same low rate of return implicit in any previously existing generation-
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transfer system. Moreover, it has been found in these contexts that prefunding of an existing pay-as-you-go system with transition costs
financed through the issuance of additional external debt cannot make
any difference in the nation’s capital stock.3 Thus, a nation cannot borrow its way out of the debt implicit in a generation-transfer-financed
elderly entitlement system.
If a nation cannot borrow its way out of the accrued debt, is there
any alternative to simply sticking with the status quo? One way to deal
with the accrued Medicare debt is to bite the bullet and raise taxes
immediately by an amount sufficient to amortize the entirety of future
promised benefits. Most Social Security privatization proposals in the
United States have adopted this way of financing the transition cost.
As admitted in these proposals, however, it is often the case that the
long-run (and overall) benefits of a transition financed by immediate
tax increases come only at a cost to the initial working generations.
Although some studies have claimed an efficiency gain from following
this type of transition path, using a criterion of discounted present
value (Feldstein 1995, for example), a comparison between gains to
one generation and costs to another generation must resort to an
across-generation welfare function. Moreover, as pointed out by Mariger (1997), any alleged efficiency gain from a privatization, followed
by the non-neutral debt management taxes intended to deal with the
newly created debt, can be accomplished by bringing forward the debt
retirement schedule with respect to the existing explicit debt and leaving the pay-as-you-go system intact.
The assessment of the efficiency gain from prefunding Medicare
that is based solely on rate-of-return comparisons is open to criticism.
The criticism applies to the argument that the private option should be
more attractive because the rate of return from private investments is
larger than the growth rate, as well as to the more sophisticated version
that, with the transition cost taken into account, the rate of return one
can get by investing one’s Medicare contributions in the private sector
would be the same rate one would get from the pay-as-you-go system.
As pointed out by Murphy and Welch (1998), incentives do matter.
Factors that may change incentives and have efficiency consequences
include alternative tax bases, higher national saving, and a lower marginal tax rate on labor income from privatization.
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In our discussion of the transition in Chapter 6, we simulated the
effect on the capital stock under different assumptions concerning the
financing of the transition. The transition we suggest requires initial
tax payments in excess of currently existing tax but future taxes that
are much lower than those that would exist if Medicare benefits are
paid with contemporaneous taxes. Thus, it is not a Pareto-improving
transition. While future generations will be better off as a result of the
larger capital stock they will inherit, the current generation must give
up current consumption to generate this larger capital stock.4

SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PREFUNDING
While the issues surrounding the movement to prepaid financing
are the same for Social Security and Medicare, certain very important
differences should be noted in how the resulting accounts must be
managed. Our approach to Medicare is to have recipients purchase, at
the time of retirement, a long-term health policy that has certain minimum characteristics. Thus, in contrast to Social Security, all retirees
must have sufficient funds in their Medicare accounts for the purchase
of the required minimum health care coverage. To ensure that the
accounts have this base capital value, the freedom of individuals to
manage their Medicare accounts must be limited. We must accept the
fact that, as a society, we will allow individuals to have very different
levels of general retirement consumption but a much smaller difference
in the level of retirement health care.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Medicare reform we suggest is in a very real sense, apolitical.
We can move to prepaid financing of Medicare and achieve all the benefits of the increased capital stock without affecting the level of redistribution. Our suggested reform is not about redistribution, but about
putting something aside for the future. This does not mean that our
reform is not without political implications. To the extent that mem-
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bers of Congress are aided by the complexity of Medicare and their
ability to micromanage the current system, they lose power by allowing individuals to be in control of their own Medicare accounts. Additionally, the health care industry has a strong interest in the status quo,
under which consumers do not care what health care costs. We must
not lose sight of our ultimate goal while fine-tuning the details of moving to a private-account-based system of financing.

CONCLUSION
In our analysis, we have shown that using reasonable assumptions
concerning male and female earnings distributions and just average
rates of return on investments in our nation’s capital stock, the younger
generations can guarantee their retirement medical expenditures for a
fraction of their current Medicare taxes. Moreover, the transition from
the current system to our system has a much smaller unfunded liability
than maintaining the existing Medicare system. Essentially we achieve
this benefit with real capital. By removing the disincentive to invest
that is inherent in the current generation-transfer system of financing
Medicare, the nation will experience an increase in capital and income.
We rely on this increase in capital to provide some of the additional
resources required to deal with the current system’s unfunded liability.
Moving to prepaid retirement health insurance is just good business.
The pending retirement of the baby boomers looms like a dark
cloud over the present Medicare system. However, by harnessing their
earning power today we can move to a system of prefunded retirement
medical insurance. If we act quickly, we can move all the baby
boomers into the new system. This allows us to begin paying for the
transition while the boomers, who currently account for more than
60% of all federal tax revenues, are still productive members of the
population.
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Notes
1. For an expanded discussion of the issues of the transition from a pay-as-you-go
elderly entitlement system to a prefunded system, see Liu, Rettenmaier, and Saving (2000).
2. The term transition cost has been widely used in policy debates concerning Social
Security reform. In fact, privatization does not generate any additional cost—at
least not the kind of cost captured by this term, but serves only to bring the
implicit government debts in terms of accrued benefits in the pay-as-you-go system to the surface.
3. See Murphy and Welch (1998), Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998), and
Mariger (1997) for discussions of this point.
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APPENDIX A: Appendix to Chapter 3
We write the common preference function for individual born in period t as
Eq. A.1 U = U (ctt , ctt +1 ),
where ctt and ctt +1 are, respectively, consumption in period t and consumption
in period t + 1. Assume that each individual has one unit of labor to supply in
the first period of life and then retires in the second period. On the production
side, assume common individual production functions that, given the one unit
of labor available in period t and using capital purchased from the retired generation, permit the production of output that can be designated on a once-andfor-all basis as either capital or consumption. Denote this production function
as
Eq. A.2 yt = f(kt),
where yt and kt are, respectively, the output and the capital stock purchased by
the representative individual in period t.1 Because output can be capital or consumption, at any point in time individuals can add to their stock of purchased
capital by consuming less, so that behavior is constrained by
Eq. A.3

yt = ctt + Pt kt + ∆kt + f ( kt ).

where Pt is the period-t price of capital in terms of consumption units and ∆kt
is the contemporaneous production of capital. Assuming a constant rate of capital depreciation δ, consumption in period t + 1 for generation-t individuals is
Eq. A.4

ctt +1 = Pt +1[kt + ( ∆kt − δkt )] .

To maximize lifetime utility, the representative consumer of generation t
decides at the beginning of time t how much productive capital to purchase (kt)
and how much additional capital to produce (∆kt), which then determines consumption at t + 1 given the capital prices in both periods. Note that in choosing
kt and ∆kt, current and future consumption ctt and ctt +1 are simultaneously determined through the budget constraints in Eq. A.3 and Eq. A.4. The first-order
conditions governing the choice of ∆kt and kt are derived as follows.
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First, the choice of the pair kt, ∆kt must be such that
Uc t +1

Eq. A.5

t

Uc t
t

=

1 .
Pt +1

Although the choice of kt can be determined as another first-order condition of
the individual’s maximization problem, we find the following alternative (but
equivalent) approach to be more intuitive. Since the supply of kt is fixed and
determined exogenously by the aggregate capital stock left over from generation t – 1 and the population of generation t, the price of capital is determined
by the marginal willingness to pay by members of generation t.
The marginal value of capital to members of generation t is in two parts: the
marginal productivity of capital in producing current consumption and the consumption value of capital carried over to the second period. One unit of purchased capital after depreciation purchases (1 – δ)Pt + 1 units of future
consumption, and when used to produce output yields the net marginal productivity of capital in units of present consumption. Thus, the price of capital at
any time t must be
Pt = f ′( kt ) + (1 − δ ) Pt +1V t +1 ,

Eq. A.6

ct

where V t+1 is the value of future consumption in terms of present consumpct

tion, which must be equal to ⎛ U t +1 / U t ⎞ .. By applying Eq. A.5 and solving for
⎝ ct
ct ⎠
the price of capital, Eq. A.6 becomes
Eq. A.7

Pt = f ′( kt ) + 1 − δ .

For a constant-population-growth economy, the steady-state solution for
this model requires that the per capita capital stock and the price of capital be
constant. Denoting the constant growth rate of population as n, the per capita
capital stock at t is related to that at t + 1 as
Eq. A.8

kt +1 =

kt + ∆kt − δkt
.
1+ n

The steady state requires that ∆kt – δkt = nkt and that Pt +1 = Pt. Because we
are interested in considering generation size shock and because the fertility rate
in the developed world is less than the population-sustaining rate, we will concentrate most of our discussion below on a zero population growth rate.2
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Given that the economy is in the steady state, the following three equations
characterize the prepaid retirement equilibrium,
Eq. A.9a

⎛ c t +1 ⎞
c t +1
ctt + ctt +1 = f ⎜ t ⎟ − δ t
P
⎝ P ⎠

Eq. A.9b

Uc t +1
t

Uc t

=

1
P

t

Eq. A.9c

⎛ c t +1 ⎞
P = f ′⎜ t ⎟ + 1 − δ .
⎝ P ⎠

Equations A.9 fully characterize the steady-state competitive equilibrium level
of ctt , ctt +1 and P, with kt = ctt +1 / P being the equilibrium per capita capital
stock.3
LUMP-SUM INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS
Consider a per-capita lump-sum tax, T, imposed on generation t, (the working generation) and distributed to generation t – 1 (the retired generation). This
lump-sum-tax-financed intergenerational transfer requires changing budget
constraints (Eq. A.3) and (Eq. A.4) respectively to
Eq. A.3´

ctt + Pt kt + ∆kt = f ( kt ) − T

and
Eq. A.4´

ctt +1 = Pt +1[kt + ( ∆kt − δkt )] + T .

Accordingly, the steady-state equilibrium characterizing conditions become
Eq. A.10a

Eq. A10.b

⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
⎛ ctt +1 − T ⎞
ctt + ctt +1 = f ⎜ t
−
δ
⎟
⎜ P
⎟
⎝ PT ⎠
⎝
⎠
T
Uc t +1
t

Uc t
t

Eq. A10.c

=

1
PT

⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
PT − f ′⎜ t
⎟ +1− δ ,
⎝ PT ⎠
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where PT denotes the equilibrium price of capital under a lump-sum-tax-financed transfer.
The economic effects and welfare implications of a lump-sum intergenerational transfer amounts to a comparison of Eqs. A.10 with Eqs. A.9. By comparing Eq. A.9c and Eq. A.10c, it is easily shown that, under fairly normal
assumptions on preferences and technology, an intergenerational transfer
from the young to the old always reduces the equilibrium capital stock; hence,
PT > P.4 This finding is consistent with empirical and theoretical work done
by Feldstein (1974, 1985) and Kotlikoff (1979).
INCOME-TAX-BASED INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS
When an intergenerational transfer of size T per person is financed through
a proportional income tax τ, the steady-state equilibrium characterizing conditions become
Eq. A.11a

Eq. A.11b

⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
⎛ ctt +1 − T ⎞
ctt + ctt +1 = f ⎜ t
⎟ − δ ⎜ t +1 ⎟
⎝ ct
⎠
⎝ Pτ ⎠
Uc t +1
t

Uc t
t

Eq. A.11c

Eq. A.11d

=

1
Pτ

⎡ ⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
⎤
Pτ = 1 + (1 − τ )⎢ f ′⎜ t
− δ⎥
⎟
⎢⎣ ⎝ Pτ ⎠
⎥⎦
⎡ ⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
ctt +1 − T ⎤
τ⎢ f ⎜ t
δ
−
⎥=T,
⎟
Pτ ⎥⎦
⎢⎣ ⎝ Pτ ⎠

where Pτ is the steady-state equilibrium price of capital when the intergenerational transfer is financed by an income tax.
The relative performance of the income-tax-financed intergenerational
transfer against the laissez-faire and lump-sum-tax-financed transfer is, of
course, determined by the solution to Eqs. A.11 as compared with Eqs. A.9 and
Eqs. A.10, respectively. What is of most importance is to establish that an intergenerational transfer, regardless of its financing method, is always welfare reducing. It can be rigorously proved that Pτ > P, so that in the income tax
world, the equilibrium price of capital is greater than the laissez-faire world
price of capital.
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LABOR SUPPLY EFFECTS
Denote the level of leisure demanded during an individual’s working period
as l t and rewrite the individual’s preferences as
Eq. A.12

U = U (ctt , ctt +1 , l t ) .

The per capita output is now
Eq. A.13

⎛ k ⎞
(1 − l t ) f ⎜ t ⎟ ,
⎝ 1 − lt ⎠

where kt is the per capita capital stock.5
In a world without any transfer, the budget constraints facing a representative generation-t individual are
Eq. A.14
and

⎛ k ⎞
ctt + Pt kt + ∆kt = (1 − l t ) f ⎜ t ⎟
⎝ 1 − lt ⎠

[

]

ctt +1 = Pt +1 kt + ( ∆kt − δkt ) .

Proceeding to the steady state, the following equations characterize the equilibrium values of the relevant variables:
Eq. A.15a

Eq. A.15b

k ⎞
ctt + ctt +1 = (1 − l) f ⎛
− δk
⎝ 1 − l⎠
U

ctt +1

U

Eq. A.15c

U1t
Ut
ct

ctt

=

1
P

k ⎞ ⎛ k ⎞ ⎛ k ⎞
= f⎛
f′
−
⎝ 1 − l⎠ ⎝ 1 − l⎠ ⎝ 1 − l⎠
⎛ k ⎞
+ (1 − δ )
⎝ 1− l⎠

Eq. A.15d

P= f′

Eq. A.15e

ctt+1 = Pk.

We should note here that, without loss of generality, we can define the labor
supplied in equilibrium as 1. Thus, the equilibrium conditions for this problem
are identical to those for the problem considered above once the optimal labor
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supply is determined. We shall use this characteristic of the equilibrium in the
discussion below.
The two critical characterizing equations for the steady state with an intergenerational transfer of size T that is financed by lump-sum tax are
Eq. A.16a

⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞ ⎛ ctt +1 − T ⎞ ⎛ ctt +1 − T ⎞
Ul
= f⎜ t
⎟
⎟ f ′⎜
⎟ −⎜
Uc t
⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠
t

Eq. A.16b

⎡ ⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
⎤
− δ⎥ ,
PT = 1 + ⎢ f ′⎜ t
⎟
⎢⎣ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠
⎥⎦

and the corresponding equations for that financed by an income tax are
Eq. A.16c

⎡ ⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞ ⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞ ⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞ ⎤
Ut
t
t
= (1 − τ)⎢ f ⎜ t
⎟⎥
⎟ f ′⎜
⎟ −⎜
Uc t
⎢⎣ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎥⎦
t

Eq. A.16d

⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
Pτ = (1 − τ) f ′⎜ t
⎟ − τδ + (1 − δ ) .
⎝ Pτ (1 − l) ⎠

Given the level of labor supplied in the prepaid world, L̂ , it follows that
PTLˆ > PTLˆ > P and that kTLˆ < kTLˆ < k . Consider Eqs. A.16a and A.16b. The
transfer-induced reduction in the capital stock reduces the marginal product
of labor, the right-hand side of Eq. A.16a, and therefore reduces labor supplied. As a result, there is a further reduction in the capital stock that increases the welfare cost of the transfer.
Given that the production function is homogeneous, the payments to labor
(the payroll) can be expressed as
Eq. A.17

YL ≡ (1 − l) f

⎛ k ⎞ ⎛ k ⎞ ⎛ k ⎞,
f′
−
⎝ 1− l⎠ ⎝ 1− l⎠ ⎝1− l⎠

so that the tax rate on payroll, τL, must be such that
Eq. A.18

⎡
⎛ k ⎞ ⎛ k ⎞ ⎛ k ⎞⎤ .
T = τ L ⎢(1 − l) f
f′
−
⎝ 1 − l ⎠ ⎝ 1 − l ⎠ ⎝ 1 − l ⎠ ⎥⎦
⎣

From Eqs. A.17 and A.18, the relevant subset of equilibrium conditions are
Eq. A.19a

⎡ ⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞ ⎛ ctt +1 − T ⎞ ⎛ ctt +1 − T ⎞ ⎤
Ul
= (1 − τ L )⎢ f ⎜ t
⎟⎥
⎟ −⎜
⎟ f ′⎜
Ut
PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎥⎦
⎝
⎢
⎣
c
t

2

⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
− τL⎜ t
f ′′⎜ t
⎟
⎟
⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠
⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠
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⎡ ⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞
⎛ c t +1 − T ⎞ ⎛ ctt +1 − T ⎞ ⎤
+ τL⎜ t
PL = ⎢ f ′⎜ t
⎟ ⎥ + (1 − δ ).
⎟ f ′′⎜
⎟
⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎝ PT (1 − l) ⎠ ⎥⎦
⎢⎣ ⎝ Pτ (1 − l) ⎠

Unfortunately, a closed-form solution for the price of capital and the equilibrium stock of capital is beyond this chapter. However, a comparison of the income tax equilibrium characterizing equations from Eq. 3.16 with Eq. 3.19
yields some insight to the solution. First, payroll is less than total income, τL > τ.
Second, the derivative of payroll with respect to the capital stock is − kf ′′ , which
is positive. Therefore, if the equilibrium price of capital remained the same with
the income tax and the payroll tax, the payroll-tax capital stock would have to
exceed the income-tax capital stock.
Notes
1. Consistent with the current literature, the production function is assumed to be
derived from a linear homogeneous function in capital and labor, which can be
written as yt = LtF(kt,1) = ƒ(kt), because Lt ≡ 1.
2. We are treating both population size and fertility as exogenous. Below, we discuss population size shocks but not fertility shocks. An interesting paper that
treats fertility as endogenous is Barro and Becker (1989). The literature also contains discussions of optimal population growth rates (Samuelson 1975, 1976;
Deardorff 1976; Gigliotti 1983; Eckstein and Woplin 1985; Nerlove, Razin, and
Sadka 1987; Lopez-Garcia 1991).
3. While the social planner’s problem would result in maximizing ctt + ctt +1 , which
requires that f ′ = δ , there is no guarantee that the competitive solution will attain
this result. As we shall show below, however, any implementation of transfers by
a social planner result in a reduction in the per capita capital stock and community
welfare.
4. In particular, the assumption of the absence of perverse time preference, defined
as a preference for the future when consumption in both periods is equal, is sufficient but not necessary for this result.
5. Production specification Eq. A.13 captures the dependence of output on the labor
supplied and the capital/labor ratio, and it is derived from a linearly homogeneous
aggregate production function.
6. We should note here that this expression for labor income internalizes the effect of
the choice of capital and the marginal product of capital. An alternative would
have to impose the market price of capital in the expression for the payments to
k ⎞
⎧
⎫
capital. In this form, T = τ L ⎨(1 − l) f ⎛
− [( P − 1) + δ ]k ⎬, and in the case of
⎝1− l⎠
⎩
⎭
fixed labor supply, the payroll tax has the same effect on the capital stock as a
lump-sum tax. However, when labor is endogenous, this form of payroll tax is
superior to the lump-sum tax.
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APPENDIX B: Appendix to Chapter 4
THE MATHEMATICS OF THE PREPAID MEDICARE
CONTRIBUTION RATE
The contribution rate required to provide for the retired health care needs of
a cohort of age a0 can be written as
119 − a0

∑

Eq. B.1 Ca =
0

Pa0 ,t ba0 ,t

t
t = 65 − a0 (1 + r )
64 − a0 P b
a0 , t a0 , t
∑
(
1 + r )t
t −0

where

a0

= the cohort’s age at the beginning of the transition to a prefunded

Medicare program
= the percentage of remaining lifetime earnings that must be saved
0
to purchase retirement medical insurance given age a0;
Pa , t = the probability of surviving to year t for an individual of age a0;
0
ba , t = the mean real retirement medical care insurance premium for
0
cohort a0 in year t;
r
= real interest rate;
ya , t = the mean real income for cohort a0 in year t.
0
Given this interpretation, Pa ,t = ∏ ta=0 a+ t Si , where si is the probability of sur0
0
Ca

viving from agei to agei+1. In effect, Ca is the tax rate that must be applied to
0
mean cohort member’s income in order to fund the retirement medical benefits
of the cohort a0.
The numerator of Eq. B.1 is the expected present value of the average retirement medical insurance benefits for members of a cohort, and the denominator
is the expected present value of the average cohort member’s income. The ratio of these two yields the appropriate tax rate for funding all members of a cohort of age a0. The older the cohort at the time transition begins, the greater the
contribution rate that is required to fund a given level of retirement Medicare
benefits, for three reasons. First, the number of years of potential benefits is
fixed because the calculation is for individuals who are less than 65 years of
age. Thus, as a0 rises, each future benefit is discounted by a smaller discount
factor. Second, as a0 rises, the number of years with earnings falls because the

157

158

Appendix B

cohort approaches retirement. Finally, as a0 rises, the survival probabilities for
retirement benefits rise.
FORECASTING THE TOTAL TAX BASE
To forecast the total tax base and, ultimately, the cohort profiles required for
the contribution rate estimates, we rely on the following accounting. We begin
with the aggregate annual earnings components for either men or women identified as
Eq. B.2 Yijt = Nijt Pijt Hijt Wijt ,
in which
i
= one of 12 age groups: 16–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44,
45–49, 50–54, 55–59, 60–64, 65–69, or 70–75;
j
= categories for years of education, 0–11, 12, 13–15, 16, and 17+;
t
= the year;
Yijt = annual earnings;
Nijt = the number of individuals;
Pijt = the proportion participating;
Hijt = the average annual hours (conditional on participation), and
Wijt = the average hourly wage (conditional on participation) for age
group i and education cell j in period t.
With 12 age groups and 5 education cells for each sex, we have 120 age × education × sex cells. Omitting the cells for age group 16–19 in the education
categories of college graduates and graduate school results in 116 age × education × sex cells.
THE THEORY UNDERLYING OUR GROWTH RATE
CALCULATIONS
Time-Period Proportional Weights
Time-period proportional weights are formed by the ratio of the specific
time period over the total time period of the data. For example, for a sample of
T and the first period
T periods, the most recent period gets a weight of

∑ tT=1 t

gets a weight of

1

. By construction, the sum of the time-period propor-

∑ tT=1 t
tional weights is 1. Because the CPS data spans 33 years, we will have 32
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growth rates, the first receiving a weight of 0.00189 and the last, for the 1994–
1995 change, weighted by 0.06061 (32 times the size of the first period’s
weight). The proportional weights compare with the equal weight of 0.03125
that is implied in a simple average of the growth rates. Equation B.3 below calculates the weighted average hourly wages expressed in logarithms using
weights that are proportional to the time period.
T

t

t =1

∑ tT=1 t

Eq. B.3 gw = ∑ ω t gw , ω t =
p
t

, gwt = Wt − Wt −1,

where gw p is the proportionally weighted average wage growth rate, ωt is the
weighting factor in time period t, and W is the wage. For simplicity, in this
equation, the age and education subscripts are dropped. However, in our work
we calculate a different growth rate for each age by education category.
Geometric Weighted Growth Rates
Geometric weights, an alternative to proportional weights, also weight recent annual growth rates more heavily. In Eq. B.4, β = (1 + d), where d is the
“discount” factor applied to the growth rates.
T

Eq. B.4 gwG1 = ∑ ω t gwt , ω t =
t =1

(β − 1)β t
, gwt = Wt − Wt −1 .
β(β T − 1)

The growth between the first and second period when (d = 0.05) is assigned a
weight of 0.0133, and the most recent growth rate is assigned a weight of
0.0603. As with the proportional weights, the geometric weights sum to 1.
Geometric Weights Levels
We consider a final geometric weighted growth rate, introduced by Murphy
and Welch (1992), which is applied to annual levels rather than annual changes. In Eqs. B.3 and B.4, the annual changes in the earnings component are differentially weighted by the degree to which we believe more-recent experience
matters. This is an important characteristic of these weights if one considers
the relatively flat real earnings for men since 1974 or the path of women’s real
earnings to be persistent trends. The growth rate presented in Eq. B.5 again relies on geometric weights, but rather than weighting annual changes like gw p
and gw do, the most recent earnings component is compared with a geometG1

rically weighted average of lagged values, with the earnings component expressed again in natural logs. This growth rate is one of two components of the
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overall growth rate; the other is gwT = (WT − W0 ) / T , which is the average
growth rate based on the first and the last points in the data. In the in-sample
forecasts in Table B.1, the growth rate calculated using Eq. B.5 with β = 1.05
produces the best overall projections,
⎛ WT − WL ⎞
⎟
L
⎝
⎠

Eq. B.5 gwG2 = ⎜

1 − ω 0T
is the average lag, which is equal to 12.5 when T = 32 and
ωT − ω0
β = 1.05, and WL is a weighted average of the lagged values of the hourly wage
as defined below, where k is the lag length:
where L =

WL =

1
∑ T (ω T +1− k − ω T − k )WT − k .
( ω T − ω 0 ) k =1

The relationship between gG1 , gT , gG2 can be written as
gG1 = (1 − ω 0 T )gG 2 + ω 0 TgT .
Thus, if growth over the entire time period exceeds growth over the recent past,
then gG2 will produce the more conservative estimates.
MEASURES OF FORECAST ACCURACY
Table B.1 quantifies the accuracy of each forecast using the root-meansquared error (RMSE) defined for wages (not expressed in logs) for the 1986–
1995 forecast,

∑ t =1986 (Wt − Wˆt )2 .
1995

RMSE =

10

The top section of Table B.1 presents the RMSE values for the 1986–1995
participation, annual hours, hourly wage, and annual earnings forecasts for
men and women. The bottom section presents the RMSE values for the forecasts over the last five years of data. As expected from the series depicted in
Figure 4.2, across all growth rates and for both in-sample forecast periods, the
women’s estimates are more accurate than the men’s when the annual earnings
are compared. For the first set of in-sample estimates, those using gG2 with β
= 1.05 produce the most accurate participation, wage, and annual earnings projections. The next most accurate forecasts are those based on the gG2 , β = 1.02

Table B.1 Root Mean Squared Errors for Forecast Earnings Components Using Alternative Growth Rate Estimates
Men
Growth ratesa

Women

Participation

Hours

Wage

Annual
earnings

0.0169

32.70c

1.52

2903.99

Participation

Hours

Wage

Annual
earnings

0.0530

13.54

0.52

1809.73

1986 to 1995 Forecastb
0.0083

33.17

0.82

1505.86

0.0396

15.58

0.26

1283.58

, β = 1.02

0.0143

34.47

1.34

2499.76

0.0499

14.15

0.45

1677.17

, β = 1.05

0.0113

33.77

1.10

2016.29

0.0457

15.42

0.36

1520.14

, β = 1.02

0.0079

36.38

0.71

1257.92

0.0385

17.04

0.21

1209.86

, β = 1.05

0.0079

35.02

0.66

1211.19

0.0374

18.29

0.20

1198.63

0.0227

27.36

0.76

1822.18

0.0383

19.23

0.32

1206.65

0.0154

31.38

0.50

1302.90

0.0277

19.10

0.16

826.61

1991 to 1995 Forecastd

a

, β = 1.02

0.0215

27.40

0.68

1666.36

0.0361

19.70

0.28

1120.20

, β = 1.05

0.0202

27.27

0.59

1502.57

0.0332

20.43

0.23

1009.54

, β = 1.02

0.0178

27.53

0.52

1346.99

0.0297

21.13

0.17

868.89

, β = 1.05

0.0179

27.19

0.51

1322.98

0.0287

21.52

0.16

839.51
is based
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is the growth rate based on the endpoints in each series,
is based on proportional weights applied to annual changes,
on geometric weights applied to annual changes, and
is based on geometric weights applied to annual levels.
b Using growth rates estimated from 1963 to 1985.
c Bolded values are minimum root mean squared errors in each column for each forecast.
d Using growth rates estimated from 1963 to 1990.
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pair, followed by the forecasts which rely on the proportionally weighted
growth rates, g p . In the second set of forecasts, the proportional weights were
most accurate. Based on these results, we will limit our projections in the following sections to include only those based on growth rates, g p and gG2 with
a β of 1.05.
DECISION RULES FOR ADJUSTING FORECAST MALE/FEMALE
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Let Ww,ijt (Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) and Wm,ijt (Fm,ijt, Hm,ijt) be the real wages (labor force
participation rate, hours worked) associated with age/education category ij, at
time t, for women and men, respectively, and let gw m,ij ( gf m,ij , gh m,ij ) be the
growth rate of wages (labor force participation rate, hours worked) for males
in age/education category ij. Then Decision Rules 1 and 2 can be written as
Decision Rule 1. If Ww,ijt (Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) first exceeds Wm,ijt (Fm,ijt,
Hm,ijt) in period t*, and if gw m,ij ( gf m,ij , gh m,ij ) > 0 , then Ww,ijt
(Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) is set equal to Wm,ijt (Fm,ijt, Hm,ijt) for all t ≥ t*. If
Ww,ijt (Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) first exceeds Wm,ijt (Fm,ijt, Hm,ijt) in period t*,
and if gw m,ij ( gf m,ij , gh m,ij ) > 0 , then Ww,ijt (Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) and Wm,ijt
(Fm,ijt, Hm,ijt) are set equal to Wm,ijt* (Fm,ijt*, Hm,ijt*) for all t ≥ t*.
Decision Rule 2. If Ww,ijt (Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) > 0.95 × Wm,ijt (Fm,ijt, Hm,ijt),
in any period t, then Ww,ijt (Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) is set equal to 0.95 × Wm,ijt
(Fm,ijt, Hm,ijt) for that period t.
The same decision rule applies to real wages, labor force participation rates,
and hours worked.
Given these two decision rules, whenever Decision Rule 1 applies, Decision
Rule 2 would also apply, so that a value of Ww,ijt (Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) that invokes Decision Rule 1 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for Decision Rule 2 being invoked. However, applying Decision Rule 2 is necessary but not a
sufficient condition for Decision Rule 1 to apply. As a result, the level of the
forecast for Ww,ijt (Fw,ijt, Hw,ijt) using Decision Rule 2 is less than or equal to the
forecast obtained using Decision Rule 1 and strictly less than the Decision Rule
1 forecast when Decision Rule 2 is invoked.
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FORECAST CROSS-SECTIONAL AND LONGITUDINAL
AGE/EARNINGS PROFILES
Table B.2 gives in detail for each age and sex the actual forecast for average
annual earnings. The left side of the table contains cross-sectional age/earnings
profiles that we forecast for the years 2010 and 2020. For each of these years,
each age is associated with a specific birth cohort. For example, the 22-yearold in 2010 is a member of the 1988 birth cohort and the 64-year-old in 2010
is a member of the 1946 birth cohort. The right side of the table contains longitudinal age earnings forecasts for the 1965 and 1975 birth cohorts. For each
year of age for a member of the 1965 birth cohort, we show our forecast of average annual earnings by sex. The entries for the 1965 birth cohort before age
31 are all blank because the average annual earnings for the ages younger than
31 are observations from our CPS data set rather than forecasts of the future,
because in 1995 (the last year for which we have data), a member of the 1965
birth cohort was 30 years of age. There are entries for all ages for the 1975 birth
cohort because a member of the 1975 birth cohort would be 22 years of age until 1997, two years after our last data observation. By comparing the forecast
average annual earnings contained in the longitudinal age earnings profile to
those in the cross sections, the convergence of female average annual earnings
toward the male average annual earnings is quite apparent.

Cross sections
2010
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Table B.2 Forecast Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Cohort Age/Earnings Profilesa ($)
Longitudinal by birth cohorts
2020

1965
Men

1975

Age

Men

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

22

10,176

6,348

10,083

5,995

Women

10,657

6,886

23

11,952

7,955

11,647

7,716

12,576

8,217

24

13,666

9,442

13,138

9,293

14,409

9,491

25

15,398

10,901

14,707

10,893

16,201

10,764

26

17,180

12,438

16,413

12,688

17,987

12,099

27

18,991

14,023

18,215

14,625

19,762

13,486

28

20,798

15,582

20,051

16,572

21,512

14,882

29

22,604

17,065

21,932

18,458

23,239

16,267

30

24,470

18,472

23,970

20,282

24,997

17,649

31

26,425

19,821

26,214

22,067

27,564

15,783

26,829

19,043

32

28,434

21,113

28,597

23,798

29,097

16,686

28,737

20,438

33

30,449

22,300

31,032

25,392

30,702

17,608

30,697

21,798

34

32,424

23,309

33,437

26,728

32,324

18,532

32,679

23,058

35

34,325

24,062

35,762

27,690

33,933

19,435

34,658

24,130

36

36,134

24,569

37,995

28,298

35,509

20,276

36,618

24,992

37

37,832

24,911

40,118

28,686

37,031

21,037

38,530

25,689

38

39,368

25,134

42,053

28,922

38,456

21,721

40,335

26,260

39

40,673

25,252

43,683

29,023

39,737

22,336

41,949

26,721

40

41,680

25,267

44,888

28,990

40,831

22,886

43,263

27,072

41

42,384

25,194

45,653

28,839

41,689

23,361

44,239

27,319

42

42,835

25,077

46,065

28,633

42,301

23,769

44,919

27,508

43

43,078

24,962

46,197

28,434

42,698

24,143

45,351

27,688

44

43,151

24,888

46,106

28,300

42,928

24,514

45,583

27,911

45

43,090

24,879

45,839

28,266

43,032

24,895

45,646

28,212

46

42,923

24,911

45,439

28,303

43,034

25,273

45,570

28,566

47

42,685

24,925

44,962

28,330

42,968

25,637

45,398

28,898

48

42,404

24,896

44,466

28,313

42,869

25,977

45,181

29,172

49

42,109

24,813

44,007

28,243

42,760

26,277

44,983

29,382

50

41,825

24,668

43,641

28,114

42,653

26,514

44,877

29,546

51

41,533

24,444

43,342

27,908

42,556

26,665

44,853

29,656

52

41,175

24,112

43,014

27,584

42,457

26,700

44,817

29,666

53

40,693

23,644

42,580

27,104

42,299

26,574

44,684

29,522

54

40,034

22,997

41,943

26,406

42,002

26,248

44,334

29,121

55

39,144

22,105

40,952

25,382

41,430

25,636

43,561

28,276

56

37,994

20,950

39,532

24,004

40,349

24,578

42,264

26,924

57

36,557

19,572

37,693

22,330

38,676

23,042

40,450

25,134

58

34,831

18,021

35,482

20,444

36,463

21,132

38,180

23,024

59

32,846

16,353

32,969

18,429

33,808

18,988

35,555

20,700

60

30,653

14,612

30,261

16,343

30,869

16,722

32,747

18,242
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Table B.2 (continued)
Cross sections
2010

a

Longitudinal by birth cohorts
2020

1965

1975

Age

Men

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

61

28,302

12,831

27,461

14,233

27,896

14,412

29,894

15,717

62

25,877

11,069

24,694

12,173

25,082

12,174

27,136

13,247

63

23,445

9,398

22,075

10,258

22,568

10,158

24,581

10,978

64

21,056

7,884

19,690

8,572

20,440

8,487

22,287

9,037

The table series are the smoothed versions of the forecasted series that appear in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. The cross-sectional series are
smoothed within the cross section, and the birth cohort series are smoothed within the birth cohort.
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